Emmanuel Kant
Pour Kant, nous ne pouvons connaître le monde que tel qu’il nous apparaît – et la morale vient de la raison, non des sentiments ni des récompenses.
Repères
Révolution copernicienne : ce n’est pas la connaissance qui se règle sur les objets, ce sont les objets qui se règlent sur notre connaissance.
Idées clés
- Impératif catégorique
- Idéalisme transcendantal
- Jugement synthétique a priori
- Les Lumières comme sortie de l’état de minorité
Élèves: Johann Gottfried von Herder
Ouvrir dans la carte stellaire
Influence
Influences reçues de 5
Isaac Newton
influencé par ✓
Kant’s Universal Natural History (1755) explained the origin of the planetary system by Newtonian attraction plus a repulsive force, a question Newton had left to God. I. Kant, Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (1755); SEP “Kant’s Philosophy of Science”
Isaac Newton › 1643–1727
Francis Hutcheson
influencé par ✓
In the Prize Essay (1764) Kant saw in Hutcheson’s ‘moral feeling’ a promising start towards the first material principles of morality, before developing his ethics of reason. I. Kant, Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral (1764); SEP “Kant’s Moral Philosophy”
Francis Hutcheson › 1694–1746
Jean-Jacques Rousseau
influencé par ✓
In his Remarks on the Observations (1764–65) Kant wrote that Rousseau had set him right: he learned to honour human beings, not only to prize knowledge. I. Kant, Bemerkungen in den “Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen” (1764–65); SEP “Kant’s Moral Philosophy”
Jean-Jacques Rousseau › 1712–1778
Adam Smith
influencé par
Marcus Herz called Smith Kant’s ‘favourite’ (letter of 1771); S. Fleischacker traces echoes of the Theory of Moral Sentiments in Kant’s moral philosophy. M. Herz to I. Kant, 9 July 1771; S. Fleischacker, “Philosophy in Moral Practice: Kant and Adam Smith”, Kant-Studien (1991)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Adam Smith › 1723–1790
Edmund Burke
influencé par
Kant’s Critique of Judgement (1790) cited Burke’s Enquiry as the leading empirical, ‘physiological’ account of the sublime and the beautiful, which Kant sought to ground transcendentally. I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790), General Remark on the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgements; E. Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757; Ger. tr. 1773)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Edmund Burke › 1729–1797
A influencé 56
Søren Kierkegaard
a influencé ✓
According to Ronald M. Green, Kierkegaard’s ethics and view of sin and grace answer Kant’s Religion, a debt he rarely named (Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, 1992). R. M. Green, Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt (1992); I. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793)
Søren Kierkegaard › 1813–1855
Karl Marx
a influencé
In a letter to his father (1837) Marx described building a philosophy of law on the idealism of Kant and Fichte before he turned to Hegel. K. Marx, letter to Heinrich Marx, 10–11 November 1837 (MEW Ergänzungsband 1; MECW 1)
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Karl Marx › 1818–1883
Edmund Husserl
a influencé ✓
Husserl took up Kant’s transcendental question (Ideas I, 1913) but faulted his constructions not drawn from intuition (‘Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie’, 1924; Krisis, 1936). E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie I (1913); “Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie” (1924; publ. 1956); Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften (1936); SEP “Edmund Husserl”
Edmund Husserl › 1859–1938
Martin Heidegger
a influencé ✓
Heidegger read the Critique of Pure Reason as grounding metaphysics in finite knowledge, rooted in the transcendental imagination (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 1929). M. Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929); Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (lectures 1927–28; publ. 1977); SEP “Martin Heidegger”
Martin Heidegger › 1889–1976
Michel Foucault
a influencé ✓
Foucault translated Kant’s Anthropology for his secondary thesis (1961) and later read ‘What is Enlightenment?’ as the start of a critical ontology of ourselves (‘What is Enlightenment?’, 1984). M. Foucault, Introduction à l’Anthropologie de Kant (1961; publ. 2008); I. Kant, Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique, trans. M. Foucault (1964); M. Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, in P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (1984); SEP “Michel Foucault”
Michel Foucault › 1926–1984
Jürgen Habermas
a influencé ✓
Habermas recast Kant’s categorical imperative as a principle of universalisation that norms must pass in real discourse among all those affected (Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln, 1983). J. Habermas, “Diskursethik – Notizen zu einem Begründungsprogramm”, in Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln (1983); SEP “Jürgen Habermas”
Jürgen Habermas › 1929–2026
Tout afficher (56)Afficher moins
Johann Gottlieb Fichte
a influencé ✓
Fichte’s Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation (1792), published anonymously, was taken for Kant’s; his Wissenschaftslehre (1794) sought to derive Kant’s results from a single principle. J. G. Fichte, Versuch einer Critik aller Offenbarung (1792); Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (1794); SEP “Johann Gottlieb Fichte”
Attestation: aussi dans Wikidata · Wikidata
Johann Gottlieb Fichte › 1762–1814
Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher
a influencé
Schleiermacher’s early essays On the Highest Good (1789) and On Freedom (1790–92) worked through Kant’s ethics, rejecting its linking of virtue and happiness in the highest good. F. Schleiermacher, Über das höchste Gut (1789); Über die Freiheit (1790–92); SEP “Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher › 1768–1834
