Ludwig Wittgenstein
Pour le premier Wittgenstein, le langage figure le monde, et ce qui ne peut être figuré doit être passé sous silence ; pour le second, dans bien des cas, ce qu’un mot signifie, c’est la manière dont il est employé.
Repères
« Les limites de mon langage signifient les limites de mon monde. » Plus tard : pour une grande classe de cas, la signification d’un mot est son usage dans le langage.
Idées clés
- Théorie de l’image
- Jeux de langage
- Ressemblance de famille
- Argument du langage privé
Maîtres: Bertrand Russell
Élèves: Georg Henrik von Wright, G. E. M. Anscombe
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Influence
Influences reçues de 5
Arthur Schopenhauer
influencé par ✓
Wittgenstein’s early view of the metaphysical subject and will, in the Notebooks 1914–16 (publ. 1961) and the Tractatus (1921), drew on Schopenhauer, whom he read as a youth. L. Wittgenstein, Tagebücher 1914–1916 (publ. 1961); Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (1921); G. H. von Wright, “Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Biographical Sketch”, Philosophical Review 64 (1955); SEP “Arthur Schopenhauer”
Arthur Schopenhauer › 1788–1860
Søren Kierkegaard
influencé par ✓
Wittgenstein esteemed Kierkegaard, as Drury reported, and shared his view that Christianity is not a doctrine but a way of living (Culture and Value, remarks 1914–51; publ. 1977). L. Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen (ed. G. H. von Wright, 1977; Engl. Culture and Value, 1980); M. O’C. Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein”, in R. Rhees (ed.), Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections (1981); SEP “Søren Kierkegaard”
Søren Kierkegaard › 1813–1855
Léon Tolstoï
influencé par
During the war Wittgenstein carried Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief, bought in Galicia (1914); biographers link it to the ethical-mystical close of the Tractatus (1921). B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig 1889–1921 (1988); R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990); L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (1921)
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Léon Tolstoï › 1828–1910
William James
influencé par
Wittgenstein found James’s Varieties of Religious Experience helpful (letter to Russell, 1912) and used his Principles of Psychology as a foil in the Philosophical Investigations (publ. 1953). L. Wittgenstein, letter to B. Russell (June 1912); Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); R. B. Goodman, Wittgenstein and William James (2002); SEP “William James”
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William James › 1842–1910
George Edward Moore
influencé par
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (written 1949–51; publ. 1969) starts from Moore’s defence of common sense (1925, 1939) and recasts his truisms as hinges of our practices. L. Wittgenstein, Über Gewißheit / On Certainty (written 1949–51; publ. 1969); G. E. Moore, “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925); “Proof of an External World” (1939); SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
George Edward Moore › 1873–1958
A influencé 30
Rudolf Carnap
a influencé ✓
Carnap took from the Tractatus, read in the Vienna Circle, the view that logic consists of tautologies and metaphysics of pseudo-sentences, and met Wittgenstein in 1927–29. R. Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache” (1932); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”; SEP “Vienna Circle”
Attestation: aussi dans Wikidata · Wikidata
Rudolf Carnap › 1891–1970
Gilbert Ryle
a influencé
Ryle, who knew Wittgenstein from 1929, shared his view of philosophy as dissolving conceptual confusions and paid tribute to his method (‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’, 1951). G. Ryle, “Ludwig Wittgenstein”, Analysis 12 (1951); “Autobiographical”, in O. P. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds.), Ryle (1970); SEP “Gilbert Ryle”
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Gilbert Ryle › 1900–1976
G. E. M. Anscombe a enseigné à
a enseigné à ✓
Anscombe moved to Newnham College, Cambridge, in 1942 as a research student and attended Wittgenstein’s lectures, which she said freed her from phenomenalism; she became one of his closest students, translated the Philosophical Investigations (1953) and was one of his literary executors. SEP “Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe”; R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990)
Attestation: aussi dans Wikidata · Wikidata
G. E. M. Anscombe › 1919–2001
Pierre Bourdieu
a influencé ✓
Bourdieu invoked Wittgenstein on rule-following against a legalistic view of practice: agents act from a practical sense, not by obeying explicit rules (‘De la règle aux stratégies’, 1985). P. Bourdieu, “De la règle aux stratégies” (1985), in Choses dites (1987); Le sens pratique (1980); SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
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Pierre Bourdieu › 1930–2002
Charles Taylor
a influencé
Taylor read Wittgenstein’s remarks on following a rule as showing that understanding rests on an unarticulated background of embodied practice (‘To Follow a Rule’, 1993). C. Taylor, “To Follow a Rule”, in C. Calhoun et al. (eds.), Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (1993), repr. in Philosophical Arguments (1995)
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Charles Taylor › né(e) en 1931
John Searle
a influencé ✓
