John Locke
Pour Locke, toutes nos idées viennent de l’expérience, et le gouvernement n’existe que pour protéger les droits naturels des gens à la vie, à la liberté et à la propriété.
Repères
L’esprit est une tabula rasa ; les droits à la vie, à la liberté et à la propriété et le gouvernement par consentement sont devenus des idées fondatrices du libéralisme.
Idées clés
- Tabula rasa
- Droits naturels
- Tolérance
- Gouvernement par consentement
Élèves: Shaftesbury
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Influence
Influences reçues de 3
Francis Bacon
influencé par
Locke’s ‘historical, plain method’ of describing the mind’s ideas in the Essay (1689) follows the Baconian natural history practised in the early Royal Society, as P. Anstey argues. J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689), Introduction; P. R. Anstey, John Locke and Natural Philosophy (2011); SEP “John Locke”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Francis Bacon › 1561–1626
Hugo Grotius
influencé par ✓
Locke worked out the property theory of the Two Treatises (1689) in dialogue with Grotius, whose On the Law of War and Peace he recommended for education (1693). J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689); Some Thoughts concerning Education (1693); J. Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (1980); SEP “John Locke”
Hugo Grotius › 1583–1645
Pierre Gassendi
influencé par contesté
During his years in France (1675–79) Locke met François Bernier, whose abridgement spread Gassendi’s philosophy; how much the Essay owes to Gassendi is disputed. F. Bernier, Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi (1674–78); R. W. Puster, Britische Gassendi-Rezeption am Beispiel John Lockes (1991); T. M. Lennon, The Battle of the Gods and Giants (1993); SEP “Pierre Gassendi”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Pierre Gassendi › 1592–1655
A influencé 12
Montesquieu
a influencé
Montesquieu’s account of the English constitution in The Spirit of the Laws (1748) is commonly read as recasting Locke’s legislative and executive powers into three separated powers. Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (1748), Book XI; J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1689); SEP “Montesquieu”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Montesquieu › 1689–1755
Voltaire
a influencé ✓
In the Philosophical Letters (1734) Voltaire praised Locke’s modest ‘history of the soul’ and his suggestion that God could give matter the power of thought. Voltaire, Lettres philosophiques (1734), “Sur M. Locke”; SEP “Voltaire”
Attestation: aussi dans Wikidata · Wikidata
Voltaire › 1694–1778
Jean-Jacques Rousseau
a influencé
Rousseau’s Emile (1762) builds on ‘the wise Locke’ and his Some Thoughts concerning Education (1693), while rejecting its maxim of reasoning with children. J.-J. Rousseau, Émile ou De l’éducation (1762); J. Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Education (1693); SEP “Jean Jacques Rousseau”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Jean-Jacques Rousseau › 1712–1778
Moses Mendelssohn
a influencé ✓
In Jerusalem (1783) Mendelssohn took up Locke’s distinction between state and church from the Letter concerning Toleration (1689), arguing that neither may coerce belief. M. Mendelssohn, Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum (1783); J. Locke, Epistola de tolerantia (1689); SEP “Moses Mendelssohn”
Attestation: aussi dans Wikidata · Wikidata
Moses Mendelssohn › 1729–1786
John Rawls
a influencé ✓
Rawls sought to carry the social contract of Locke, Rousseau and Kant ‘to a higher level of abstraction’ in the original position (A Theory of Justice, 1971). J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, ed. S. Freeman (2007)
John Rawls › 1921–2002
Robert Nozick
a influencé
Nozick started from Locke’s state of nature and natural rights and reworked his proviso on just acquisition for an entitlement theory of justice (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974). R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974); J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689); SEP “Libertarianism”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Robert Nozick › 1938–2002
Tout afficher (12)Afficher moins
Damaris Masham
a influencé
Masham’s Occasional Thoughts (1705), written in Locke’s circle at Oates, argues in a Lockean spirit that women must understand the reasons for their religious and moral beliefs. D. Masham, Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian Life (1705); SEP “Lady Damaris Masham”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Damaris Masham › 1659–1708
John Toland
a influencé
Toland’s Christianity not Mysterious (1696) applied the theory of knowledge of Locke’s Essay to religion: nothing in the Gospel is contrary to reason or above it. J. Toland, Christianity not Mysterious (1696); J. Locke, replies to Stillingfleet (1697–99); S. H. Daniel, John Toland: His Methods, Manners, and Mind (1984)
Attestation: brouillon IA
John Toland › 1670–1722
Émilie du Châtelet
a influencé
In the Institutions de physique (1740) Du Châtelet set aside Locke’s modest view of metaphysics, arguing with Leibniz’s sufficient reason that Newtonian physics needs firmer metaphysical foundations. É. Du Châtelet, Institutions de physique (1740); R. Hagengruber (ed.), Emilie du Châtelet between Leibniz and Newton (2012); SEP “Émilie Du Châtelet”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Émilie du Châtelet › 1706–1749
Denis Diderot
a influencé