Friedrich Hölderlin
a influencé
Hölderlin studied Kant from his Tübingen years and, writing to his brother (1799), called him ‘the Moses of our nation’, leading it out of Egyptian slackness. F. Hölderlin, letter to his brother Karl Gok, 1 Jan. 1799
Attestation: brouillon IA
Friedrich Hölderlin › 1770–1843
Frédéric Schlegel
a influencé
In his Essay on the Concept of Republicanism (1796) Schlegel took up Kant’s Toward Perpetual Peace (1795) but argued, against Kant, that republicanism is necessarily democratic. F. Schlegel, Versuch über den Begriff des Republikanismus (1796); I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden (1795); SEP “Friedrich Schlegel”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Frédéric Schlegel › 1772–1829
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling
a influencé ✓
In Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1797) Schelling took up Kant’s dynamic theory of matter as attractive and repulsive forces (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, 1786). F. W. J. Schelling, Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797); I. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (1786); SEP “Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling”
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling › 1775–1854
Arthur Schopenhauer
a influencé ✓
Schopenhauer kept Kant’s distinction of appearance and thing in itself, calling the latter will, and appended a Critique of the Kantian Philosophy to his main work (1819). A. Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1819), appendix “Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie”; SEP “Arthur Schopenhauer”
Arthur Schopenhauer › 1788–1860
Ralph Waldo Emerson
a influencé
In ‘The Transcendentalist’ (1842) Emerson traced his movement’s name to Kant’s use of ‘transcendental’, a Kant he knew largely at second hand, through Coleridge and Carlyle. R. W. Emerson, “The Transcendentalist” (1842); SEP “Ralph Waldo Emerson”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Ralph Waldo Emerson › 1803–1882
Wilhelm Dilthey
a influencé ✓
Dilthey called his project a ‘critique of historical reason’, doing for the human sciences what Kant had done for natural science (Introduction to the Human Sciences, 1883). W. Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (1883); SEP “Wilhelm Dilthey”
Wilhelm Dilthey › 1833–1911
Henry Sidgwick
a influencé
In The Methods of Ethics (1874) Sidgwick accepted Kant’s universalisability principle as a self-evident axiom of justice, holding that alone it cannot settle what we ought to do. H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1874); “The Kantian Conception of Free Will”, Mind (1888); SEP “Henry Sidgwick”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Henry Sidgwick › 1838–1900
Charles Sanders Peirce
a influencé
Peirce studied the Critique of Pure Reason for years in his youth and took the name ‘pragmatism’ from Kant’s distinction between pragmatisch and praktisch (‘What Pragmatism Is’, 1905). C. S. Peirce, “What Pragmatism Is”, The Monist (1905); SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Charles Sanders Peirce › 1839–1914
Hermann Cohen
a influencé ✓
In Kant’s Theory of Experience (1871) Cohen read the first Critique as a theory of the conditions of scientific knowledge, starting from the ‘fact’ of mathematical natural science. H. Cohen, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871; 2nd ed. 1885); SEP “Hermann Cohen”
Attestation: aussi dans Wikidata · Wikidata
Hermann Cohen › 1842–1918
Émile Durkheim
a influencé
Durkheim gave Kant’s categories a social origin: time, space and causality derive from collective life, above all religion (Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, 1912). É. Durkheim, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (1912), introduction; S. Lukes, Émile Durkheim: His Life and Work (1973)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Émile Durkheim › 1858–1917
Georg Simmel
a influencé
Simmel recast Kant’s ‘How is nature possible?’ as ‘How is society possible?’, answering with a priori forms through which individuals experience themselves as members of society (Soziologie, 1908). G. Simmel, Soziologie (1908), “Exkurs über das Problem: Wie ist Gesellschaft möglich?”; Kant. Sechzehn Vorlesungen (1904); D. Frisby, Georg Simmel (1984)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Georg Simmel › 1858–1918
David Hilbert
a influencé ✓
Hilbert took Kant’s sentence on intuitions, concepts and ideas as motto of the Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899) and grounded finitism in Kant’s extra-logical content of mathematics (1926). D. Hilbert, Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899); “Über das Unendliche”, Mathematische Annalen 95 (1926); I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/87); SEP “Hilbert’s Program”
Attestation: aussi dans Wikidata · Wikidata
David Hilbert › 1862–1943
Jakob von Uexküll
a influencé
Uexküll applied Kant’s thesis that the forms of perception belong to the subject to animals, each living in its own Umwelt (Theoretische Biologie, 1920). J. von Uexküll, Theoretische Biologie (1920); Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere (1909)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Jakob von Uexküll › 1864–1944
Max Weber
a influencé contesté
Through Rickert’s neo-Kantianism Weber took over Kant’s gulf between is and ought: science cannot ground value judgements, and concepts select from an infinite reality (‘Objectivity’ essay, 1904). M. Weber, “Die ‚Objektivität‘ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis” (1904); SEP “Max Weber”; SEP “Neo-Kantianism”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Max Weber › 1864–1920
Liang Qichao
a influencé
