Bertrand Russell
Les mathématiques peuvent être dérivées de la logique, et les confusions philosophiques se dissipent dès que l’on analyse la forme logique cachée sous les phrases ordinaires.
Repères
Logicisme, théorie des descriptions et atomisme logique – et un intellectuel public combatif, adversaire de la Première Guerre mondiale, puis des armes nucléaires.
Idées clés
- Paradoxe de Russell
- Théorie des descriptions
- Atomisme logique
Maîtres: Alfred North Whitehead
Élèves: Ludwig Wittgenstein
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Influence
Influences reçues de 10
Platon
influencé par
Russell defended universals that subsist independently of minds, calling Plato’s theory of ideas one of the most successful attempts at the problem (The Problems of Philosophy, 1912). B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1912), ch. 9 (“The World of Universals”)
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Platon › 428–348 av. J.-C.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
influencé par ✓
Russell argued that Leibniz’s metaphysics follows from a few logical premises, above all the subject–predicate doctrine of propositions (A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, 1900). B. Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (1900); SEP “Bertrand Russell”; SEP “Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz”
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz › 1646–1716
David Hume
influencé par ✓
Russell restated Hume’s problem of induction, holding that the inductive principle can be neither proved nor disproved by experience (The Problems of Philosophy, 1912). B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1912), “On Induction”; A History of Western Philosophy (1945); SEP “Bertrand Russell”
David Hume › 1711–1776
John Stuart Mill
influencé par ✓
Russell, Mill’s lay godson, gave up the first-cause argument on reading Mill’s Autobiography, as he recalled in 1927, and honoured him in a British Academy lecture (1955). B. Russell, “Why I Am Not a Christian” (1927); “John Stuart Mill”, Proceedings of the British Academy 41 (1955); J. S. Mill, Autobiography (1873); SEP “Bertrand Russell”
John Stuart Mill › 1806–1873
Georg Cantor
influencé par ✓
Russell read Cantor intensively in his youth, and his paradox arose from a study of Cantor’s theorem. SEP “Bertrand Russell” (A. D. Irvine), on the Autobiography; SEP “The Early Development of Set Theory” (J. Ferreirós)
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Georg Cantor › 1845–1918
George Edward Moore
influencé par ✓
Russell followed Moore’s revolt against idealism, adopting his realism of propositions and concepts (‘The Nature of Judgment’, 1899), as the preface to The Principles of Mathematics (1903) acknowledges. G. E. Moore, “The Nature of Judgment”, Mind 8 (1899); B. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics (1903), preface; My Philosophical Development (1959); SEP “Bertrand Russell”
George Edward Moore › 1873–1958
Tout afficher (10)Afficher moins
Lao Tseu
influencé par
In The Problem of China (1922) Russell took Laozi’s “production without possession, action without self-assertion, development without domination” as the Chinese conception of the ends of life, set against Western possession, self-assertion and domination. B. Russell, The Problem of China (1922), ch. XI “Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Lao Tseu › figure légendaire
Hermann Lotze
influencé par
Early Russell, like early Moore, was shaped by British idealists who had taken over Lotze’s logic and metaphysics. SEP “Hermann Lotze” (D. Sullivan), §2
Attestation: brouillon IA
Hermann Lotze › 1817–1881
Giuseppe Peano
influencé par ✓
Russell met Peano at the Paris congress of 1900, and Principia Mathematica adopts Peano’s logical notation. SEP “Bertrand Russell” (A. D. Irvine), chronology; SEP “The Algebra of Logic Tradition” (S. Burris, J. Legris)
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Giuseppe Peano › 1858–1932
Alfred North Whitehead élève de
élève de ✓
Whitehead examined Russell for his entrance scholarship to Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1890 and taught him there; the former pupil became his co-author of Principia Mathematica (1910–13). B. Russell, Autobiography I (1967), ch. 3
Attestation: brouillon IA
Alfred North Whitehead › 1861–1947
A influencé 7
Susan Stebbing
a influencé
Stebbing presented the logic of Principia Mathematica and Russell’s theory of descriptions in A Modern Introduction to Logic (1930), treating Russell as a reference point of Cambridge analysis. L. S. Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic (1930); SEP “Susan Stebbing”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Susan Stebbing › 1885–1943
Stanisław Leśniewski
a influencé
Leśniewski traced Russell’s paradox to a confusion of distributive and collective classes and built mereology, a theory of collective classes, in response (Podstawy ogólnej teoryi mnogości, 1916). S. Leśniewski, Podstawy ogólnej teoryi mnogości I (1916); SEP “Stanisław Leśniewski”; SEP “Mereology”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Stanisław Leśniewski › 1886–1939
Rudolf Carnap
a influencé
