Ludwig Wittgenstein

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Schlick saw in the Tractatus the turning point of philosophy, now an activity of clarifying meaning, not a science (‘Die Wende der Philosophie’, 1930); they met from 1927. M. Schlick, “Die Wende der Philosophie”, Erkenntnis 1 (1930); F. Waismann, Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis (ed. B. McGuinness, 1967); SEP “Moritz Schlick”

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Langer modelled discursive symbolism on the Tractatus’ picture theory, then argued that art and myth are ‘presentational’ symbols beyond its limits (Philosophy in a New Key, 1942). S. K. Langer, The Practice of Philosophy (1930); Philosophy in a New Key (1942); L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921/22)

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Ayer took from the Tractatus (1921) the view that logical truths are tautologies saying nothing about the world and extended it to mathematics (Language, Truth and Logic, 1936). A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936); L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (1921); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”

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Sellars took up Wittgenstein’s language games and met the regress of rules with pattern-governed behaviour that precedes explicit rule-obeying (‘Some Reflections on Language Games’, 1954). W. Sellars, “Some Reflections on Language Games”, Philosophy of Science 21 (1954); SEP “Wilfrid Sellars”

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Turing attended Wittgenstein’s Cambridge lectures on the foundations of mathematics (1939) and argued with him over contradictions; how far this shaped Turing’s work is disputed. C. Diamond (ed.), Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939 (1976); J. Floyd, “Turing on ‘Common Sense’: Cambridge Resonances”, in J. Floyd and A. Bokulich (eds.), Philosophical Explorations of the Legacy of Alan Turing (2017)

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Von Wright met Wittgenstein in Cambridge in 1939 and attended his lectures; in 1948 he succeeded him in the Cambridge chair and later became one of his literary executors. G. H. von Wright, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright (1989)

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Foot, influenced by Wittgenstein through Anscombe, argued that moral terms like ‘rude’ have criteria of application fixed by use, against the fact–value gap (‘Moral Arguments’, 1958). P. Foot, “Moral Arguments”, Mind 67 (1958); “Moral Beliefs”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1958–59); SEP “Philippa Foot”

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Kuhn used Wittgenstein’s family resemblance to explain how paradigms can guide research without a shared set of rules (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”

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Feyerabend, who had planned to study with Wittgenstein in Cambridge, gave an early long account of the Philosophical Investigations (‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations’, 1955). P. K. Feyerabend, “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations”, Philosophical Review 64 (1955); Killing Time (1995); SEP “Paul Feyerabend”

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Lyotard took Wittgenstein’s language games as the model for the heterogeneity of discourses in The Postmodern Condition (1979), later recast as incommensurable phrase regimens (Le différend, 1983). J.-F. Lyotard, La condition postmoderne (1979); Le différend (1983); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953); SEP “Jean François Lyotard”

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Dummett turned Wittgenstein’s idea that meaning is use into the demand that understanding be manifest in use, the basis of his anti-realism (1976; Truth and Other Enigmas, 1978). M. Dummett, “What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II)” (1976), in The Seas of Language (1993); Truth and Other Enigmas (1978); “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); SEP “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”

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Putnam drew on Wittgenstein, read not as an anti-realist, for his natural realism of perception and his account of religious language (Renewing Philosophy, 1992; The Threefold Cord, 1999). H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (1992); The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (1999); “Was Wittgenstein Really an Anti-realist about Mathematics?” (2001)

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Hintikka modelled his game-theoretical semantics on Wittgenstein’s language-games (Logic, Language-Games and Information, 1973) and with Merrill B. Hintikka reinterpreted his development (Investigating Wittgenstein, 1986). J. Hintikka, Logic, Language-Games and Information (1973); M. B. Hintikka and J. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (1986)

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MacIntyre’s early conceptual study of Freud treated the unconscious as a descriptive rather than explanatory concept, a method commentators link to Wittgenstein (The Unconscious, 1958). A. MacIntyre, The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis (1958; rev. 2004)

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Williams asked whether Wittgenstein’s later philosophy implies a transcendental idealism of the first-person plural (‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’, 1974) and discussed Wittgensteinian arguments on thick ethical concepts (1985). B. Williams, “Wittgenstein and Idealism” (1974), in Moral Luck (1981); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985); SEP “Bernard Williams”

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Rorty took from the later Wittgenstein the idea of philosophy as therapy, not theory, and read him as dissolving rather than solving traditional problems (‘Keeping Philosophy Pure’, 1976). R. Rorty, “Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay on Wittgenstein” (1976), in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); SEP “Richard Rorty”

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To understand non-Western worldviews, Cordova’s dissertation (1992) drew on Whorf and on Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough. V. F. Cordova, The Concept of Monism in Navajo Thought (PhD diss., University of New Mexico, 1992), abstract; L. Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über Frazers Golden Bough (1967)

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Nagel met Wittgenstein’s later philosophy at Cornell through Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein’s student and friend, whose letter introduced him to Anscombe at Oxford in 1958. T. Nagel, review essay on Anscombe, Foot, Midgley and Murdoch, London Review of Books (2022); N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (1958)

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Giddens took from Wittgenstein the view that knowing a rule means knowing how to go on, making practical consciousness central to structuration theory (The Constitution of Society, 1984). A. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (1976); The Constitution of Society (1984); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953)

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Kripke presented Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks as a sceptical paradox – no fact fixes that ‘plus’ means addition – stressing it was the argument ‘as it struck Kripke’ (1982). S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Rule-Following and Intentionality”

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In Exploration I (Tankyū I, 1986) Karatani took up Wittgenstein’s rule-following problem and recast communication as teaching or selling to an other who does not share one’s rules. Karatani Kōjin, Tankyū I (1986); Transcritique (2001; Eng. 2003)

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Dennett, a student of Ryle, drew on Wittgenstein’s attack on private inner objects in denying that experience has ineffable, intrinsic qualia (‘Quining Qualia’, 1988; Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, “Quining Qualia”, in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science (1988); Consciousness Explained (1991)

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Crary co-edited The New Wittgenstein (2000) and drew on Wittgenstein to argue that moral thought pervades our concepts, not only explicit judgements (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary and R. Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein (2000); A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007)

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Medina read Wittgenstein as a contextualist for whom meaning rests on shared practices (The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, 2002), extending this to identity and agency (2006). J. Medina, The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Necessity, Intelligibility, and Normativity (2002); Speaking from Elsewhere (2006)

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