Liang Qichao introduced Kant to Chinese readers via Japanese sources in an essay series of 1903–04, explaining Kant’s moral freedom through Buddhism and Wang Yangming’s innate knowing. Liang Qichao, “Jinshi diyi dazhe Kangde zhi xueshuo”, Xinmin congbao (1903–04); H. Chang, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Intellectual Transition in China (1971)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Liang Qichao › 1873–1929
Ernst Cassirer
a influencé
Cassirer, trained in Marburg Neo-Kantianism, widened Kant’s critique of reason into a critique of culture covering myth, language and science (Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, 1923–29). E. Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen I–III (1923–29); Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff (1910); Kants Leben und Lehre (1918); SEP “Ernst Cassirer”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Ernst Cassirer › 1874–1945
Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya
a influencé
K. C. Bhattacharya started from Kant’s limits of theoretical knowledge but argued in The Subject as Freedom (1930) that the subject is realised through progressive freedom from objectivity. K. C. Bhattacharya, The Subject as Freedom (1930); N. Bhushan & J. L. Garfield (eds.), Indian Philosophy in English (2011)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya › 1875–1949
Albert Einstein
a influencé
Einstein, who read Kant as a schoolboy, held that physical concepts are free creations, not abstracted from experience, but rejected their a priori status (‘Reply to Criticisms’, 1949). A. Einstein, “Reply to Criticisms”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (1949); “Geometrie und Erfahrung” (1921); SEP “Einstein’s Philosophy of Science”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Albert Einstein › 1879–1955
Karl Jaspers
a influencé ✓
Jaspers appended a study of Kant’s doctrine of ideas to his Psychology of Worldviews (1919) and took Kant’s limits of knowledge as the frame of his Philosophy (1932). K. Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (1919), appendix “Kants Ideenlehre”; Philosophie (1932); SEP “Karl Jaspers”
Karl Jaspers › 1883–1969
Rudolf Carnap
a influencé ✓
Carnap kept a Kantian synthetic a priori for the topological structure of intuitive space (Der Raum, 1922); Friedman reads the Aufbau (1928) as recasting neo-Kantian constitution. R. Carnap, Der Raum (1922); Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928); M. Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (1999); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”
Rudolf Carnap › 1891–1970
Walter Benjamin
a influencé
In ‘On the Programme of the Coming Philosophy’ (1918) Benjamin kept Kant’s system as the frame but demanded a higher concept of experience that includes religious experience. W. Benjamin, “Über das Programm der kommenden Philosophie” (written 1917–18, printed 1963); SEP “Walter Benjamin”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Walter Benjamin › 1892–1940
Lucian Blaga
a influencé
Blaga set unconscious ‘abyssal categories’ beside Kant’s categories of understanding (Horizon and Style, 1935) and engaged with Kant’s theory of knowledge in his Trilogy of Knowledge (1943). L. Blaga, Orizont și stil (1935); Trilogia cunoașterii (1943)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Lucian Blaga › 1895–1961
Max Horkheimer
a influencé
Horkheimer took his doctorate (1922) and habilitation (1925) under Hans Cornelius with studies of Kant’s Critique of Judgement as the link between theoretical and practical philosophy. M. Horkheimer, Zur Antinomie der teleologischen Urteilskraft (1922); Über Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft als Bindeglied zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie (1925)
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Max Horkheimer › 1895–1973
Jean Piaget
a influencé ✓
Piaget kept Kant’s necessary categories but held that they are constructed in development, not given, a position he described as a dynamic Kantianism (Introduction à l’épistémologie génétique, 1950). J. Piaget, Introduction à l’épistémologie génétique (1950); Sagesse et illusions de la philosophie (1965)
Attestation: aussi dans Wikidata · Wikidata
Jean Piaget › 1896–1980
Karl Popper
a influencé
Popper called demarcation ‘Kant’s problem’ and reinterpreted Kant’s claim that the intellect prescribes its laws to nature: we propose conjectures, which nature may defeat (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934); “Kant’s Critique and Cosmology” (1954), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963); SEP “Karl Popper”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Karl Popper › 1902–1994
Theodor W. Adorno
a influencé ✓
Adorno lectured on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1959) and devoted the model on freedom in Negative Dialectics (1966) to a metacritique of Kant’s practical reason. T. W. Adorno, Kants „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“ (lectures 1959, publ. 1995); Negative Dialektik (1966), “Freiheit. Zur Metakritik der praktischen Vernunft”
Theodor W. Adorno › 1903–1969
Hans Jonas
a influencé
Jonas recast Kant’s imperative for technology: ‘act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life’ (Das Prinzip Verantwortung, 1979). H. Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung (1979)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Hans Jonas › 1903–1993
Jean-Paul Sartre
a influencé
Sartre agreed with Kant that freedom wills its own and others’ freedom, but held formal, universal principles too abstract to define action (L’existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946). J.-P. Sartre, L’existentialisme est un humanisme (lecture 1945, publ. 1946)
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Jean-Paul Sartre › 1905–1980
Hannah Arendt
a influencé ✓
Arendt read Kant’s judgement of taste, with its ‘enlarged mentality’, as the model of political judgement (Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, given 1970, publ. 1982). H. Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. R. Beiner (1982); I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790); SEP “Hannah Arendt”