Searle acknowledged the later Wittgenstein, especially On Certainty, as a source of his thesis that intentional states work only against a non-representational Background (Intentionality, 1983). J. R. Searle, Intentionality (1983); The Construction of Social Reality (1995); L. Wittgenstein, Über Gewißheit (publ. 1969)
John Searle › 1932–2025
Tout afficher (30)Afficher moins
Moritz Schlick
a influencé
Schlick saw in the Tractatus the turning point of philosophy, now an activity of clarifying meaning, not a science (‘Die Wende der Philosophie’, 1930); they met from 1927. M. Schlick, “Die Wende der Philosophie”, Erkenntnis 1 (1930); F. Waismann, Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis (ed. B. McGuinness, 1967); SEP “Moritz Schlick”
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Moritz Schlick › 1882–1936
Susanne Langer
a influencé
Langer modelled discursive symbolism on the Tractatus’ picture theory, then argued that art and myth are ‘presentational’ symbols beyond its limits (Philosophy in a New Key, 1942). S. K. Langer, The Practice of Philosophy (1930); Philosophy in a New Key (1942); L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921/22)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Susanne Langer › 1895–1985
Alfred Jules Ayer
a influencé
Ayer took from the Tractatus (1921) the view that logical truths are tautologies saying nothing about the world and extended it to mathematics (Language, Truth and Logic, 1936). A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936); L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (1921); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”
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Alfred Jules Ayer › 1910–1989
Wilfrid Sellars
a influencé
Sellars took up Wittgenstein’s language games and met the regress of rules with pattern-governed behaviour that precedes explicit rule-obeying (‘Some Reflections on Language Games’, 1954). W. Sellars, “Some Reflections on Language Games”, Philosophy of Science 21 (1954); SEP “Wilfrid Sellars”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Wilfrid Sellars › 1912–1989
Alan Turing
a influencé contesté
Turing attended Wittgenstein’s Cambridge lectures on the foundations of mathematics (1939) and argued with him over contradictions; how far this shaped Turing’s work is disputed. C. Diamond (ed.), Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939 (1976); J. Floyd, “Turing on ‘Common Sense’: Cambridge Resonances”, in J. Floyd and A. Bokulich (eds.), Philosophical Explorations of the Legacy of Alan Turing (2017)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Alan Turing › 1912–1954
Georg Henrik von Wright a enseigné à
a enseigné à ✓
Von Wright met Wittgenstein in Cambridge in 1939 and attended his lectures; in 1948 he succeeded him in the Cambridge chair and later became one of his literary executors. G. H. von Wright, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright (1989)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Georg Henrik von Wright › 1916–2003
Philippa Foot
a influencé ✓
Foot, influenced by Wittgenstein through Anscombe, argued that moral terms like ‘rude’ have criteria of application fixed by use, against the fact–value gap (‘Moral Arguments’, 1958). P. Foot, “Moral Arguments”, Mind 67 (1958); “Moral Beliefs”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1958–59); SEP “Philippa Foot”
Philippa Foot › 1920–2010
Thomas Kuhn
a influencé
Kuhn used Wittgenstein’s family resemblance to explain how paradigms can guide research without a shared set of rules (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Thomas Kuhn › 1922–1996
Paul Feyerabend
a influencé
Feyerabend, who had planned to study with Wittgenstein in Cambridge, gave an early long account of the Philosophical Investigations (‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations’, 1955). P. K. Feyerabend, “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations”, Philosophical Review 64 (1955); Killing Time (1995); SEP “Paul Feyerabend”
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Paul Feyerabend › 1924–1994
Jean-François Lyotard
a influencé
Lyotard took Wittgenstein’s language games as the model for the heterogeneity of discourses in The Postmodern Condition (1979), later recast as incommensurable phrase regimens (Le différend, 1983). J.-F. Lyotard, La condition postmoderne (1979); Le différend (1983); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953); SEP “Jean François Lyotard”
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Jean-François Lyotard › 1924–1998
Michael Dummett
a influencé
Dummett turned Wittgenstein’s idea that meaning is use into the demand that understanding be manifest in use, the basis of his anti-realism (1976; Truth and Other Enigmas, 1978). M. Dummett, “What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II)” (1976), in The Seas of Language (1993); Truth and Other Enigmas (1978); “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); SEP “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Michael Dummett › 1925–2011
Hilary Putnam
a influencé ✓
Putnam drew on Wittgenstein, read not as an anti-realist, for his natural realism of perception and his account of religious language (Renewing Philosophy, 1992; The Threefold Cord, 1999). H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (1992); The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (1999); “Was Wittgenstein Really an Anti-realist about Mathematics?” (2001)
Hilary Putnam › 1926–2016
Jaakko Hintikka
a influencé
