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Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

1770–1831

Pierwsze przybliżeniecelowe uproszczenie – portret mówi więcej

Według Hegla prawda jest całością: historia, myśl i społeczeństwo rozwijają się przez konflikty i ich rozwiązywanie ku coraz większej wolności i samoświadomości.

Umiejscowienie

Idealizm niemiecki i jego spadkobiercy · Europa Zachodnia · Metafizyka, Logika, Społeczeństwo i historia, Polityka i prawo, Estetyka, Religia

Dialektyka Ducha: prawda jest całością, a historia świata jest postępem w świadomości wolności.

Kluczowe idee

  • Dialektyka
  • Duch absolutny
  • Pan i niewolnik
  • Zniesienie (Aufhebung)

Uczniowie: Ludwig Feuerbach, Max Stirner

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Wpływ

Pod wpływem 11

  • Heraklit

    pod wpływem ✓

    Hegel said there is no proposition of Heraclitus he had not taken into his Logic, where becoming unites being and nothing (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1833). G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. K. L. Michelet (1833); Wissenschaft der Logik (1812)

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    Heraklit › ok. 535–475 p.n.e.

  • Platon

    pod wpływem ✓

    Hegel read Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist as the beginning of speculative dialectic and, in the Philosophy of Right (1820), the Republic as an interpretation of Greek ethical life. G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1820), Preface; Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (1833); SEP “Hegel”

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    Platon › 428–348 p.n.e.

  • Arystoteles

    pod wpływem ✓

    Hegel closed his Encyclopaedia (1830) with Aristotle’s account of the divine thought that thinks itself, quoted in Greek from Book Lambda of the Metaphysics. G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830), conclusion; Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Lambda; SEP “Hegel”

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    Arystoteles › 384–322 p.n.e.

  • Kartezjusz

    pod wpływem ✓

    Hegel made Descartes’ principle of thinking the start of modern philosophy: with him ‘we are at home’ (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1833–36). G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III (ed. K. L. Michelet, 1836), section on Descartes

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    Kartezjusz › 1596–1650

  • Baruch Spinoza

    pod wpływem ✓

    Hegel held that thinking must begin with Spinoza’s substance, yet in the Phenomenology (1807) demanded that the true be grasped not only as substance but also as subject. G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), Preface; Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (1833), “Spinoza”; SEP “Hegel”

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    Baruch Spinoza › 1632–1677

  • Jean-Jacques Rousseau

    pod wpływem ✓

    Hegel credited Rousseau with making the will the principle of the state, though he faulted the general will as a common will of individuals (Philosophy of Right, 1820). G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1820), on the state; SEP “Hegel’s Social and Political Philosophy”

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    Jean-Jacques Rousseau › 1712–1778

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  • Monteskiusz

    pod wpływem ✓

    In the Philosophy of Right (1820) Hegel praised Montesquieu for treating laws not in isolation but as part of the whole character of a nation and its age. G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1820), Introduction; SEP “Hegel’s Social and Political Philosophy”

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    Monteskiusz › 1689–1755

  • Denis Diderot

    pod wpływem

    In the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) Hegel used Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew, known from Goethe’s translation (1805), as the image of the ‘disrupted’ consciousness of culture. G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), “Der sich entfremdete Geist; die Bildung”; D. Diderot, Rameaus Neffe, tr. J. W. Goethe (1805)

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    Denis Diderot › 1713–1784

  • Adam Ferguson

    pod wpływem

    Hegel drew on Ferguson’s Institutes of Moral Philosophy, read in Garve’s translation, for his concept of civil society (Philosophy of Right, 1820), as N. Waszek showed. N. Waszek, The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel’s Account of ‘Civil Society’ (1988); A. Ferguson, Grundsätze der Moralphilosophie, tr. C. Garve (1772); G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1820)

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    Adam Ferguson › 1723–1816

  • Adam Smith

    pod wpływem

    Hegel cited Smith’s pin factory on the division of labour in his Jena lectures (1803–04) and named Smith among the political economists in the Philosophy of Right (1820). G. W. F. Hegel, Jenaer Systementwürfe I (1803–04); Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1820); N. Waszek, The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel’s Account of ‘Civil Society’ (1988)

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    Adam Smith › 1723–1790

  • Friedrich Hölderlin

    pod wpływem

    In Frankfurt (1797–1800) Hegel took up Hölderlin’s philosophy of unification, which shaped his early concepts of love and life, as D. Henrich has argued. D. Henrich, “Hegel und Hölderlin” (1970), in Hegel im Kontext (1971); G. W. F. Hegel, Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal (1798–1800)

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    Friedrich Hölderlin › 1770–1843