Hannah Arendt › 1906–1975
Norberto Bobbio
a influencé
Bobbio studied Kant’s philosophy of law (1957) and took Kant’s ‘sign of history’ in the French Revolution as evidence of progress in rights (L’età dei diritti, 1990). N. Bobbio, Diritto e stato nel pensiero di Emanuele Kant (1957); L’età dei diritti (1990); I. Kant, Der Streit der Fakultäten (1798)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Norberto Bobbio › 1909–2004
Mou Zongsan
a influencé
Mou Zongsan, who translated Kant’s three Critiques, kept Kant’s framework but argued that moral experience grants humans intellectual intuition (Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy, 1971). Mou Zongsan, Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue (1971); Xianxiang yu wu zishen (1975); IEP “Mou Zongsan”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Mou Zongsan › 1909–1995
Wilfrid Sellars
a influencé
Sellars took up Kant’s distinction between sensibility and understanding for his account of sensory and conceptual elements in perception (Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes, 1968). W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (John Locke Lectures 1965–66; publ. 1968); SEP “Wilfrid Sellars”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Wilfrid Sellars › 1912–1989
R. M. Hare
a influencé
Hare built his universal prescriptivism on Kant’s universalizability and argued that Kant’s test leads to utilitarian results (Freedom and Reason, 1963; ‘Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?’, 1993). R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (1963); Moral Thinking (1981); “Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?”, Utilitas 5 (1993); SEP “Richard Mervyn Hare”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
R. M. Hare › 1919–2002
Peter Frederick Strawson
a influencé
Strawson reconstructed the analytic core of Kant’s Critique – the conditions of any experience intelligible to us – while rejecting transcendental idealism (The Bounds of Sense, 1966). P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (1966); Individuals (1959); SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Peter Frederick Strawson › 1919–2006
John Rawls
a influencé ✓
Rawls read the original position of justice as fairness as a procedural expression of Kant’s autonomy (A Theory of Justice, 1971; ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, 1980). J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980); SEP “John Rawls”
John Rawls › 1921–2002
Jean-François Lyotard
a influencé
Lyotard took from Kant the heterogeneity of the faculties and the sublime as presentation of the unpresentable (Le différend, 1983; Leçons sur l’Analytique du sublime, 1991). J.-F. Lyotard, Le différend (1983); L’enthousiasme. La critique kantienne de l’histoire (1986); Leçons sur l’Analytique du sublime (1991); SEP “Jean François Lyotard”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Jean-François Lyotard › 1924–1998
Gilles Deleuze
a influencé ✓
Deleuze read Kant’s doctrine of the faculties and their discordant accord in the sublime (La philosophie critique de Kant, 1963) and recast transcendental philosophy as ‘transcendental empiricism’ (1968). G. Deleuze, La philosophie critique de Kant (1963); “L’idée de genèse dans l’esthétique de Kant” (1963); Différence et répétition (1968); SEP “Gilles Deleuze”
Gilles Deleuze › 1925–1995
Li Zehou
a influencé
In Critique of Critical Philosophy (1979) Li Zehou read Kant’s a priori forms of knowledge and morality as products of collective practice, calling this process ‘sedimentation’. Li Zehou, Pipan zhexue de pipan: Kangde shuping (1979), Eng. A New Approach to Kant (2018); J. S. Rošker, Following His Own Path: Li Zehou and Contemporary Chinese Philosophy (2019)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Li Zehou › 1930–2021
Sadek al-Azem
a influencé
Al-Azm took his doctorate at Yale on Kant and wrote Kant’s Theory of Time (1967) and The Origins of Kant’s Arguments in the Antinomies (1972). S. J. al-Azm, Kant’s Theory of Time (1967); The Origins of Kant’s Arguments in the Antinomies (Oxford, 1972)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Sadek al-Azem › 1934–2016
Robert Nozick
a influencé
Nozick grounded his side constraints in Kant’s principle that individuals are ends and not merely means, ruling out sacrificing some for others (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974). R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974); SEP “Libertarianism”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Robert Nozick › 1938–2002
Kōjin Karatani
a influencé
In Transcritique (2001) Karatani read Kant’s critique as a movement between perspectives, a ‘pronounced parallax’, and the realm of ends as a task for associations. Karatani Kōjin, Toransukuritīku (2001), tr. S. Kohso, Transcritique: On Kant and Marx (2003)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Kōjin Karatani › né(e) en 1941
Onora O’Neill
a influencé
O’Neill read Kant as a constructivist: moral principles are those all could adopt, not derived from a prior good (Constructions of Reason, 1989; Towards Justice and Virtue, 1996). O. O’Neill, Constructions of Reason (1989); Towards Justice and Virtue (1996)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Onora O’Neill › né(e) en 1941
Slavoj Žižek
a influencé ✓
Žižek read Kant’s paralogisms, in which the subject cannot know itself as a substance, as anticipating Lacan’s empty subject (Tarrying with the Negative, 1993). S. Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology (1993)
Slavoj Žižek › né(e) en 1949
Seyla Benhabib
a influencé
Benhabib took Kant’s cosmopolitan right of hospitality as the starting point for her account of the rights of migrants and refugees (The Rights of Others, 2004). S. Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (2004); Another Cosmopolitanism (2006); I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden (1795)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Seyla Benhabib › né(e) en 1950
