لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين
يرى فيتغنشتاين المبكر أنّ اللغة تصوّر العالم، وأنّ ما لا يمكن تصويره يجب السكوت عنه؛ ويرى فيتغنشتاين المتأخر أنّ معنى الكلمة في كثير من الحالات هو كيفية استعمالها.
التموضع
«حدود لغتي تعني حدود عالمي.» وفي مرحلته المتأخرة: في طائفة واسعة من الحالات معنى الكلمة هو استعمالها في اللغة.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- نظرية الصورة
- ألعاب اللغة
- تشابه الأسرة
- حجة اللغة الخاصة
الأساتذة: بيرتراند راسل
التلاميذ: جورج هنريك فون رايت, إليزابيث أنسكوم
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 5
أرتور شوبنهاور
تأثّر بـ ✓
Wittgenstein’s early view of the metaphysical subject and will, in the Notebooks 1914–16 (publ. 1961) and the Tractatus (1921), drew on Schopenhauer, whom he read as a youth. L. Wittgenstein, Tagebücher 1914–1916 (publ. 1961); Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (1921); G. H. von Wright, “Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Biographical Sketch”, Philosophical Review 64 (1955); SEP “Arthur Schopenhauer”
أرتور شوبنهاور › 1788–1860
سورين كيركغور
تأثّر بـ ✓
Wittgenstein esteemed Kierkegaard, as Drury reported, and shared his view that Christianity is not a doctrine but a way of living (Culture and Value, remarks 1914–51; publ. 1977). L. Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen (ed. G. H. von Wright, 1977; Engl. Culture and Value, 1980); M. O’C. Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein”, in R. Rhees (ed.), Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections (1981); SEP “Søren Kierkegaard”
سورين كيركغور › 1813–1855
ليو تولستوي
تأثّر بـ
During the war Wittgenstein carried Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief, bought in Galicia (1914); biographers link it to the ethical-mystical close of the Tractatus (1921). B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig 1889–1921 (1988); R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990); L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (1921)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ليو تولستوي › 1828–1910
ويليام جيمس
تأثّر بـ
Wittgenstein found James’s Varieties of Religious Experience helpful (letter to Russell, 1912) and used his Principles of Psychology as a foil in the Philosophical Investigations (publ. 1953). L. Wittgenstein, letter to B. Russell (June 1912); Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); R. B. Goodman, Wittgenstein and William James (2002); SEP “William James”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ويليام جيمس › 1842–1910
جورج إدوارد مور
تأثّر بـ
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (written 1949–51; publ. 1969) starts from Moore’s defence of common sense (1925, 1939) and recasts his truisms as hinges of our practices. L. Wittgenstein, Über Gewißheit / On Certainty (written 1949–51; publ. 1969); G. E. Moore, “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925); “Proof of an External World” (1939); SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
جورج إدوارد مور › 1873–1958
أثّر في 30
رودولف كارناب
أثّر في ✓
Carnap took from the Tractatus, read in the Vienna Circle, the view that logic consists of tautologies and metaphysics of pseudo-sentences, and met Wittgenstein in 1927–29. R. Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache” (1932); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”; SEP “Vienna Circle”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في Wikidata · Wikidata
رودولف كارناب › 1891–1970
غلبرت رايل
أثّر في
Ryle, who knew Wittgenstein from 1929, shared his view of philosophy as dissolving conceptual confusions and paid tribute to his method (‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’, 1951). G. Ryle, “Ludwig Wittgenstein”, Analysis 12 (1951); “Autobiographical”, in O. P. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds.), Ryle (1970); SEP “Gilbert Ryle”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
غلبرت رايل › 1900–1976
إليزابيث أنسكوم علّم
علّم ✓
Anscombe moved to Newnham College, Cambridge, in 1942 as a research student and attended Wittgenstein’s lectures, which she said freed her from phenomenalism; she became one of his closest students, translated the Philosophical Investigations (1953) and was one of his literary executors. SEP “Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe”; R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في Wikidata · Wikidata
إليزابيث أنسكوم › 1919–2001
بيير بورديو
أثّر في ✓
Bourdieu invoked Wittgenstein on rule-following against a legalistic view of practice: agents act from a practical sense, not by obeying explicit rules (‘De la règle aux stratégies’, 1985). P. Bourdieu, “De la règle aux stratégies” (1985), in Choses dites (1987); Le sens pratique (1980); SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في Wikidata · Wikidata
بيير بورديو › 1930–2002
تشارلز تيلور
أثّر في
Taylor read Wittgenstein’s remarks on following a rule as showing that understanding rests on an unarticulated background of embodied practice (‘To Follow a Rule’, 1993). C. Taylor, “To Follow a Rule”, in C. Calhoun et al. (eds.), Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (1993), repr. in Philosophical Arguments (1995)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
تشارلز تيلور › وُلد 1931
جون سورل
أثّر في ✓