Hintikka modelled his game-theoretical semantics on Wittgenstein’s language-games (Logic, Language-Games and Information, 1973) and with Merrill B. Hintikka reinterpreted his development (Investigating Wittgenstein, 1986). J. Hintikka, Logic, Language-Games and Information (1973); M. B. Hintikka and J. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (1986)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Jaakko Hintikka › 1929–2015
Alasdair MacIntyre
a influencé
MacIntyre’s early conceptual study of Freud treated the unconscious as a descriptive rather than explanatory concept, a method commentators link to Wittgenstein (The Unconscious, 1958). A. MacIntyre, The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis (1958; rev. 2004)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Alasdair MacIntyre › 1929–2025
Bernard Williams
a influencé
Williams asked whether Wittgenstein’s later philosophy implies a transcendental idealism of the first-person plural (‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’, 1974) and discussed Wittgensteinian arguments on thick ethical concepts (1985). B. Williams, “Wittgenstein and Idealism” (1974), in Moral Luck (1981); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985); SEP “Bernard Williams”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Bernard Williams › 1929–2003
Richard Rorty
a influencé
Rorty took from the later Wittgenstein the idea of philosophy as therapy, not theory, and read him as dissolving rather than solving traditional problems (‘Keeping Philosophy Pure’, 1976). R. Rorty, “Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay on Wittgenstein” (1976), in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); SEP “Richard Rorty”
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Richard Rorty › 1931–2007
Viola Cordova
a influencé
To understand non-Western worldviews, Cordova’s dissertation (1992) drew on Whorf and on Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough. V. F. Cordova, The Concept of Monism in Navajo Thought (PhD diss., University of New Mexico, 1992), abstract; L. Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über Frazers Golden Bough (1967)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Viola Cordova › 1937–2002
Thomas Nagel
a influencé
Nagel met Wittgenstein’s later philosophy at Cornell through Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein’s student and friend, whose letter introduced him to Anscombe at Oxford in 1958. T. Nagel, review essay on Anscombe, Foot, Midgley and Murdoch, London Review of Books (2022); N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (1958)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Thomas Nagel › né(e) en 1937
Anthony Giddens
a influencé
Giddens took from Wittgenstein the view that knowing a rule means knowing how to go on, making practical consciousness central to structuration theory (The Constitution of Society, 1984). A. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (1976); The Constitution of Society (1984); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Anthony Giddens › né(e) en 1938
Saul Kripke
a influencé ✓
Kripke presented Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks as a sceptical paradox – no fact fixes that ‘plus’ means addition – stressing it was the argument ‘as it struck Kripke’ (1982). S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Rule-Following and Intentionality”
Saul Kripke › 1940–2022
Kōjin Karatani
a influencé
In Exploration I (Tankyū I, 1986) Karatani took up Wittgenstein’s rule-following problem and recast communication as teaching or selling to an other who does not share one’s rules. Karatani Kōjin, Tankyū I (1986); Transcritique (2001; Eng. 2003)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Kōjin Karatani › né(e) en 1941
Daniel Dennett
a influencé
Dennett, a student of Ryle, drew on Wittgenstein’s attack on private inner objects in denying that experience has ineffable, intrinsic qualia (‘Quining Qualia’, 1988; Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, “Quining Qualia”, in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science (1988); Consciousness Explained (1991)
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Daniel Dennett › 1942–2024
Alice Crary
a influencé
Crary co-edited The New Wittgenstein (2000) and drew on Wittgenstein to argue that moral thought pervades our concepts, not only explicit judgements (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary and R. Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein (2000); A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Alice Crary › né(e) en 1967
José Medina
a influencé
Medina read Wittgenstein as a contextualist for whom meaning rests on shared practices (The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, 2002), extending this to identity and agency (2006). J. Medina, The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Necessity, Intelligibility, and Normativity (2002); Speaking from Elsewhere (2006)
Attestation: brouillon IA
José Medina › né(e) en 1968
Critique
Critiques reçues de 2
Karl Popper
critiqué par
Popper rejected Wittgenstein’s view that there are no genuine philosophical problems, and objected that the Tractatus’ criterion of meaning would also exclude natural laws (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 4, 10; “The Nature of Philosophical Problems and Their Roots in Science” (1952), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Karl Popper › 1902–1994
Jerry Fodor
critiqué par
With Chihara, Fodor attacked Wittgensteinian criteria for mental concepts (1965) and later argued that learning a language presupposes an innate language of thought (The Language of Thought, 1975). C. Chihara & J. Fodor, “Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein”, American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965); J. Fodor, The Language of Thought (1975), ch. 2