Christine Korsgaard
a influencé
Korsgaard derived normativity from Kant’s reflective agent, who cannot act without some practical identity and so must value humanity itself (The Sources of Normativity, 1996). C. M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Tanner Lectures 1992; publ. 1996); Creating the Kingdom of Ends (1996)
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Christine Korsgaard › né(e) en 1952
Kwame Anthony Appiah
a influencé
Appiah counted Kant’s proposal of a league of nations (Perpetual Peace, 1795) among the Enlightenment sources of his cosmopolitanism of universal concern and respect for difference (Cosmopolitanism, 2006). K. A. Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (2006); I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden (1795)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Kwame Anthony Appiah › né(e) en 1954
Luciano Floridi
a influencé
Floridi gave his constructionism a Kantian shape: things in themselves remain unknowable, and we know systems through models at chosen levels of abstraction (The Philosophy of Information, 2011). L. Floridi, “The Method of Levels of Abstraction”, Minds and Machines 18 (2008); The Philosophy of Information (2011)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Luciano Floridi › né(e) en 1964
Rainer Forst
a influencé
Forst grounded his theory of justice in a Kantian, reflexive ‘right to justification’ that each person holds as a moral agent (Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung, 2007). R. Forst, Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung. Elemente einer konstruktivistischen Theorie der Gerechtigkeit (2007)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Rainer Forst › né(e) en 1964
Critique
Critiques reçues de 26
Johann Gottfried von Herder a enseigné à
a enseigné à ✓
Herder studied at Königsberg from 1762 to 1764 and attended Kant’s lectures, among them those on metaphysics and moral philosophy; Kant gave him special privileges, and Herder’s notes on the metaphysics and ethics lectures are printed in the Academy edition. SEP “Johann Gottfried von Herder”; Kant, Gesammelte Schriften (Akademie-Ausgabe), vols. 27–28 (Herder’s lecture notes)
Attestation: brouillon IA
critiqué par
Herder rejected dividing humanity into races, seeing only shades of one species (Ideas II, 1785), and in his Metacritique (1799) attacked Kant’s split of sensibility and understanding. J. G. Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit II (1785), book 7, ch. 1; Verstand und Erfahrung. Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1799); SEP “Johann Gottfried von Herder”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Johann Gottfried von Herder › 1744–1803
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel a influencé
a influencé ✓
Hegel took from Kant’s antinomies the insight that contradiction belongs to reason itself, and from the unity of apperception his concept of the concept (Science of Logic, 1812–16). G. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik (1812–16), “Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen”; SEP “Hegel”
critiqué par
Hegel likened Kant’s critique of knowledge to learning to swim before entering the water and called his moral law empty formalism (Encyclopaedia §10; Philosophy of Right §135). G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie (1830), §10; Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1820), §135; SEP “Hegel”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel › 1770–1831
Ernst Mach a influencé
a influencé
Mach recalled that Kant’s Prolegomena, read at fifteen, made a ‘powerful, indelible impression’ and turned him to the critique of knowledge (Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen, 1886). E. Mach, Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen (1886); SEP “Ernst Mach”
Attestation: brouillon IA
critiqué par
Mach, who read Kant’s Prolegomena at fifteen, came to see the thing in itself as playing an ‘idle role’: the world consists of elements such as sensations (1886). E. Mach, Die Analyse der Empfindungen (1886), ch. I, note; SEP “Ernst Mach”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Ernst Mach › 1838–1916
Friedrich Nietzsche
critiqué par
Nietzsche mocked Kant’s synthetic a priori, possible ‘by virtue of a faculty’, and called the categorical imperative a danger to life (Beyond Good and Evil §11; Antichrist §11). F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse (1886), §11; Der Antichrist (1888), §11
Attestation: brouillon IA
Friedrich Nietzsche › 1844–1900
Gottlob Frege a influencé
a influencé
Frege kept Kant’s view that geometry rests on a priori intuition and recast his analytic–synthetic distinction as concerning how a truth is justified (Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884). G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); SEP “Gottlob Frege”
Attestation: brouillon IA
critiqué par
Frege argued against Kant that arithmetic is analytic, not synthetic a priori, and that Kant underestimated analytic judgements; geometry he left to intuition (Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884). G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), §§ 5, 12–13, 88–90
Attestation: brouillon IA
Gottlob Frege › 1848–1925
Tom Regan a influencé
a influencé
Regan extended Kant’s principle of respect – never to treat someone merely as a means – to all ‘subjects-of-a-life’ with inherent value (The Case for Animal Rights, 1983). T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983); SEP “The Moral Status of Animals”
Attestation: brouillon IA
critiqué par
