Karl Popper
Une théorie n’est scientifique que si l’observation pourrait la réfuter, et une société libre vit de la critique, non de grands plans pour l’histoire.
Repères
Rationalisme critique : les théories ne sont pas vérifiables mais falsifiables ; la société ouverte contre l’historicisme.
Idées clés
- Falsification
- Société ouverte
- Rationalisme critique
Élèves: Paul Feyerabend
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Influence
Influences reçues de 5
Socrate
influencé par ✓
Popper took Socrates’ awareness of his ignorance and his critical questioning as the model of critical rationalism, set against Plato’s ‘spell’ (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945). K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. I: The Spell of Plato (1945); SEP “Karl Popper”
Socrate › 470–399 av. J.-C.
David Hume
influencé par
Popper accepted Hume’s argument that induction cannot be logically justified but rejected his psychology of habit, replacing induction with conjecture and falsification (Objective Knowledge, 1972). K. R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934); Objective Knowledge (1972), “Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution of the Problem of Induction”; SEP “Karl Popper”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
David Hume › 1711–1776
Emmanuel Kant
influencé par
Popper called demarcation ‘Kant’s problem’ and reinterpreted Kant’s claim that the intellect prescribes its laws to nature: we propose conjectures, which nature may defeat (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934); “Kant’s Critique and Cosmology” (1954), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963); SEP “Karl Popper”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Emmanuel Kant › 1724–1804
Albert Einstein
influencé par ✓
Popper drew his falsifiability criterion from Einstein’s risky prediction of light deflection, tested in 1919, in contrast to Marx, Freud and Adler (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations” (lecture 1953), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963); Unended Quest (1976); SEP “Karl Popper”
Albert Einstein › 1879–1955
Alfred Tarski
influencé par
Popper credited Tarski, who explained his theory to him in Vienna (1935), with rehabilitating correspondence truth, and built on it his notion of verisimilitude (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (1963); Objective Knowledge (1972); Unended Quest (1976); SEP “Karl Popper”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Alfred Tarski › 1901–1983
A influencé 1
Abdolkarim Soroush
a influencé
Soroush took up Popper’s fallibilism for his theory that religious knowledge, unlike religion itself, is human, historical and revisable (The Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge, 1990). A. Soroush, Qabz va bast-e teorik-e shariat (1990); M. Sadri & A. Sadri (eds.), Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam (2000)
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Abdolkarim Soroush › né(e) en 1945
Critique
Critiques reçues de 5
Theodor W. Adorno
critiqué par
In the positivism dispute Adorno objected that Popper’s critical rationalism confines criticism to testing hypotheses rather than to society as a contradictory totality (Tübingen, 1961; Der Positivismusstreit, 1969). T. W. Adorno, “Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften” (reply to K. Popper, Tübingen 1961), in Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (1969)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Theodor W. Adorno › 1903–1969
Thomas Kuhn
critiqué par
Kuhn objected to Popper that normal science solves puzzles without testing its paradigm, which single anomalies do not overturn (‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, 1970). T. S. Kuhn, “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970); Popper’s reply “Normal Science and Its Dangers”, ibid.
Attestation: brouillon IA
Thomas Kuhn › 1922–1996
Imre Lakatos a influencé
a influencé ✓
Lakatos, Popper’s colleague at the LSE from 1960, applied his critical rationalism to mathematics, whose growth he traced through proofs and counterexamples (‘Proofs and Refutations’, 1963–64). I. Lakatos, “Proofs and Refutations”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (1963–64); SEP “Imre Lakatos”
critiqué par
Against Popper’s naive falsificationism, Lakatos argued that single refutations decide nothing; research programmes are judged as progressive or degenerating (‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, 1970). I. Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” (1970); “Popper on Demarcation and Induction”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1974)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Imre Lakatos › 1922–1974
Paul Feyerabend a enseigné à
a enseigné à ✓
Feyerabend came to the London School of Economics in 1952–53 on a British Council scholarship to study with Popper – he had hoped to work with Wittgenstein, who died in 1951 – and defended Popper’s views for some years before turning against them. P. Feyerabend, Killing Time (1995)
Attestation: aussi dans Wikidata · Wikidata
critiqué par
Feyerabend argued that Popper’s falsificationism, applied strictly, would have wiped out science, since every theory conflicts with some known facts (Against Method, 1975, ch. 5). P. Feyerabend, Against Method (1975), ch. 5; “Consolations for the Specialist”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Paul Feyerabend › 1924–1994
Jürgen Habermas
critiqué par
Habermas attacked Popper’s critical rationalism as a ‘positivistically halved rationalism’ that confines reason to method and leaves the choice of values to decision (1963–64, in Der Positivismusstreit, 1969). J. Habermas, “Analytische Wissenschaftstheorie und Dialektik” (1963); “Gegen einen positivistisch halbierten Rationalismus” (1964, reply to H. Albert); both in Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (1969)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Jürgen Habermas › 1929–2026
Critiques adressées à 9
Platon
a critiqué
Popper read Plato’s ideal state as a closed society and his historicism and holism as an intellectual source of modern totalitarianism (The Spell of Plato, 1945). K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1: The Spell of Plato (1945); critique: R. B. Levinson, In Defense of Plato (1953)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Platon › 428–348 av. J.-C.