Diderot’s Letter on the Blind (1749) took up Molyneux’s question from Locke’s Essay and asked, through the blind mathematician Saunderson, how ideas depend on the senses. D. Diderot, Lettre sur les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient (1749); SEP “Denis Diderot”; SEP “Molyneux’s Problem”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Denis Diderot › 1713–1784
Mary Wollstonecraft
a influencé
Wollstonecraft built on Locke’s view that the mind is formed by experience and education, arguing women’s apparent weakness is an effect of their upbringing (Rights of Woman, 1792). M. Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792); SEP “Mary Wollstonecraft”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Mary Wollstonecraft › 1759–1797
Derek Parfit
a influencé
Parfit developed Locke’s memory criterion into psychological continuity – overlapping chains of memories, intentions and character – and asked whether identity is what matters (Reasons and Persons, 1984). D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984); J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (2nd ed., 1694), “Of Identity and Diversity”; SEP “Locke on Personal Identity”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Derek Parfit › 1942–2017
Critique
Critiques reçues de 11
Shaftesbury a enseigné à
a enseigné à ✓
The first Earl of Shaftesbury put Locke, his physician and adviser, in charge of the education of his grandson, the later third Earl; the two remained friends until Locke’s death, although the pupil came to reject much of Locke’s philosophy. SEP “Lord Shaftesbury [Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury]”
Attestation: brouillon IA
critiqué par
Shaftesbury wrote that Locke struck ‘the home blow’ by denying innate moral ideas and making virtue depend on fashion and custom (letter to Michael Ainsworth, 1709). Shaftesbury to M. Ainsworth, 3 June 1709, in Several Letters Written by a Noble Lord to a Young Man at the University (1716); SEP “Lord Shaftesbury”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Shaftesbury › 1671–1713
George Berkeley a influencé
a influencé ✓
In the New Theory of Vision (1709) Berkeley took up Molyneux’s question from Locke’s Essay, agreeing with Locke’s negative answer and building his theory of vision on it. G. Berkeley, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709); J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (2nd ed., 1694); SEP “Molyneux’s Problem”
critiqué par
Berkeley rejected Locke’s abstract general ideas – a triangle neither oblique nor right-angled – and his distinction of primary and secondary qualities (Principles, 1710). G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Introduction §§6–20, Part I §§9–15; J. Locke, Essay IV.vii.9; SEP “George Berkeley”
Attestation: brouillon IA
George Berkeley › 1685–1753
Thomas Reid a influencé
a influencé
Reid kept Locke’s primary–secondary quality distinction but recast it: primary qualities are conceived directly, secondary only relatively (Essays on the Intellectual Powers, 1785). T. Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764); Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785); SEP “Thomas Reid”
Attestation: brouillon IA
critiqué par
With the ‘brave officer’ Reid argued that Locke’s memory criterion of personal identity breaks transitivity: the general would be and not be the flogged boy (Essays, 1785, III.6). T. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), III.6; J. Locke, Essay II.xxvii; SEP “Thomas Reid”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Thomas Reid › 1710–1796
David Hume a influencé
a influencé ✓
Hume took over Locke’s principle that all ideas come from experience, recasting it as the thesis that every simple idea copies a prior impression (Treatise, 1739). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739); J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689); SEP “David Hume”
critiqué par
Hume objected that Locke drew the idea of power from reasoning, though no reasoning can yield a new simple idea (Treatise, 1739, 1.3.14; Enquiry VII). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), 1.3.14; An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), VII, note; J. Locke, Essay II.xxi
Attestation: brouillon IA
David Hume › 1711–1776
Emmanuel Kant
critiqué par
Kant objected that Locke derived the pure concepts of the understanding from experience, a ‘physiology’ of the understanding that cannot show their necessity (Critique of Pure Reason, 1781). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A ix; §§ 13–14 (B 118–119, B 127–128)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Emmanuel Kant › 1724–1804
Jeremy Bentham a influencé
a influencé
Building on the empiricist psychology of Locke and Hume, Bentham took pleasure and pain as the ultimate motives and measures of action (Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789). J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789); J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689); IEP “Jeremy Bentham”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
critiqué par
Bentham dismissed the original contract as a fiction (against Blackstone, 1776) and natural rights as ‘nonsense upon stilts’ (against the French Declaration), both central to Locke. J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government (1776), ch. I §§36–48; Nonsense upon Stilts (written c. 1795); SEP “Jeremy Bentham”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Jeremy Bentham › 1748–1832
Tout afficher (11)Afficher moins
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
critiqué par
In the New Essays (written 1704, published 1765) Leibniz defended innate ideas against Locke: the mind is not a blank tablet but like veined marble. G. W. Leibniz, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (1704; publ. 1765), Preface and Book I