Regan rejected Kant’s view that we have only indirect duties concerning animals: beings with inherent value are owed direct duties of respect (The Case for Animal Rights, 1983). T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983), ch. 5 (indirect duty views); I. Kant, Lectures on Ethics (Collins), “Of Duties towards Animals and Spirits”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Tom Regan › 1938–2017
Tout afficher (26)Afficher moins
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi
critiqué par
Jacobi objected that without the thing in itself one cannot enter Kant’s system, and with it one cannot remain inside (David Hume on Faith, 1787, appendix). F. H. Jacobi, David Hume über den Glauben (1787), appendix “Über den transzendentalen Idealismus”; SEP “Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi › 1743–1819
Bernard Bolzano
critiqué par
Bolzano rejected Kant’s grounding of mathematics in pure intuitions of space and time and sought proofs from concepts alone (Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik, 1810). B. Bolzano, Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik (1810), appendix “Über die Kantische Lehre von der Construction der Begriffe durch Anschauungen”; Wissenschaftslehre (1837); SEP “Bernard Bolzano”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Bernard Bolzano › 1781–1848
Antonio Rosmini
critiqué par
Rosmini held against Kant that the a priori is not a set of subjective forms but the single, objective idea of being (Nuovo saggio sull’origine delle idee, 1830). A. Rosmini, Nuovo saggio sull’origine delle idee (1830)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Antonio Rosmini › 1797–1855
John Stuart Mill
critiqué par
Mill argued that when Kant derives actual duties from the categorical imperative he shows no contradiction, only consequences no one would choose (Utilitarianism, 1861, ch. 1). J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1861), ch. 1; ch. 5
Attestation: brouillon IA
John Stuart Mill › 1806–1873
Friedrich Engels
critiqué par
Engels held that practice, experiment and industry refute Kant’s unknowable thing-in-itself: once chemistry produces alizarin, the thing-in-itself becomes a thing for us (Ludwig Feuerbach, 1886). F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie (1886), part II
Attestation: brouillon IA
Friedrich Engels › 1820–1895
Henri Bergson
critiqué par
Bergson objected that Kant took time for a homogeneous medium like space and so had to banish freedom to a timeless noumenal realm (Time and Free Will, 1889). H. Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (1889), Conclusion; SEP “Henri Bergson”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Henri Bergson › 1859–1941
Max Scheler
critiqué par
Scheler rejected Kant’s formal ethics, holding that a priori values are given in feeling and ground a material ethics of value (Der Formalismus in der Ethik, 1913–16). M. Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (1913–16); SEP “Max Scheler”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Max Scheler › 1874–1928
Georg Lukács
critiqué par
Lukács read Kant’s unknowable thing-in-itself and the split between form and content as antinomies of bourgeois thought rooted in reification (History and Class Consciousness, 1923). G. Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein (1923), “Die Verdinglichung und das Bewußtsein des Proletariats”, part II
Attestation: brouillon IA
Georg Lukács › 1885–1971
Hans Reichenbach
critiqué par
Reichenbach argued that relativity theory is incompatible with Kant’s synthetic a priori of Euclidean space, keeping only a revisable, constitutive a priori (Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis apriori, 1920). H. Reichenbach, Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis apriori (1920); SEP “Hans Reichenbach”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Hans Reichenbach › 1891–1953
Norbert Elias
critiqué par
Elias rejected Kant’s timeless a priori categories, arguing that concepts such as time and causality are learned and developed socially over generations (Über die Zeit, 1984). N. Elias, Über die Zeit (1984); on his dissertation dispute with R. Hönigswald: Notizen zum Lebenslauf (1984)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Norbert Elias › 1897–1990
Hans-Georg Gadamer
critiqué par
Gadamer argued that Kant’s Critique of Judgement subjectivised aesthetics and so cut art off from the question of truth (Truth and Method, 1960). H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (1960), part I (“Die Subjektivierung der Ästhetik durch die Kantische Kritik”)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Hans-Georg Gadamer › 1900–2002
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
critiqué par
Merleau-Ponty objected that Kant’s reflective analysis makes the world the work of a constituting intellect and passes over perception lived through the body (Phénoménologie de la perception, 1945). M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (1945), preface and introduction (critique of ‘intellectualism’)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Maurice Merleau-Ponty › 1908–1961
G. E. M. Anscombe
critiqué par
Anscombe called Kant’s idea of legislating for oneself absurd and objected that universalisability is useless without a rule on relevant descriptions of an act (‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, 1958). G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33 (1958), 1–19
Attestation: brouillon IA
G. E. M. Anscombe › 1919–2001
Alasdair MacIntyre
critiqué par
MacIntyre argued that Kant’s attempt to ground morality in pure practical reason fails: universalisability lets through trivial and immoral maxims alike (After Virtue, 1981, chs. 4–5). A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981), chs. 4–5; A Short History of Ethics (1966)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Alasdair MacIntyre › 1929–2025
Bernard Williams
critiqué par