Aristote
a critiqué
Popper attacked Aristotle’s ‘methodological essentialism’, the search for definitions of essences, as a root of Hegelian historicism (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945). K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2 (1945), ch. 11 (“The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism”)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Aristote › 384–322 av. J.-C.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
a critiqué
Popper read Hegel as a historicist apologist of the Prussian state whose dialectic prepared modern totalitarianism (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945, vol. 2, ch. 12). K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), vol. 2, ch. 12 “Hegel and the New Tribalism”; critique of this reading: W. Kaufmann, “The Hegel Myth and Its Method”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel › 1770–1831
Karl Marx
a critiqué
Popper argued that Marx’s historicism claims to predict history; when its prophecies failed, they were reinterpreted, making the theory immune to criticism (The Open Society, 1945). K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), vol. 2; Conjectures and Refutations (1963), ch. 1; The Poverty of Historicism (1957)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Karl Marx › 1818–1883
Sigmund Freud
a critiqué
Popper argued that psychoanalysis can interpret any behaviour in its own terms; its constant confirmations show that it cannot be tested (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963, ch. 1). K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (1963), ch. 1 “Science: Conjectures and Refutations”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Sigmund Freud › 1856–1939
Ludwig Wittgenstein
a critiqué
Popper rejected Wittgenstein’s view that there are no genuine philosophical problems, and objected that the Tractatus’ criterion of meaning would also exclude natural laws (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 4, 10; “The Nature of Philosophical Problems and Their Roots in Science” (1952), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951
Tout afficher (9)Afficher moins
Otto Neurath
a critiqué
Popper welcomed Neurath’s view that protocol sentences are revisable, but objected that without rules for discarding them empiricism is thrown overboard (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), § 26; O. Neurath, “Protokollsätze”, Erkenntnis 3 (1932/33)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Otto Neurath › 1882–1945
Rudolf Carnap
a critiqué
Popper rejected Carnap’s verifiability criterion of meaning and inductive logic, proposing falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation, not of meaning (‘The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics’, 1963). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 4–6; “The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963), with Carnap’s reply
Attestation: brouillon IA
Rudolf Carnap › 1891–1970
Hans Reichenbach
a critiqué
Popper rejected Reichenbach’s probability logic of induction: no principle of induction can be justified without infinite regress, and hypotheses cannot be assigned probabilities (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 1, 80–81; H. Reichenbach, Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre (1935)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Hans Reichenbach › 1891–1953
Œuvres
La falsifiabilité plutôt que la vérification – une solution au problème de l’induction ?
Contre Platon, Hegel et Marx : l’historicisme menace la liberté.
Position
Popper partait du problème de l’induction de Hume : aucun nombre de cygnes blancs observés ne prouve que tous les cygnes sont blancs. La science ne peut donc pas vérifier ses théories – mais elle peut les réfuter. Une théorie est scientifique si elle interdit quelque chose et risque ainsi d’être falsifiée ; les théories qui expliquent tout, comme certaines formes de marxisme ou de psychanalyse selon lui, n’expliquent rien. La connaissance progresse par des conjectures audacieuses et des tentatives rigoureuses de réfutation. Popper porta ce rationalisme critique en politique : contre Platon, Hegel et Marx, il défendit la « société ouverte », dans laquelle les institutions peuvent être corrigées sans effusion de sang et où personne ne prétend connaître le cours de l’histoire. Ses idées ont influencé des scientifiques et des responsables politiques bien au-delà de la philosophie.
Vie et contexte
Popper naquit à Vienne en 1902, travailla comme enseignant et passa son doctorat en 1928 avec une thèse sur la méthode de la psychologie de la pensée ; il fut proche du Cercle de Vienne sans en faire partie. En 1937, il fuit la montée du national-socialisme pour la Nouvelle-Zélande, où il écrivit La Société ouverte. À partir de 1946, il enseigna à la London School of Economics ; il fut fait chevalier en 1965 et mourut à Londres en 1994.
Autres œuvres principales
- Misère de l’historicisme (1957)
- Conjectures et réfutations (1963)
- La Connaissance objective (1972)
Apparaît dans
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