Carnap set Russell’s maxim to replace inferred entities by logical constructions as motto of the Aufbau (1928); reading Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) had launched it. R. Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928); “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); B. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (1914); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Rudolf Carnap › 1891–1970
Willard Van Orman Quine
a influencé
Quine generalised Principia Mathematica in his dissertation (1932) and used Russell’s theory of descriptions to dissolve the riddle of non-being (‘On What There Is’, 1948). W. V. Quine, The Logic of Sequences: A Generalization of Principia Mathematica (dissertation 1932; publ. 1990); “On What There Is”, Review of Metaphysics 2 (1948); SEP “Willard Van Orman Quine”
Attestation: aussi dans InPhO · InPhO
Willard Van Orman Quine › 1908–2000
Alfred Jules Ayer
a influencé ✓
Ayer named Russell, with Wittgenstein, as source of Language, Truth and Logic (1936) and used his method of logical construction to reduce material things to sense-contents. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936), preface; Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage (1971); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”
Alfred Jules Ayer › 1910–1989
Alan Turing
a influencé
Turing studied Russell’s Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy in 1933, according to Hodges, and later adapted Russell’s theory of types (‘Practical Forms of Type Theory’, 1948). A. Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma (1983); A. M. Turing, “Practical Forms of Type Theory”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (1948); B. Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919)
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Alan Turing › 1912–1954
David Chalmers
a influencé ✓
Chalmers took up Russell’s view that physics reveals only structure, leaving intrinsic natures that may ground consciousness, as ‘Russellian monism’ (‘Consciousness and its Place in Nature’, 2002). D. J. Chalmers, “Consciousness and its Place in Nature” (2002); “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”, Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 8 (2013); B. Russell, The Analysis of Matter (1927); SEP “Russellian Monism”
Attestation: aussi dans Wikidata · Wikidata
David Chalmers › né(e) en 1966
Critique
Critiques reçues de 6
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
critiqué par
A chapter of The Reign of Religion (1920) examines Russell’s new realism – not, Radhakrishnan conceded, shaped by religious bias – and concludes that it is satisfactory only where it departs from its pluralism and “makes friends with absolutism”. S. Radhakrishnan, The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy (1920), ch. XI “The New Realism of Mr. Bertrand Russell”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan › 1888–1975
Ludwig Wittgenstein a enseigné àinfluencé par
a enseigné à ✓
Wittgenstein came to Cambridge in October 1911 to study logic with Russell and in 1912 was admitted to Trinity College as his student; his Notes on Logic (1913) were written for Russell. R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990); B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig (1988)
Attestation: brouillon IA
influencé par ✓
Russell said his lectures on logical atomism were largely concerned with explaining ideas he had learnt from his former pupil Wittgenstein (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, 1918). B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (lectures 1918; The Monist 1918–19), preliminary note
critiqué par
Wittgenstein objected that Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgement allows nonsense to be judged (1913), and later rejected his theory of types as superfluous (Tractatus, 1921, 3.331–3.333, 5.5422). L. Wittgenstein to B. Russell, June 1913; Notes on Logic (1913); Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), 3.331–3.333, 5.5422
Attestation: brouillon IA
Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951
Kurt Gödel a influencé
a influencé
Gödel took Principia Mathematica as the formal system of his incompleteness theorems (1931) and welcomed Russell’s early realism about classes and concepts (‘Russell’s Mathematical Logic’, 1944). K. Gödel, “Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I”, Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik 38 (1931); “Russell’s Mathematical Logic”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (1944); SEP “Kurt Gödel”
Attestation: brouillon IA
critiqué par
Gödel criticised Russell’s vicious-circle principle and no-class theory as too restrictive for classical mathematics, defending classes and concepts as real objects (‘Russell’s Mathematical Logic’, 1944). K. Gödel, “Russell’s Mathematical Logic”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (1944), 123–153
Attestation: brouillon IA
Kurt Gödel › 1906–1978
Wilfrid Sellars
critiqué par
Sellars argued that Russell’s acquaintance either involves concepts or is not knowledge (‘Acquaintance and Description Again’, 1949), later calling such views the ‘Myth of the Given’ (1956). W. Sellars, “Acquaintance and Description Again”, Journal of Philosophy 46 (1949); “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (1956); B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1912), ch. 5
Attestation: brouillon IA
Wilfrid Sellars › 1912–1989
Peter Frederick Strawson
critiqué par
