David Hume
Pour Hume, nous ne voyons jamais une chose en causer une autre, seulement l’une suivre l’autre ; le moi n’est qu’un faisceau d’expériences ; et la raison est au service de nos sentiments.
Repères
Empiriste radical : la causalité est une habitude, le moi un faisceau de perceptions, la raison l’esclave des passions.
Idées clés
- Critique de la causalité
- Problème de l’induction
- Distinction entre l’être et le devoir-être
- Théorie du faisceau du moi
Ouvrir dans la carte stellaire
Influence
Influences reçues de 8
Cicéron
influencé par
Hume told Hutcheson (1739) he meant to take his catalogue of virtues from Cicero’s Offices; his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion follow Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods. D. Hume to F. Hutcheson, 17 Sept. 1739, in Letters, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (1932); Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779); SEP “Hume on Religion”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Cicéron › 106–43 av. J.-C.
Thomas Hobbes
influencé par
Paul Russell (1985) argued that the scope and plan of Hume’s Treatise (1739–40) were modelled on Hobbes’ Elements of Law (1640); the thesis is debated. P. Russell, “Hume’s Treatise and Hobbes’s The Elements of Law”, Journal of the History of Ideas 46 (1985); The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise (2008)
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Thomas Hobbes › 1588–1679
Nicolas Malebranche
influencé par
Hume took Malebranche’s argument that no necessary connection between finite causes and effects is perceived, but rejected his conclusion that God is the only true cause (Treatise, 1739). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), “Of the idea of necessary connexion”; An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748); SEP “David Hume”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Nicolas Malebranche › 1638–1715
Isaac Newton
influencé par ✓
Hume subtitled his Treatise (1739) ‘an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects’, modelling his science of man on Newton’s natural philosophy. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), title page; SEP “David Hume”
Isaac Newton › 1643–1727
George Berkeley
influencé par ✓
Hume adopted Berkeley’s account of abstract ideas as particular ideas that stand for others, praising it as a ‘valuable discovery’ (Treatise, 1739). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), “Of abstract ideas”; G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Introduction; SEP “David Hume”
George Berkeley › 1685–1753
Francis Hutcheson
influencé par ✓
Hume grounded the morals of Treatise Book III (1740) in a moral sense, following Hutcheson, and discussed the manuscript with him in letters of 1739–40. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III (1740), “Moral distinctions deriv’d from a moral sense”; letters to F. Hutcheson (1739–40), in Letters, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (1932); SEP “Francis Hutcheson”
Francis Hutcheson › 1694–1746
Tout afficher (8)Afficher moins
Pierre Bayle
influencé par
In the Treatise (1739) Hume used Bayle’s Dictionary article ‘Spinoza’ to turn the charge of atheism back on the theologians’ doctrine of an immaterial soul. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), “Of the immateriality of the soul”; P. Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697), “Spinoza”; SEP “Pierre Bayle”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Pierre Bayle › 1647–1706
Bernard de Mandeville
influencé par
Introducing the Treatise (1739), Hume named Mandeville, with Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Butler, among those who began to put the science of man on a new footing. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Introduction; SEP “Bernard Mandeville”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Bernard de Mandeville › 1670–1733
A influencé 17
Adam Smith
a influencé
Smith developed Hume’s account of sympathy into the theory of moral judgement of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), denying that utility is the first source of approval. A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Part IV; D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40); SEP “Adam Smith’s Moral and Political Philosophy”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Adam Smith › 1723–1790
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi
a influencé ✓
In David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism (1787) Jacobi took over Hume’s ‘belief’ as his own term for the immediate certainty of external things. F. H. Jacobi, David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus (1787); SEP “Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi”
Attestation: aussi dans Wikidata · Wikidata
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi › 1743–1819
Jeremy Bentham
a influencé
On reading Hume’s Treatise, Bentham felt ‘as if scales had fallen’ from his eyes: utility was the test of virtue (A Fragment on Government, 1776). J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government (1776); D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III (1740); SEP “Jeremy Bentham”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Jeremy Bentham › 1748–1832
Auguste Comte
a influencé
Comte’s restriction of science to laws of phenomena, renouncing the search for causes, is commonly traced to Hume’s critique of causation (Cours de philosophie positive, 1830–42). A. Comte, Cours de philosophie positive (1830–42); M. Pickering, Auguste Comte: An Intellectual Biography, vol. I (1993); SEP “Auguste Comte”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Auguste Comte › 1798–1857