Williams objected that Kantian impartiality alienates agents from their attachments: a husband rescuing his wife on impartial grounds has ‘one thought too many’ (‘Persons, Character and Morality’, 1976). B. Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality” (1976), in Moral Luck (1981); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), ch. 10
Attestation: brouillon IA
Bernard Williams › 1929–2003
Richard Rorty
critiqué par
Rorty held that Kant turned philosophy into a tribunal of pure reason and made epistemology the foundation of culture (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979, ch. 3). R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Introduction, ch. 3
Attestation: brouillon IA
Richard Rorty › 1931–2007
Walter Mignolo
critiqué par
In “The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis” (2000) Mignolo read Kant’s cosmopolitanism as a global design from the centre of colonial power and set against it a “critical cosmopolitanism” grounded in border thinking. W. D. Mignolo, “The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism”, Public Culture 12:3 (2000), 721–748
Attestation: brouillon IA
Walter Mignolo › né(e) en 1941
Bruno Latour
critiqué par
Latour read Kant’s split between things in themselves and the knowing subject as the moderns’ model ‘purification’ separating nature from society (We Have Never Been Modern, 1991). B. Latour, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes (1991)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Bruno Latour › 1947–2022
Charles W. Mills
critiqué par
Mills argued that Kant’s theory of personhood, read together with his racial theory, in practice treated non-whites as ‘sub-persons’ (‘Kant’s Untermenschen’, 2005). C. W. Mills, “Kant’s Untermenschen”, in A. Valls (ed.), Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy (2005); Black Rights/White Wrongs (2017)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Charles W. Mills › 1951–2021
Michael Sandel
critiqué par
Sandel criticised the Kantian self prior to its ends, the basis of deontological liberalism, as an ‘unencumbered self’ (‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self’, 1984). M. J. Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self”, Political Theory 12 (1984); Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Michael Sandel › né(e) en 1953
Critiques adressées à 15
René Descartes
a critiqué
Kant rejected Descartes’ inference from ‘I think’ to a simple thinking substance (Paralogisms) and argued that inner experience presupposes outer objects (Refutation of Idealism, B 274–279). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 341–405 / B 399–432 (Paralogisms); B 274–279 (Refutation of Idealism)
Attestation: brouillon IA
René Descartes › 1596–1650
John Locke
a critiqué
Kant objected that Locke derived the pure concepts of the understanding from experience, a ‘physiology’ of the understanding that cannot show their necessity (Critique of Pure Reason, 1781). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A ix; §§ 13–14 (B 118–119, B 127–128)
Attestation: brouillon IA
John Locke › 1632–1704
Baruch Spinoza
a critiqué
Kant objected that Spinoza’s single substance turns the purposive unity of nature into mere inherence and cannot explain purposiveness (Critique of the Power of Judgment, 1790). I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790), §§ 72–73; Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren? (1786)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Baruch Spinoza › 1632–1677
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz influencé par
influencé par ✓
Kant’s early works, such as the New Elucidation (1755), argued within Leibniz’s principles, and in 1790 he called the Critique ‘the genuine apology for Leibniz’. I. Kant, Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio (1755); Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll (1790); SEP “Leibniz’s Influence on Kant”
a critiqué
Kant held that Leibniz ‘intellectualised the appearances’, taking sensibility for confused thought, and so misapplied the identity of indiscernibles (Critique of Pure Reason, A 263–264, A 271). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection, A 260–289 / B 316–346
Attestation: brouillon IA
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz › 1646–1716
Christian Wolff influencé par
influencé par ✓
Kant learned metaphysics in the Wolffian school and taught from Baumgarten’s textbook; Wolff’s division into ontology, rational psychology, cosmology and theology structures the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781), Transcendental Dialectic; A. G. Baumgarten, Metaphysica (1739); SEP “Christian Wolff”
a critiqué
Kant praised Wolff as ‘the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers’ yet faulted his method for lacking a prior critique of reason’s capacity (Critique of Pure Reason, B xxxvi). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787), B xxxvi–xxxvii; A 44 / B 61–62
Attestation: brouillon IA
Christian Wolff › 1679–1754
David Hume influencé par
influencé par ✓
Kant generalised Hume’s question about cause and effect into the problem of how synthetic judgements a priori are possible (Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd ed. 1787, Introduction). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2nd ed. 1787), Introduction; Prolegomena (1783); SEP “Kant and Hume on Causality”
a critiqué
Kant credited Hume with interrupting his dogmatic slumber but rejected deriving causality from habit, making it an a priori category (Prolegomena, 1783, Preface). I. Kant, Prolegomena (1783), Preface (AA IV 257–260); Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 19–20, B 127–128
Attestation: brouillon IA
David Hume › 1711–1776
Tout afficher (15)Afficher moins
Lao Tseu
a critiqué
In “The End of All Things” (1794) Kant named “the monstrous system of Lao-kiun”, whose highest good is said to consist in nothingness, as an example of a mysticism in which the person dissolves into the deity. Kant, Das Ende aller Dinge (1794), AA 8:335
