Ludwig Wittgenstein
For the early Wittgenstein, language pictures the world, and whatever cannot be pictured must be passed over in silence; for the later, in many cases what a word means is how it is used.
Placement
“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.” Later: for a large class of cases, the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
Key ideas
- Picture theory
- Language games
- Family resemblance
- Private language argument
Teachers: Bertrand Russell
Students: Georg Henrik von Wright, G. E. M. Anscombe
Influence
Influenced by 5
Arthur Schopenhauer
influenced by ✓
Wittgenstein’s early view of the metaphysical subject and will, in the Notebooks 1914–16 (publ. 1961) and the Tractatus (1921), drew on Schopenhauer, whom he read as a youth. L. Wittgenstein, Tagebücher 1914–1916 (publ. 1961); Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (1921); G. H. von Wright, “Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Biographical Sketch”, Philosophical Review 64 (1955); SEP “Arthur Schopenhauer”
Arthur Schopenhauer › 1788–1860
Søren Kierkegaard
influenced by ✓
Wittgenstein esteemed Kierkegaard, as Drury reported, and shared his view that Christianity is not a doctrine but a way of living (Culture and Value, remarks 1914–51; publ. 1977). L. Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen (ed. G. H. von Wright, 1977; Engl. Culture and Value, 1980); M. O’C. Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein”, in R. Rhees (ed.), Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections (1981); SEP “Søren Kierkegaard”
Søren Kierkegaard › 1813–1855
Leo Tolstoy
influenced by
During the war Wittgenstein carried Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief, bought in Galicia (1914); biographers link it to the ethical-mystical close of the Tractatus (1921). B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig 1889–1921 (1988); R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990); L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (1921)
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Leo Tolstoy › 1828–1910
William James
influenced by
Wittgenstein found James’s Varieties of Religious Experience helpful (letter to Russell, 1912) and used his Principles of Psychology as a foil in the Philosophical Investigations (publ. 1953). L. Wittgenstein, letter to B. Russell (June 1912); Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); R. B. Goodman, Wittgenstein and William James (2002); SEP “William James”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
William James › 1842–1910
G. E. Moore
influenced by
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (written 1949–51; publ. 1969) starts from Moore’s defence of common sense (1925, 1939) and recasts his truisms as hinges of our practices. L. Wittgenstein, Über Gewißheit / On Certainty (written 1949–51; publ. 1969); G. E. Moore, “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925); “Proof of an External World” (1939); SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
G. E. Moore › 1873–1958
Influenced 30
Rudolf Carnap
influenced ✓
Carnap took from the Tractatus, read in the Vienna Circle, the view that logic consists of tautologies and metaphysics of pseudo-sentences, and met Wittgenstein in 1927–29. R. Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache” (1932); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”; SEP “Vienna Circle”
Evidence: also in Wikidata · Wikidata
Rudolf Carnap › 1891–1970
Gilbert Ryle
influenced
Ryle, who knew Wittgenstein from 1929, shared his view of philosophy as dissolving conceptual confusions and paid tribute to his method (‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’, 1951). G. Ryle, “Ludwig Wittgenstein”, Analysis 12 (1951); “Autobiographical”, in O. P. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds.), Ryle (1970); SEP “Gilbert Ryle”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Gilbert Ryle › 1900–1976
G. E. M. Anscombe taught
taught ✓
Anscombe moved to Newnham College, Cambridge, in 1942 as a research student and attended Wittgenstein’s lectures, which she said freed her from phenomenalism; she became one of his closest students, translated the Philosophical Investigations (1953) and was one of his literary executors. SEP “Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe”; R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990)
Evidence: also in Wikidata · Wikidata
G. E. M. Anscombe › 1919–2001
Pierre Bourdieu
influenced ✓
Bourdieu invoked Wittgenstein on rule-following against a legalistic view of practice: agents act from a practical sense, not by obeying explicit rules (‘De la règle aux stratégies’, 1985). P. Bourdieu, “De la règle aux stratégies” (1985), in Choses dites (1987); Le sens pratique (1980); SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
Evidence: also in Wikidata · Wikidata
Pierre Bourdieu › 1930–2002
Charles Taylor
influenced
Taylor read Wittgenstein’s remarks on following a rule as showing that understanding rests on an unarticulated background of embodied practice (‘To Follow a Rule’, 1993). C. Taylor, “To Follow a Rule”, in C. Calhoun et al. (eds.), Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (1993), repr. in Philosophical Arguments (1995)
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Charles Taylor › b. 1931
John Searle
influenced ✓