Bertrand Russell
a influencé ✓
Russell restated Hume’s problem of induction, holding that the inductive principle can be neither proved nor disproved by experience (The Problems of Philosophy, 1912). B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1912), “On Induction”; A History of Western Philosophy (1945); SEP “Bertrand Russell”
Bertrand Russell › 1872–1970
Karl Popper
a influencé
Popper accepted Hume’s argument that induction cannot be logically justified but rejected his psychology of habit, replacing induction with conjecture and falsification (Objective Knowledge, 1972). K. R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934); Objective Knowledge (1972), “Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution of the Problem of Induction”; SEP “Karl Popper”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Karl Popper › 1902–1994
Tout afficher (17)Afficher moins
John Millar
a influencé
Millar, who met Hume at Lord Kames’ house and later taught his nephew, was by John Craig’s account ‘convinced of the truth’ of Hume’s metaphysical opinions. J. Craig, “Account of the Life and Writings of John Millar”, in J. Millar, The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks (4th ed., 1806)
Attestation: brouillon IA
John Millar › 1735–1801
Alexius Meinong
a influencé
Meinong’s first works, Hume-Studien I (1877) on abstraction and nominalism and II (1882) on relations, began from Hume’s theory and prepared his own theory of relations. A. Meinong, Hume-Studien I: Zur Geschichte und Kritik des modernen Nominalismus (1877); Hume-Studien II: Zur Relationstheorie (1882); SEP “Alexius Meinong”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Alexius Meinong › 1853–1920
Edvard Westermarck
a influencé
Westermarck placed his theory that moral judgements express disinterested emotions of approval and disapproval in Hume’s tradition, naming Hume a forerunner (Ethical Relativity, 1932). E. Westermarck, Ethical Relativity (1932); The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (1906–08); T. Stroup, Westermarck’s Ethics (1982); SEP “Hume’s Moral Philosophy”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Edvard Westermarck › 1862–1939
Albert Einstein
a influencé ✓
Einstein said that reading Hume’s critique of concepts, with Mach, helped him question absolute simultaneity in special relativity (letter to Schlick, 1915; Autobiographical Notes, 1949). A. Einstein, “Autobiographical Notes”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (1949); Einstein to M. Schlick, 14 Dec. 1915; SEP “Einstein’s Philosophy of Science”
Albert Einstein › 1879–1955
Alfred Jules Ayer
a influencé
Ayer modelled his split of analytic and empirical propositions on Hume’s relations of ideas and matters of fact, quoting his ‘commit it then to the flames’ (1936). A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936); Hume (1980); D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Alfred Jules Ayer › 1910–1989
Peter Frederick Strawson
a influencé
Strawson took from Hume a naturalist answer to scepticism: belief in bodies and induction are inescapable natural commitments that neither need nor admit justification (Skepticism and Naturalism, 1985). P. F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (1985); SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Peter Frederick Strawson › 1919–2006
John Rawls
a influencé
Rawls took the circumstances of justice – moderate scarcity and limited altruism – from Hume as the conditions under which justice is needed (A Theory of Justice, 1971). J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature III (1740); An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751)
Attestation: brouillon IA
John Rawls › 1921–2002
Gilles Deleuze
a influencé ✓
In Empiricism and Subjectivity (1953) Deleuze read Hume as showing how a subject is constituted within the given through habit and association, and stressed his externality of relations. G. Deleuze, Empirisme et subjectivité (1953); SEP “Gilles Deleuze”; SEP “David Hume”
Attestation: aussi dans Wikidata · Wikidata
Gilles Deleuze › 1925–1995
Saul Kripke
a influencé ✓
Kripke modelled the ‘sceptical solution’ he ascribed to Wittgenstein on Hume’s treatment of causation: a sceptical paradox about meaning is answered by community practice, not facts (1982). S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982); D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748); SEP “Rule-Following and Intentionality”
Attestation: aussi dans Wikidata · Wikidata
Saul Kripke › 1940–2022
David Lewis
a influencé
Lewis named his thesis of ‘Humean supervenience’ after Hume, the denier of necessary connections: everything supervenes on the local distribution of particular qualities (Philosophical Papers II, 1986). D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol. II (1986), introduction; “Humean Supervenience Debugged”, Mind 103 (1994); SEP “David Lewis”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
David Lewis › 1941–2001
Derek Parfit
a influencé
Parfit’s reductionism about persons – identity is psychological and physical continuity, no further fact – is commonly compared with Hume’s bundle view (Reasons and Persons, 1984). D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984); D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), “Of personal identity”; SEP “Personal Identity”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Derek Parfit › 1942–2017
Critique
Critiques reçues de 5