Searle acknowledged the later Wittgenstein, especially On Certainty, as a source of his thesis that intentional states work only against a non-representational Background (Intentionality, 1983). J. R. Searle, Intentionality (1983); The Construction of Social Reality (1995); L. Wittgenstein, Über Gewißheit (publ. 1969)
جون سورل › 1932–2025
عرض الكل (30)عرض أقل
موريتز شليك
أثّر في
Schlick saw in the Tractatus the turning point of philosophy, now an activity of clarifying meaning, not a science (‘Die Wende der Philosophie’, 1930); they met from 1927. M. Schlick, “Die Wende der Philosophie”, Erkenntnis 1 (1930); F. Waismann, Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis (ed. B. McGuinness, 1967); SEP “Moritz Schlick”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
موريتز شليك › 1882–1936
سوزان لانغر
أثّر في
Langer modelled discursive symbolism on the Tractatus’ picture theory, then argued that art and myth are ‘presentational’ symbols beyond its limits (Philosophy in a New Key, 1942). S. K. Langer, The Practice of Philosophy (1930); Philosophy in a New Key (1942); L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921/22)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
سوزان لانغر › 1895–1985
ألفرد آير
أثّر في
Ayer took from the Tractatus (1921) the view that logical truths are tautologies saying nothing about the world and extended it to mathematics (Language, Truth and Logic, 1936). A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936); L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (1921); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ألفرد آير › 1910–1989
ولفريد سيلارز
أثّر في
Sellars took up Wittgenstein’s language games and met the regress of rules with pattern-governed behaviour that precedes explicit rule-obeying (‘Some Reflections on Language Games’, 1954). W. Sellars, “Some Reflections on Language Games”, Philosophy of Science 21 (1954); SEP “Wilfrid Sellars”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ولفريد سيلارز › 1912–1989
آلان تورنغ
أثّر في مختلف عليها
Turing attended Wittgenstein’s Cambridge lectures on the foundations of mathematics (1939) and argued with him over contradictions; how far this shaped Turing’s work is disputed. C. Diamond (ed.), Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939 (1976); J. Floyd, “Turing on ‘Common Sense’: Cambridge Resonances”, in J. Floyd and A. Bokulich (eds.), Philosophical Explorations of the Legacy of Alan Turing (2017)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
آلان تورنغ › 1912–1954
جورج هنريك فون رايت علّم
علّم ✓
Von Wright met Wittgenstein in Cambridge in 1939 and attended his lectures; in 1948 he succeeded him in the Cambridge chair and later became one of his literary executors. G. H. von Wright, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright (1989)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جورج هنريك فون رايت › 1916–2003
فيليبا فوت
أثّر في ✓
Foot, influenced by Wittgenstein through Anscombe, argued that moral terms like ‘rude’ have criteria of application fixed by use, against the fact–value gap (‘Moral Arguments’, 1958). P. Foot, “Moral Arguments”, Mind 67 (1958); “Moral Beliefs”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1958–59); SEP “Philippa Foot”
فيليبا فوت › 1920–2010
توماس كون
أثّر في
Kuhn used Wittgenstein’s family resemblance to explain how paradigms can guide research without a shared set of rules (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
توماس كون › 1922–1996
بول فايراباند
أثّر في
Feyerabend, who had planned to study with Wittgenstein in Cambridge, gave an early long account of the Philosophical Investigations (‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations’, 1955). P. K. Feyerabend, “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations”, Philosophical Review 64 (1955); Killing Time (1995); SEP “Paul Feyerabend”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
بول فايراباند › 1924–1994
جان فرانسوا ليوتار
أثّر في
Lyotard took Wittgenstein’s language games as the model for the heterogeneity of discourses in The Postmodern Condition (1979), later recast as incommensurable phrase regimens (Le différend, 1983). J.-F. Lyotard, La condition postmoderne (1979); Le différend (1983); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953); SEP “Jean François Lyotard”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
جان فرانسوا ليوتار › 1924–1998
مايكل دوميت
أثّر في
Dummett turned Wittgenstein’s idea that meaning is use into the demand that understanding be manifest in use, the basis of his anti-realism (1976; Truth and Other Enigmas, 1978). M. Dummett, “What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II)” (1976), in The Seas of Language (1993); Truth and Other Enigmas (1978); “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); SEP “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
مايكل دوميت › 1925–2011
هيلاري بوتنام
أثّر في ✓
Putnam drew on Wittgenstein, read not as an anti-realist, for his natural realism of perception and his account of religious language (Renewing Philosophy, 1992; The Threefold Cord, 1999). H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (1992); The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (1999); “Was Wittgenstein Really an Anti-realist about Mathematics?” (2001)
هيلاري بوتنام › 1926–2016
ياكو هينتيكا
أثّر في
Hintikka modelled his game-theoretical semantics on Wittgenstein’s language-games (Logic, Language-Games and Information, 1973) and with Merrill B. Hintikka reinterpreted his development (Investigating Wittgenstein, 1986). J. Hintikka, Logic, Language-Games and Information (1973); M. B. Hintikka and J. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (1986)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ياكو هينتيكا › 1929–2015