Searle acknowledged the later Wittgenstein, especially On Certainty, as a source of his thesis that intentional states work only against a non-representational Background (Intentionality, 1983). J. R. Searle, Intentionality (1983); The Construction of Social Reality (1995); L. Wittgenstein, Über Gewißheit (publ. 1969)
John Searle › 1932–2025
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Moritz Schlick
influenced
Schlick saw in the Tractatus the turning point of philosophy, now an activity of clarifying meaning, not a science (‘Die Wende der Philosophie’, 1930); they met from 1927. M. Schlick, “Die Wende der Philosophie”, Erkenntnis 1 (1930); F. Waismann, Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis (ed. B. McGuinness, 1967); SEP “Moritz Schlick”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Moritz Schlick › 1882–1936
Susanne K. Langer
influenced
Langer modelled discursive symbolism on the Tractatus’ picture theory, then argued that art and myth are ‘presentational’ symbols beyond its limits (Philosophy in a New Key, 1942). S. K. Langer, The Practice of Philosophy (1930); Philosophy in a New Key (1942); L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921/22)
Evidence: AI draft
Susanne K. Langer › 1895–1985
A. J. Ayer
influenced
Ayer took from the Tractatus (1921) the view that logical truths are tautologies saying nothing about the world and extended it to mathematics (Language, Truth and Logic, 1936). A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936); L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (1921); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
A. J. Ayer › 1910–1989
Wilfrid Sellars
influenced
Sellars took up Wittgenstein’s language games and met the regress of rules with pattern-governed behaviour that precedes explicit rule-obeying (‘Some Reflections on Language Games’, 1954). W. Sellars, “Some Reflections on Language Games”, Philosophy of Science 21 (1954); SEP “Wilfrid Sellars”
Evidence: AI draft
Wilfrid Sellars › 1912–1989
Alan Turing
influenced disputed
Turing attended Wittgenstein’s Cambridge lectures on the foundations of mathematics (1939) and argued with him over contradictions; how far this shaped Turing’s work is disputed. C. Diamond (ed.), Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939 (1976); J. Floyd, “Turing on ‘Common Sense’: Cambridge Resonances”, in J. Floyd and A. Bokulich (eds.), Philosophical Explorations of the Legacy of Alan Turing (2017)
Evidence: AI draft
Alan Turing › 1912–1954
Georg Henrik von Wright taught
taught ✓
Von Wright met Wittgenstein in Cambridge in 1939 and attended his lectures; in 1948 he succeeded him in the Cambridge chair and later became one of his literary executors. G. H. von Wright, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright (1989)
Evidence: AI draft
Georg Henrik von Wright › 1916–2003
Philippa Foot
influenced ✓
Foot, influenced by Wittgenstein through Anscombe, argued that moral terms like ‘rude’ have criteria of application fixed by use, against the fact–value gap (‘Moral Arguments’, 1958). P. Foot, “Moral Arguments”, Mind 67 (1958); “Moral Beliefs”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1958–59); SEP “Philippa Foot”
Philippa Foot › 1920–2010
Thomas S. Kuhn
influenced
Kuhn used Wittgenstein’s family resemblance to explain how paradigms can guide research without a shared set of rules (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
Evidence: AI draft
Thomas S. Kuhn › 1922–1996
Paul Feyerabend
influenced
Feyerabend, who had planned to study with Wittgenstein in Cambridge, gave an early long account of the Philosophical Investigations (‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations’, 1955). P. K. Feyerabend, “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations”, Philosophical Review 64 (1955); Killing Time (1995); SEP “Paul Feyerabend”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Paul Feyerabend › 1924–1994
Jean-François Lyotard
influenced
Lyotard took Wittgenstein’s language games as the model for the heterogeneity of discourses in The Postmodern Condition (1979), later recast as incommensurable phrase regimens (Le différend, 1983). J.-F. Lyotard, La condition postmoderne (1979); Le différend (1983); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953); SEP “Jean François Lyotard”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Jean-François Lyotard › 1924–1998
Michael Dummett
influenced
Dummett turned Wittgenstein’s idea that meaning is use into the demand that understanding be manifest in use, the basis of his anti-realism (1976; Truth and Other Enigmas, 1978). M. Dummett, “What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II)” (1976), in The Seas of Language (1993); Truth and Other Enigmas (1978); “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); SEP “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”
Evidence: AI draft
Michael Dummett › 1925–2011
Hilary Putnam
influenced ✓
Putnam drew on Wittgenstein, read not as an anti-realist, for his natural realism of perception and his account of religious language (Renewing Philosophy, 1992; The Threefold Cord, 1999). H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (1992); The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (1999); “Was Wittgenstein Really an Anti-realist about Mathematics?” (2001)
Hilary Putnam › 1926–2016
Jaakko Hintikka
influenced