Thomas Reid
critiqué par
Reid argued that Hume’s scepticism follows from the theory of ideas and answered it with first principles of common sense (Inquiry into the Human Mind, 1764). T. Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), Dedication, chs. I and VII; SEP “Thomas Reid”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Thomas Reid › 1710–1796
Emmanuel Kant a influencé
a influencé ✓
Kant generalised Hume’s question about cause and effect into the problem of how synthetic judgements a priori are possible (Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd ed. 1787, Introduction). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2nd ed. 1787), Introduction; Prolegomena (1783); SEP “Kant and Hume on Causality”
critiqué par
Kant credited Hume with interrupting his dogmatic slumber but rejected deriving causality from habit, making it an a priori category (Prolegomena, 1783, Preface). I. Kant, Prolegomena (1783), Preface (AA IV 257–260); Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 19–20, B 127–128
Attestation: brouillon IA
Emmanuel Kant › 1724–1804
Catharine Macaulay
critiqué par
Macaulay’s History of England (1763–1783) set a republican account of the Stuart era against Hume’s History, which in Macaulay’s view excused arbitrary royal power. C. Macaulay, The History of England from the Accession of James I to that of the Brunswick Line (8 vols., 1763–1783); SEP “Catharine Macaulay”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Catharine Macaulay › 1731–1791
Mary Shepherd
critiqué par
Against Hume, Shepherd held that reason, not custom, shows that nothing begins to exist without a cause (Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, 1824). M. Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect (1824); SEP “Mary Shepherd”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Mary Shepherd › 1777–1847
Alasdair MacIntyre
critiqué par
MacIntyre read Hume’s grounding of morals in the passions, and his is–ought gap, as part of the failed Enlightenment project of justifying morality (After Virtue, 1981). A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981), chs. 4–5; Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Alasdair MacIntyre › 1929–2025
Critiques adressées à 3
René Descartes
a critiqué
Hume objected that Descartes’ antecedent universal doubt would be incurable, since no principle could restore trust in our faculties once all were suspended (Enquiry, 1748, XII). D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), XII.i; SEP “David Hume”
Attestation: brouillon IA
René Descartes › 1596–1650
John Locke influencé par
influencé par ✓
Hume took over Locke’s principle that all ideas come from experience, recasting it as the thesis that every simple idea copies a prior impression (Treatise, 1739). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739); J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689); SEP “David Hume”
a critiqué
Hume objected that Locke drew the idea of power from reasoning, though no reasoning can yield a new simple idea (Treatise, 1739, 1.3.14; Enquiry VII). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), 1.3.14; An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), VII, note; J. Locke, Essay II.xxi
Attestation: brouillon IA
John Locke › 1632–1704
Adam Ferguson
a critiqué
Hume judged the draft of Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society unfit for the public in style and reasoning (letter to Hugh Blair, 1766). D. Hume to H. Blair, 11 Feb. 1766, in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (1932), vol. II
Attestation: brouillon IA
Adam Ferguson › 1723–1816
Œuvres
Impressions et idées, la causalité comme coutume, le moi comme faisceau.
La version resserrée des problèmes de la causalité et de l’induction.
Une critique de l’argument du dessein.
Position
Hume voulait bâtir une science de la nature humaine sur l’expérience. Toutes nos idées dérivent d’impressions, et quand nous examinons la causalité, nous ne trouvons aucune connexion nécessaire, seulement une conjonction constante et notre habitude d’attendre l’effet – de sorte que l’induction n’a aucune justification rationnelle. Le moi non plus n’est pas une substance, mais un faisceau de perceptions. En éthique, la raison est « l’esclave des passions » : la morale repose sur le sentiment et la sympathie, et aucun « devoir être » ne découle d’un « être ». Ses Dialogues démantèlent l’argument du dessein. Kant dit que le scepticisme de Hume l’avait tiré de son « sommeil dogmatique », et Hume reste une influence essentielle sur l’empirisme et la philosophie analytique. Dans une note de bas de page ajoutée en 1753 à « Des caractères nationaux », il écrivit qu’il était « porté à soupçonner » que les Noirs sont « naturellement inférieurs aux Blancs » – un passage contesté dès son vivant (notamment par James Beattie) et central dans les débats sur le racisme au siècle des Lumières.
Vie et contexte
Né à Édimbourg en 1711, Hume écrivit sa première œuvre majeure pendant un séjour en France et la publia vers la fin de la vingtaine. Son mauvais accueil et sa réputation de sceptique lui coûtèrent des chaires à Édimbourg et à Glasgow. Il devint célèbre à la place comme essayiste et comme auteur d’une Histoire d’Angleterre, travailla comme bibliothécaire de la bibliothèque des Avocats d’Édimbourg et comme diplomate à Paris, et mourut à Édimbourg en 1776.
Autres œuvres principales
- Enquête sur les principes de la morale (1751)
- Histoire d’Angleterre (1754–1762)
Apparaît dans
État en novembre 2026 · Sources · Améliorer cette page · Comment Agora est faite