Attestation: brouillon IA
Jerry Fodor › 1935–2017
Critiques adressées à 4
Augustin d’Hippone influencé par
influencé par
Wittgenstein used Augustine’s puzzle about time – known until one is asked – as a model of philosophical perplexity (Blue Book, dictated 1933–34; Philosophical Investigations, publ. 1953). L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (dictated 1933–35; publ. 1958); Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); Augustine, Confessiones XI; SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
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a critiqué
Wittgenstein opened the Philosophical Investigations (1953) with Augustine’s account of learning words (Confessions I.8) and criticised its picture that every word names an object. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953), §§ 1–3, 32; Augustine, Confessions I.8.13
Attestation: brouillon IA
Augustin d’Hippone › 354–430
Gottlob Frege influencé par
influencé par ✓
Wittgenstein, who visited Frege (1911), thanked ‘the great works of Frege’ in the Tractatus preface and adopted his principle that names have meaning only in propositions (1921). L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (completed 1918; publ. 1921), preface; G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
a critiqué
Wittgenstein rejected Frege’s view that sentences name truth-values and that logical constants represent anything; Frege’s assertion sign he called logically meaningless (Tractatus, 1921, 4.0312, 4.431, 4.442). L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), 3.143, 4.0312, 4.431, 4.442; Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953), § 71
Attestation: brouillon IA
Gottlob Frege › 1848–1925
Bertrand Russell élève dea influencé
élève de ✓
Wittgenstein came to Cambridge in October 1911 to study logic with Russell and in 1912 was admitted to Trinity College as his student; his Notes on Logic (1913) were written for Russell. R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990); B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig (1988)
Attestation: brouillon IA
a influencé ✓
Russell said his lectures on logical atomism were largely concerned with explaining ideas he had learnt from his former pupil Wittgenstein (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, 1918). B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (lectures 1918; The Monist 1918–19), preliminary note
a critiqué
Wittgenstein objected that Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgement allows nonsense to be judged (1913), and later rejected his theory of types as superfluous (Tractatus, 1921, 3.331–3.333, 5.5422). L. Wittgenstein to B. Russell, June 1913; Notes on Logic (1913); Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), 3.331–3.333, 5.5422
Attestation: brouillon IA
Bertrand Russell › 1872–1970
Kurt Gödel
a critiqué
Wittgenstein questioned the philosophical significance of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and doubted that ‘true but unprovable’ makes sense outside a system (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 1956). L. Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (1956), part I, appendix I (3rd ed. 1978: appendix III); SEP “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Kurt Gödel › 1906–1978
Œuvres
Le monde est tout ce qui arrive … Ce dont on ne peut parler, il faut le taire.
Jeux de langage, suivi de règle, langage privé – en ouverture, l’image augustinienne du langage.
- 1969De la certitude
Que signifie savoir quelque chose ? Notes sur la défense du sens commun de Moore et son « Voici une main ».
Position
Le premier Wittgenstein se demandait ce que doit être le langage pour pouvoir représenter le monde. Sa réponse dans le Tractatus : une phrase douée de sens est une image logique d’un état de choses possible ; l’éthique, l’esthétique et le sens de la vie ne peuvent pas être dits, mais seulement montrés – « Ce dont on ne peut parler, il faut le taire. » Le second Wittgenstein rompit avec cette image. Les mots, soutenait-il désormais, n’ont pas d’essence cachée ; leur signification est leur usage dans de multiples « jeux de langage » entrelacés, reliés par des ressemblances de famille plutôt que par un noyau commun. Les problèmes philosophiques surgissent quand le langage « part en vacances ». Les deux phases ont marqué le XXe siècle : la première l’empirisme logique, la seconde la philosophie du langage ordinaire et au-delà.
Vie et contexte
Wittgenstein grandit dans l’une des familles industrielles les plus riches de Vienne, étudia l’ingénierie à Berlin et à Manchester et vint trouver Bertrand Russell à Cambridge en 1911. Il acheva le Tractatus comme soldat pendant la Première Guerre mondiale, puis distribua sa fortune et enseigna dans des écoles de village de Basse-Autriche, où il frappa des élèves – les châtiments corporels restaient alors répandus dans les écoles de village, mais des parents se plaignirent de sa sévérité ; après l’effondrement d’un élève en avril 1926, il démissionna, une procédure devant le tribunal de district de Gloggnitz suivit (son issue n’est pas claire dans les sources), et en 1936–1937 il présenta ses excuses à d’anciens élèves. En 1929, il retourna à Cambridge, où il occupa plus tard une chaire jusqu’en 1947.
Autres œuvres principales
- Le Cahier bleu et le Cahier brun (1958)
Apparaît dans
- Voyage « Le doute et le moi » · Étape 10 sur 10
- Voyage « Le tournant linguistique » · Étape 3 sur 10
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