Hintikka modelled his game-theoretical semantics on Wittgenstein’s language-games (Logic, Language-Games and Information, 1973) and with Merrill B. Hintikka reinterpreted his development (Investigating Wittgenstein, 1986). J. Hintikka, Logic, Language-Games and Information (1973); M. B. Hintikka and J. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (1986)
Evidence: AI draft
Jaakko Hintikka › 1929–2015
Alasdair MacIntyre
influenced
MacIntyre’s early conceptual study of Freud treated the unconscious as a descriptive rather than explanatory concept, a method commentators link to Wittgenstein (The Unconscious, 1958). A. MacIntyre, The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis (1958; rev. 2004)
Evidence: AI draft
Alasdair MacIntyre › 1929–2025
Bernard Williams
influenced
Williams asked whether Wittgenstein’s later philosophy implies a transcendental idealism of the first-person plural (‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’, 1974) and discussed Wittgensteinian arguments on thick ethical concepts (1985). B. Williams, “Wittgenstein and Idealism” (1974), in Moral Luck (1981); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985); SEP “Bernard Williams”
Evidence: AI draft
Bernard Williams › 1929–2003
Richard Rorty
influenced
Rorty took from the later Wittgenstein the idea of philosophy as therapy, not theory, and read him as dissolving rather than solving traditional problems (‘Keeping Philosophy Pure’, 1976). R. Rorty, “Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay on Wittgenstein” (1976), in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); SEP “Richard Rorty”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Richard Rorty › 1931–2007
Viola Cordova
influenced
To understand non-Western worldviews, Cordova’s dissertation (1992) drew on Whorf and on Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough. V. F. Cordova, The Concept of Monism in Navajo Thought (PhD diss., University of New Mexico, 1992), abstract; L. Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über Frazers Golden Bough (1967)
Evidence: AI draft
Viola Cordova › 1937–2002
Thomas Nagel
influenced
Nagel met Wittgenstein’s later philosophy at Cornell through Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein’s student and friend, whose letter introduced him to Anscombe at Oxford in 1958. T. Nagel, review essay on Anscombe, Foot, Midgley and Murdoch, London Review of Books (2022); N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (1958)
Evidence: AI draft
Thomas Nagel › b. 1937
Anthony Giddens
influenced
Giddens took from Wittgenstein the view that knowing a rule means knowing how to go on, making practical consciousness central to structuration theory (The Constitution of Society, 1984). A. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (1976); The Constitution of Society (1984); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953)
Evidence: AI draft
Anthony Giddens › b. 1938
Saul Kripke
influenced ✓
Kripke presented Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks as a sceptical paradox – no fact fixes that ‘plus’ means addition – stressing it was the argument ‘as it struck Kripke’ (1982). S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Rule-Following and Intentionality”
Saul Kripke › 1940–2022
Karatani Kōjin
influenced
In Exploration I (Tankyū I, 1986) Karatani took up Wittgenstein’s rule-following problem and recast communication as teaching or selling to an other who does not share one’s rules. Karatani Kōjin, Tankyū I (1986); Transcritique (2001; Eng. 2003)
Evidence: AI draft
Karatani Kōjin › b. 1941
Daniel Dennett
influenced
Dennett, a student of Ryle, drew on Wittgenstein’s attack on private inner objects in denying that experience has ineffable, intrinsic qualia (‘Quining Qualia’, 1988; Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, “Quining Qualia”, in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science (1988); Consciousness Explained (1991)
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Daniel Dennett › 1942–2024
Alice Crary
influenced
Crary co-edited The New Wittgenstein (2000) and drew on Wittgenstein to argue that moral thought pervades our concepts, not only explicit judgements (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary and R. Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein (2000); A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007)
Evidence: AI draft
Alice Crary › b. 1967
José Medina
influenced
Medina read Wittgenstein as a contextualist for whom meaning rests on shared practices (The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, 2002), extending this to identity and agency (2006). J. Medina, The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Necessity, Intelligibility, and Normativity (2002); Speaking from Elsewhere (2006)
Evidence: AI draft
José Medina › b. 1968
Criticism
Criticized by 2
Karl Popper
criticised by
Popper rejected Wittgenstein’s view that there are no genuine philosophical problems, and objected that the Tractatus’ criterion of meaning would also exclude natural laws (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 4, 10; “The Nature of Philosophical Problems and Their Roots in Science” (1952), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963)
Evidence: AI draft
Karl Popper › 1902–1994
Jerry Fodor
criticised by