Attestation: brouillon IA
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz › 1646–1716
Mary Astell
critiqué par
Astell attacked Locke’s suggestion that matter might think (The Christian Religion, 1705) and asked why, if all men are born free, women are born slaves (1706). M. Astell, The Christian Religion, as Profess’d by a Daughter of the Church of England (1705); Some Reflections upon Marriage, 3rd ed. (1706), Preface; SEP “Mary Astell”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Mary Astell › 1666–1731
Carole Pateman
critiqué par
Pateman objected that Locke, rejecting Filmer’s paternal power, kept husbands’ natural conjugal right, as ‘the abler and the stronger’, outside the social contract (The Sexual Contract, 1988). C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (1988); J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1689), § 82
Attestation: brouillon IA
Carole Pateman › né(e) en 1940
Charles W. Mills
critiqué par
Mills argued that Locke’s theory of property through labour let Native American land appear as vacant waste – part of a ‘racial contract’ (The Racial Contract, 1997). C. W. Mills, The Racial Contract (1997); J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1689), ch. V
Attestation: brouillon IA
Charles W. Mills › 1951–2021
Brian Burkhart
critiqué par
Burkhart argued that Locke’s labour theory of property made Indigenous land appear unowned, a concept framed to exclude Indigenous peoples (Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land, 2019). B. Burkhart, Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land (2019); J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1689), ch. V
Attestation: brouillon IA
Brian Burkhart › contemporain
Critiques adressées à 3
Aristote
a critiqué
Locke denied that Aristotle’s syllogism is the instrument of reasoning: God did not leave it ‘to Aristotle to make them rational’ (An Essay concerning Human Understanding, 1689). J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689), IV.xvii.4
Attestation: brouillon IA
Aristote › 384–322 av. J.-C.
Thomas Hobbes influencé par
influencé par ✓
Locke’s early Two Tracts on Government (1660–62) defended an absolute magistrate close to Hobbes; later he kept the state of nature and consent but denied reading Hobbes closely. J. Locke, Two Tracts on Government, ed. P. Abrams (1967); replies to Stillingfleet (1697–99); SEP “Locke’s Political Philosophy”
a critiqué
Locke set the state of nature apart from the state of war and rejected absolute rule as its remedy (Second Treatise, 1689, §§19, 93); Hobbes is not named. J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1689), §§13, 19, 90–94; SEP “Locke’s Political Philosophy”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Thomas Hobbes › 1588–1679
René Descartes influencé par
influencé par ✓
According to Damaris Masham, Descartes’ writings first gave Locke a relish for philosophy, for he found them intelligible even where he disagreed (letter to Le Clerc, 1705). D. Masham, letter to J. Le Clerc (Jan. 1705); M. Cranston, John Locke: A Biography (1957); SEP “John Locke”
a critiqué
Locke denied innate ideas (Essay, 1689, Book I) and, against the Cartesians, that the soul always thinks, since thinking is its action, not its essence (II.i.10). J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689), I.ii–iv, II.i.10–19; SEP “John Locke”
Attestation: brouillon IA
René Descartes › 1596–1650
Œuvres
Contre le droit divin patriarcal des rois défendu par Filmer : la vie, la liberté, la propriété – et le droit de résistance.
La séparation de l’Église et de l’État.
Pas d’idées innées : toute connaissance vient de l’expérience.
Position
Locke se demandait d’où viennent nos idées et répondait : de l’expérience. À la naissance, l’esprit est comme une feuille blanche ; toutes les idées naissent de la sensation et de la réflexion, et nous ne devons pas prétendre à un savoir qui dépasse ce qu’elles garantissent. Il distingua les qualités premières des corps de leurs qualités secondes et examina l’identité personnelle par la conscience et la mémoire. En politique, il soutint que les gens ont des droits naturels à la vie, à la liberté et à la propriété, et que le gouvernement existe par consentement pour les protéger ; un gouvernement qui les viole peut être résisté. Son plaidoyer pour la tolérance religieuse fut tout aussi influent. On tient souvent Locke pour le père de l’empirisme et du libéralisme politique, et les pères fondateurs américains se sont inspirés de lui. Il fut aussi investisseur dans la Royal African Company, engagée dans la traite des esclaves, et participa à la rédaction des Constitutions fondamentales de la Caroline (1669), qui donnaient à tout homme libre un « pouvoir et une autorité absolus » sur les personnes qu’il tenait en esclavage ; sa théorie de la propriété fondée sur le travail a été utilisée pour justifier la prise de terres amérindiennes.
Vie et contexte
Né en 1632 à Wrington, dans le Somerset, Locke étudia à Christ Church, à Oxford, et se forma à la médecine. Médecin et conseiller du comte de Shaftesbury, il fut impliqué dans la politique whig et dut fuir aux Pays-Bas en 1683. Il revint après la Glorieuse Révolution de 1688 et publia ses œuvres majeures en succession rapide. Il mourut en 1704.
Autres œuvres principales
- Quelques pensées sur l’éducation (1693)
- Le Christianisme raisonnable (1695)
Apparaît dans
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- Voyage « Qu’est-ce qui est juste ? » · Étape 4 sur 10
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