ألسدير ماكنتاير
أثّر في
MacIntyre’s early conceptual study of Freud treated the unconscious as a descriptive rather than explanatory concept, a method commentators link to Wittgenstein (The Unconscious, 1958). A. MacIntyre, The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis (1958; rev. 2004)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ألسدير ماكنتاير › 1929–2025
بيرنارد وليمز
أثّر في
Williams asked whether Wittgenstein’s later philosophy implies a transcendental idealism of the first-person plural (‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’, 1974) and discussed Wittgensteinian arguments on thick ethical concepts (1985). B. Williams, “Wittgenstein and Idealism” (1974), in Moral Luck (1981); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985); SEP “Bernard Williams”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
بيرنارد وليمز › 1929–2003
ريتشارد رورتي
أثّر في
Rorty took from the later Wittgenstein the idea of philosophy as therapy, not theory, and read him as dissolving rather than solving traditional problems (‘Keeping Philosophy Pure’, 1976). R. Rorty, “Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay on Wittgenstein” (1976), in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); SEP “Richard Rorty”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ريتشارد رورتي › 1931–2007
فيولا كوردوفا
أثّر في
To understand non-Western worldviews, Cordova’s dissertation (1992) drew on Whorf and on Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough. V. F. Cordova, The Concept of Monism in Navajo Thought (PhD diss., University of New Mexico, 1992), abstract; L. Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über Frazers Golden Bough (1967)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
فيولا كوردوفا › 1937–2002
توماس ناغل
أثّر في
Nagel met Wittgenstein’s later philosophy at Cornell through Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein’s student and friend, whose letter introduced him to Anscombe at Oxford in 1958. T. Nagel, review essay on Anscombe, Foot, Midgley and Murdoch, London Review of Books (2022); N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (1958)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
توماس ناغل › وُلد 1937
أنتوني غيدنز
أثّر في
Giddens took from Wittgenstein the view that knowing a rule means knowing how to go on, making practical consciousness central to structuration theory (The Constitution of Society, 1984). A. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (1976); The Constitution of Society (1984); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أنتوني غيدنز › وُلد 1938
شاول كريبك
أثّر في ✓
Kripke presented Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks as a sceptical paradox – no fact fixes that ‘plus’ means addition – stressing it was the argument ‘as it struck Kripke’ (1982). S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Rule-Following and Intentionality”
شاول كريبك › 1940–2022
كوجين كاراتاني
أثّر في
In Exploration I (Tankyū I, 1986) Karatani took up Wittgenstein’s rule-following problem and recast communication as teaching or selling to an other who does not share one’s rules. Karatani Kōjin, Tankyū I (1986); Transcritique (2001; Eng. 2003)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
كوجين كاراتاني › وُلد 1941
دانيال دينيت
أثّر في
Dennett, a student of Ryle, drew on Wittgenstein’s attack on private inner objects in denying that experience has ineffable, intrinsic qualia (‘Quining Qualia’, 1988; Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, “Quining Qualia”, in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science (1988); Consciousness Explained (1991)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
دانيال دينيت › 1942–2024
أليس كراري
أثّر في
Crary co-edited The New Wittgenstein (2000) and drew on Wittgenstein to argue that moral thought pervades our concepts, not only explicit judgements (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary and R. Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein (2000); A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أليس كراري › وُلد 1967
خوسيه مدينا
أثّر في
Medina read Wittgenstein as a contextualist for whom meaning rests on shared practices (The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, 2002), extending this to identity and agency (2006). J. Medina, The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Necessity, Intelligibility, and Normativity (2002); Speaking from Elsewhere (2006)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
خوسيه مدينا › وُلد 1968
النقد
انتقده 2
كارل بوبر
انتقده
Popper rejected Wittgenstein’s view that there are no genuine philosophical problems, and objected that the Tractatus’ criterion of meaning would also exclude natural laws (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 4, 10; “The Nature of Philosophical Problems and Their Roots in Science” (1952), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
كارل بوبر › 1902–1994
جيري فودور
انتقده
With Chihara, Fodor attacked Wittgensteinian criteria for mental concepts (1965) and later argued that learning a language presupposes an innate language of thought (The Language of Thought, 1975). C. Chihara & J. Fodor, “Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein”, American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965); J. Fodor, The Language of Thought (1975), ch. 2