With Chihara, Fodor attacked Wittgensteinian criteria for mental concepts (1965) and later argued that learning a language presupposes an innate language of thought (The Language of Thought, 1975). C. Chihara & J. Fodor, “Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein”, American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965); J. Fodor, The Language of Thought (1975), ch. 2
Evidence: AI draft
Jerry Fodor › 1935–2017
Criticizes 4
Augustine influenced by
influenced by
Wittgenstein used Augustine’s puzzle about time – known until one is asked – as a model of philosophical perplexity (Blue Book, dictated 1933–34; Philosophical Investigations, publ. 1953). L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (dictated 1933–35; publ. 1958); Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); Augustine, Confessiones XI; SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
criticised
Wittgenstein opened the Philosophical Investigations (1953) with Augustine’s account of learning words (Confessions I.8) and criticised its picture that every word names an object. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953), §§ 1–3, 32; Augustine, Confessions I.8.13
Evidence: AI draft
Augustine › 354–430
Gottlob Frege influenced by
influenced by ✓
Wittgenstein, who visited Frege (1911), thanked ‘the great works of Frege’ in the Tractatus preface and adopted his principle that names have meaning only in propositions (1921). L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (completed 1918; publ. 1921), preface; G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
criticised
Wittgenstein rejected Frege’s view that sentences name truth-values and that logical constants represent anything; Frege’s assertion sign he called logically meaningless (Tractatus, 1921, 4.0312, 4.431, 4.442). L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), 3.143, 4.0312, 4.431, 4.442; Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953), § 71
Evidence: AI draft
Gottlob Frege › 1848–1925
Bertrand Russell studied withinfluenced
studied with ✓
Wittgenstein came to Cambridge in October 1911 to study logic with Russell and in 1912 was admitted to Trinity College as his student; his Notes on Logic (1913) were written for Russell. R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990); B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig (1988)
Evidence: AI draft
influenced ✓
Russell said his lectures on logical atomism were largely concerned with explaining ideas he had learnt from his former pupil Wittgenstein (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, 1918). B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (lectures 1918; The Monist 1918–19), preliminary note
criticised
Wittgenstein objected that Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgement allows nonsense to be judged (1913), and later rejected his theory of types as superfluous (Tractatus, 1921, 3.331–3.333, 5.5422). L. Wittgenstein to B. Russell, June 1913; Notes on Logic (1913); Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), 3.331–3.333, 5.5422
Evidence: AI draft
Bertrand Russell › 1872–1970
Kurt Gödel
criticised
Wittgenstein questioned the philosophical significance of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and doubted that ‘true but unprovable’ makes sense outside a system (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 1956). L. Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (1956), part I, appendix I (3rd ed. 1978: appendix III); SEP “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”
Evidence: AI draft
Kurt Gödel › 1906–1978
Works
The world is all that is the case … Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
Language games, rule-following, private language – opening with Augustine's picture of language.
- 1969On Certainty
What does it mean to know something? Notes on Moore’s defence of common sense and his “Here is one hand”.
Position
The early Wittgenstein asked what language must be like to be able to depict the world at all. His answer in the Tractatus: a meaningful sentence is a logical picture of a possible state of affairs; ethics, aesthetics and the meaning of life cannot be said but only shown – “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” The later Wittgenstein broke with this picture. Words, he now held, have no hidden essence; their meaning is their use in many interwoven “language games,” connected by family resemblances rather than a common core. Philosophical problems arise when language “goes on holiday.” Both phases shaped the twentieth century: the first logical empiricism, the second ordinary language philosophy and beyond.
Life & context
Wittgenstein grew up in one of Vienna’s richest industrial families, studied engineering in Berlin and Manchester and came to Bertrand Russell in Cambridge in 1911. He finished the Tractatus as a soldier in the First World War, then gave away his fortune and taught at village schools in Lower Austria, where he hit pupils – corporal punishment was still widespread in village schools, but parents complained about his severity; after a pupil collapsed in April 1926 he resigned, proceedings before the district court in Gloggnitz followed (their outcome is unclear in the sources), and in 1936–37 he apologised to former pupils. In 1929 he returned to Cambridge, where he later held a chair until 1947.
Further main works
- The Blue and Brown Books (1958)
Appears in
- Journey ‘Doubt and the Self’ · Stop 10 of 10
- Journey ‘The Linguistic Turn’ · Stop 3 of 10
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