Strawson objected that Russell’s theory of descriptions confuses sentences with uses: ‘The King of France is bald’ presupposes, not asserts, that a king exists (‘On Referring’, 1950). P. F. Strawson, “On Referring”, Mind 59 (1950), 320–344; Russell’s reply: “Mr. Strawson on Referring”, Mind 66 (1957)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Peter Frederick Strawson › 1919–2006
Saul Kripke
critiqué par
Kripke rejected Russell’s view that ordinary names are disguised descriptions: ‘Aristotle’ names Aristotle even in worlds where he did nothing we describe him by (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lectures I–II; B. Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” (1911)
Attestation: brouillon IA
Saul Kripke › 1940–2022
Critiques adressées à 6
Confucius
a critiqué
In the same book Russell confessed himself “unable to appreciate the merits of Confucius”, whose writings he found largely occupied with trivial points of etiquette, while granting that Confucian ethics had produced no priesthood and no persecution. B. Russell, The Problem of China (1922), ch. XI
Attestation: brouillon IA
Confucius › selon la tradition 551–479 av. J.-C.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
a critiqué
Russell rejected Hegel’s doctrine that only the whole is real: if all relations were internal, nothing could be known without knowing everything (History of Western Philosophy, 1945). B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (1945), ch. 22; Our Knowledge of the External World (1914), Lecture II
Attestation: brouillon IA
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel › 1770–1831
William James
a critiqué
Russell objected that James’s pragmatist theory confuses a criterion of truth with its meaning: ‘true’ cannot mean ‘useful to believe’ (‘William James’s Conception of Truth’, 1908). B. Russell, “William James’s Conception of Truth” (1908), in Philosophical Essays (1910); W. James, Pragmatism (1907), Lecture VI
Attestation: brouillon IA
William James › 1842–1910
Gottlob Frege influencé par
influencé par ✓
Russell recognised Frege’s logicism as close to his own, expounded it in an appendix to The Principles of Mathematics (1903) and continued it in Principia Mathematica (1910–13). B. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics (1903), appendix A; A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematica (1910–13); SEP “Bertrand Russell”
a critiqué
In a letter of 16 June 1902 Russell showed that Frege’s Basic Law V yields a contradiction; ‘On Denoting’ (1905) rejected Frege’s distinction of sense and reference. B. Russell to G. Frege, 16 June 1902, in J. van Heijenoort (ed.), From Frege to Gödel (1967); “On Denoting”, Mind 14 (1905); G. Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik II (1903), appendix
Attestation: brouillon IA
Gottlob Frege › 1848–1925
Alexius Meinong
a critiqué
Russell objected that Meinong’s non-existent objects, such as the round square, infringe the law of contradiction, and analysed them away with his theory of descriptions (‘On Denoting’, 1905). B. Russell, “On Denoting”, Mind 14 (1905), 479–493; SEP “Alexius Meinong”
Attestation: brouillon IA
Alexius Meinong › 1853–1920
Henri Bergson
a critiqué
Russell rejected Bergson’s intuition as anti-intellectualism: his attack on the intellect rests on misunderstandings of mathematics and of Zeno’s paradoxes (‘The Philosophy of Bergson’, 1912). B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Bergson”, The Monist 22 (1912), 321–347; A History of Western Philosophy (1945), ch. 28
Attestation: brouillon IA
Henri Bergson › 1859–1941
Œuvres
- 1905De la dénotation
L’actuel roi de France est chauve – analyse des descriptions définies.
Les mathématiques dérivées de la logique – la proposition dont découle 1+1=2 n’arrive qu’en *54.43, à la page 379 du premier volume.
Un panorama incisif de toute l’histoire – avec des verdicts moqueurs sur Hegel et Nietzsche.
Position
Russell fut l’un des fondateurs de la philosophie analytique. Il découvrit le paradoxe de l’ensemble de tous les ensembles qui ne se contiennent pas eux-mêmes, qui ébranla les fondements des mathématiques, et tenta avec Whitehead, dans les Principia Mathematica, de dériver les mathématiques de la logique. Sa théorie des descriptions montra que des phrases comme « L’actuel roi de France est chauve » peuvent être analysées de telle sorte que leur forme grammaticale ne nous égare plus sur ce qui existe. Cela fit de l’analyse logique la méthode centrale de la philosophie. En épistémologie, il distingua la connaissance par accointance de la connaissance par description. Au-delà du monde universitaire, il écrivit des livres influents sur l’éthique, la religion, la politique et l’histoire de la philosophie.
Vie et contexte
Russell, petit-fils d’un Premier ministre britannique, fut orphelin très tôt et élevé par sa grand-mère. Il étudia les mathématiques et la philosophie au Trinity College de Cambridge. Pacifiste, il perdit son poste de chargé de cours et fut emprisonné pendant la Première Guerre mondiale. Il écrivit abondamment pour un large public, reçut le prix Nobel de littérature en 1950 et fit campagne contre les armes nucléaires jusqu’à plus de quatre-vingt-dix ans.
Autres œuvres principales
- The Principles of Mathematics (traduction propre : « Les Principes des mathématiques », 1903)
- Problèmes de philosophie (1912)
Apparaît dans
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