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جيري فودور › 1935–2017
ينتقد 4
أوغسطينوس تأثّر بـ
تأثّر بـ
Wittgenstein used Augustine’s puzzle about time – known until one is asked – as a model of philosophical perplexity (Blue Book, dictated 1933–34; Philosophical Investigations, publ. 1953). L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (dictated 1933–35; publ. 1958); Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); Augustine, Confessiones XI; SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
انتقد
Wittgenstein opened the Philosophical Investigations (1953) with Augustine’s account of learning words (Confessions I.8) and criticised its picture that every word names an object. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953), §§ 1–3, 32; Augustine, Confessions I.8.13
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أوغسطينوس › 354–430
غوتلوب فريغه تأثّر بـ
تأثّر بـ ✓
Wittgenstein, who visited Frege (1911), thanked ‘the great works of Frege’ in the Tractatus preface and adopted his principle that names have meaning only in propositions (1921). L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (completed 1918; publ. 1921), preface; G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
انتقد
Wittgenstein rejected Frege’s view that sentences name truth-values and that logical constants represent anything; Frege’s assertion sign he called logically meaningless (Tractatus, 1921, 4.0312, 4.431, 4.442). L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), 3.143, 4.0312, 4.431, 4.442; Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953), § 71
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
غوتلوب فريغه › 1848–1925
بيرتراند راسل تتلمذ علىأثّر في
تتلمذ على ✓
Wittgenstein came to Cambridge in October 1911 to study logic with Russell and in 1912 was admitted to Trinity College as his student; his Notes on Logic (1913) were written for Russell. R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990); B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig (1988)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أثّر في ✓
Russell said his lectures on logical atomism were largely concerned with explaining ideas he had learnt from his former pupil Wittgenstein (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, 1918). B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (lectures 1918; The Monist 1918–19), preliminary note
انتقد
Wittgenstein objected that Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgement allows nonsense to be judged (1913), and later rejected his theory of types as superfluous (Tractatus, 1921, 3.331–3.333, 5.5422). L. Wittgenstein to B. Russell, June 1913; Notes on Logic (1913); Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), 3.331–3.333, 5.5422
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
بيرتراند راسل › 1872–1970
كورت غودل
انتقد
Wittgenstein questioned the philosophical significance of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and doubted that ‘true but unprovable’ makes sense outside a system (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 1956). L. Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (1956), part I, appendix I (3rd ed. 1978: appendix III); SEP “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
كورت غودل › 1906–1978
الأعمال
- 1921مصنف منطقي فلسفي
العالم هو كل ما هو الحال … وما لا يمكن الكلام عنه، فعنه يجب السكوت.
- 1953تحقيقات فلسفية
ألعاب اللغة، واتباع القاعدة، واللغة الخاصة – ويبدأ بصورة أوغسطينوس للغة.
ماذا يعني أن نعرف شيئًا؟ ملاحظات على دفاع مور عن الحس المشترك وعبارته «هذه يد».
الموقف
The early Wittgenstein asked what language must be like to be able to depict the world at all. His answer in the Tractatus: a meaningful sentence is a logical picture of a possible state of affairs; ethics, aesthetics and the meaning of life cannot be said but only shown – “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” The later Wittgenstein broke with this picture. Words, he now held, have no hidden essence; their meaning is their use in many interwoven “language games,” connected by family resemblances rather than a common core. Philosophical problems arise when language “goes on holiday.” Both phases shaped the twentieth century: the first logical empiricism, the second ordinary language philosophy and beyond.
الحياة والسياق
Wittgenstein grew up in one of Vienna’s richest industrial families, studied engineering in Berlin and Manchester and came to Bertrand Russell in Cambridge in 1911. He finished the Tractatus as a soldier in the First World War, then gave away his fortune and taught at village schools in Lower Austria, where he hit pupils – corporal punishment was still widespread in village schools, but parents complained about his severity; after a pupil collapsed in April 1926 he resigned, proceedings before the district court in Gloggnitz followed (their outcome is unclear in the sources), and in 1936–37 he apologised to former pupils. In 1929 he returned to Cambridge, where he later held a chair until 1947.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921)
- Philosophical Investigations (1953)
- The Blue and Brown Books (1958)
- On Certainty (1969)
يرد في
- رحلة «الشكّ والذات» · المحطة 10 من 10
- رحلة «المنعطف اللغوي» · المحطة 3 من 10
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