Attestation: brouillon IA
Lao Tseu › figure légendaire
Hugo Grotius
a critiqué
Kant called Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel ‘sorry comforters’: their law of nations has no binding force and is cited only to justify wars (Perpetual Peace, 1795). I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden (1795), Second Definitive Article (AA VIII 355)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Hugo Grotius › 1583–1645
Nicolas Malebranche
a critiqué
Kant counted Malebranche’s continuing intuition of God among the deus ex machina answers to how concepts fit objects – ‘the greatest absurdity’ (letter to Marcus Herz, 1772). I. Kant, letter to Marcus Herz, 21 February 1772 (AA X 129–135)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Nicolas Malebranche › 1638–1715
Bernard de Mandeville
a critiqué
Kant listed Mandeville’s grounding of morality in the civil constitution among the material, heteronomous principles unfit to found moral law (Critique of Practical Reason, 1788, Ak. 5:40). I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788), §8, Remark II (AA V 40)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Bernard de Mandeville › 1670–1733
George Berkeley
a critiqué
Kant set his transcendental idealism apart from Berkeley’s ‘dogmatic’ idealism, which he said degrades bodies to mere illusion (Critique of Pure Reason, 1787, B 71, B 274). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787), B 69–71, B 274; Prolegomena (1783), Appendix; SEP “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism”
Attestation: brouillon IA
George Berkeley › 1685–1753
Emanuel Swedenborg
a critiqué
Kant likened Swedenborg’s visions of spirits to the dreams of speculative metaphysics: both claim knowledge of a spirit world no experience can confirm (Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, 1766). I. Kant, Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (1766)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Emanuel Swedenborg › 1688–1772
Émilie du Châtelet
a critiqué
In his first book (Living Forces, 1746/49) Kant discussed du Châtelet’s Leibnizian arguments for vis viva against Mairan and rejected parts of them. I. Kant, Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte (1746/49), §§ 44, 57, 111 (AA I 55–56, 67, 124); R. Hagengruber (ed.), Emilie du Châtelet between Leibniz and Newton (2012)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Émilie du Châtelet › 1706–1749
Moses Mendelssohn
a critiqué
Kant rejected Mendelssohn’s proof of the soul’s immortality in Phaedon (1767): a simple soul could still fade away by degrees of intensity (Critique of Pure Reason, B 413–415). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787), B 413–415 (“Refutation of Mendelssohn’s Proof of the Permanence of the Soul”); M. Mendelssohn, Phädon (1767)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Moses Mendelssohn › 1729–1786
Cesare Beccaria
a critiqué
Kant rejected Beccaria’s argument against the death penalty: one is punished not for having willed the punishment but for willing a punishable act (Doctrine of Right, 1797). I. Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre (1797), §49 E (AA VI 334–335); C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene (1764), §28
Attestation: brouillon IA
Cesare Beccaria › 1738–1794
Œuvres
Comment des jugements synthétiques a priori sont-ils possibles ? Les limites de la connaissance.
Sapere aude ! Aie le courage de te servir de ton propre entendement.
L’impératif catégorique et la dignité de la personne.
Le ciel étoilé au-dessus de moi et la loi morale en moi.
Le beau, le sublime et la finalité de la nature.
Les républiques, une ligue de nations, le droit cosmopolitique.
Position
Kant cherchait à trancher le conflit entre rationalisme et empirisme en demandant ce que la raison peut connaître. Son « tournant copernicien » soutient que les objets se règlent sur notre connaissance : l’espace et le temps sont des formes de notre intuition, et des catégories telles que la causalité sont des concepts de notre entendement. Nous ne connaissons donc les choses que telles qu’elles nous apparaissent, jamais telles qu’elles sont en soi, et la métaphysique ne peut prouver ni Dieu, ni la liberté, ni l’immortalité. En morale, la raison pratique se donne à elle-même la loi : l’impératif catégorique nous ordonne d’agir seulement selon des maximes que nous pourrions vouloir comme lois universelles et de traiter toujours les personnes comme des fins. Kant a façonné toute la philosophie ultérieure, de l’idéalisme à la pensée analytique. Ses écrits sur les « races » humaines (1775, 1785) et ses cours d’anthropologie plaçaient les Européens blancs au-dessus des autres peuples et contenaient des affirmations dépréciatives sur les femmes ; on débat de la question de savoir si sa critique ultérieure du colonialisme dans Vers la paix perpétuelle (1795) équivaut à une révision.
Vie et contexte
Né à Königsberg, en Prusse-Orientale, en 1724, Kant grandit dans un foyer piétiste modeste et passa toute sa vie dans sa ville natale et ses environs. Après de longues années comme privat-docent, il devint professeur de logique et de métaphysique en 1770. À la suite d’une « décennie silencieuse », il publia la Critique de la raison pure en 1781, suivie d’une série d’œuvres majeures. Il mourut à Königsberg en 1804.
Apparaît dans
- Voyage « Le doute et le moi » · Étape 6 sur 10
- Débat « Les animaux et l’élevage industriel »
- Débat « Des droits pour les animaux ? »
- Débat « L’expérimentation animale »
- Débat « Sommes-nous libres ? Le libre arbitre à l’ère des neurosciences »
- Débat « Guerre et paix : quand la force armée est-elle justifiée ? »
- Débat « Frontières ouvertes ou fermées ? L’éthique de la migration »
- Débat « Un droit de mourir ? L’aide à mourir »
- Débat « Leibniz et Clarke sur l’espace, le temps et Dieu »
État en novembre 2026 · Sources · Améliorer cette page · Comment Agora est faite