Wpływ na 43

  • Wilhelm Dilthey

    wpływ na ✓

    In Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels (1905) Dilthey opened up Hegel’s early theological manuscripts, and he took over Hegel’s objective spirit, without its metaphysics, for the human sciences (Aufbau, 1910). W. Dilthey, Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels (1905); Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften (1910); SEP “Wilhelm Dilthey”

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    Wilhelm Dilthey › 1833–1911

  • John Dewey

    wpływ na

    Dewey began as a Hegelian at Johns Hopkins and recalled in ‘From Absolutism to Experimentalism’ (1930) that Hegel had left a permanent deposit in his thinking. J. Dewey, “From Absolutism to Experimentalism” (1930); SEP “John Dewey”

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    John Dewey › 1859–1952

  • Jean-Paul Sartre

    wpływ na ✓

    In Being and Nothingness (1943) Sartre took up Hegel’s struggle for recognition between consciousnesses to describe being-for-others, while denying any reconciling totality. J.-P. Sartre, L’Être et le néant (1943), “L’existence d’autrui”; SEP “Jean-Paul Sartre”

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    Jean-Paul Sartre › 1905–1980

  • Michel Foucault

    wpływ na ✓

    Foucault wrote his diploma thesis on Hegel’s Phenomenology under Hyppolite (1949) and later said that his whole age was trying to escape Hegel (L’ordre du discours, 1971). M. Foucault, La constitution d’un transcendantal historique dans la Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel (mémoire de DES, 1949, unpublished); L’ordre du discours (1971)

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    Michel Foucault › 1926–1984

  • Jürgen Habermas

    wpływ na ✓

    In ‘Labour and Interaction’ (1967) Habermas drew from Hegel’s Jena philosophy of spirit the distinction between labour and interaction that underlies his theory of communicative action. J. Habermas, “Arbeit und Interaktion. Bemerkungen zu Hegels Jenenser Philosophie des Geistes” (1967), in Technik und Wissenschaft als „Ideologie“ (1968)

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    Jürgen Habermas › 1929–2026

  • Jacques Derrida

    wpływ na ✓

    Derrida read Hegel as the thinker of the Aufhebung, which différance resembles and resists, in ‘Le puits et la pyramide’ (1968) and the Hegel column of Glas (1974). J. Derrida, “Le puits et la pyramide” (1968), in Marges de la philosophie (1972); Glas (1974); SEP “Jacques Derrida”

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    Jacques Derrida › 1930–2004

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  • J. V. Snellman

    wpływ na

    Following Hegel, Snellman held that freedom and personality are realised only in ethical community life, the state embodying a people’s national spirit (The Theory of the State, 1842). J. V. Snellman, Versuch einer speculativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit (1841); Läran om staten (1842)

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    J. V. Snellman › 1806–1881

  • Max Stirner uczeń/uczennica

    uczeń/uczennica ✓

    Stirner studied in Berlin from 1826 to 1828 and attended three of Hegel’s lecture series – on the philosophy of religion, the history of philosophy and the philosophy of subjective spirit. Lecture attendance, no closer contact is known. SEP “Max Stirner”; J. H. Mackay, Max Stirner. Sein Leben und sein Werk (1898)

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    Max Stirner › 1806–1856

  • Pierre Joseph Proudhon

    wpływ na ✓

    Proudhon learned of Hegel in Paris from Marx, Bakunin and Karl Grün (1844–45) and built his System of Economic Contradictions (1846) on a dialectic of antinomies. P.-J. Proudhon, Système des contradictions économiques, ou Philosophie de la misère (1846); K. Marx, letter to J. B. Schweitzer (24 Jan. 1865); K. S. Vincent, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican Socialism (1984)

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    Pierre Joseph Proudhon › 1809–1865

  • Aleksander Hercen

    wpływ na

    Herzen called Hegel’s philosophy ‘the algebra of revolution’ and argued in Dilettantism in Science (1842–43) that scientific thought must pass over into action. A. Herzen, Diletantizm v nauke (1842–43); Byloe i dumy (My Past and Thoughts, 1852–68); A. Walicki, A History of Russian Thought (1979)

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    Aleksander Hercen › 1812–1870

  • Michaił Bakunin

    wpływ na ✓

    In ‘The Reaction in Germany’ (1842) Bakunin turned Hegel’s dialectic into a philosophy of negation, ending: ‘the passion for destruction is a creative passion, too’. M. Bakunin (as Jules Elysard), “Die Reaction in Deutschland”, Deutsche Jahrbücher (1842); E. H. Carr, Michael Bakunin (1937)

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    Michaił Bakunin › 1814–1876

  • August Cieszkowski

    wpływ na

    Cieszkowski kept Hegel’s dialectic but extended it to the future: after thought, an epoch of the deed would realise philosophy in practice (Prolegomena to Historiosophy, 1838). A. von Cieszkowski, Prolegomena zur Historiosophie (1838); A. Liebich, Between Ideology and Utopia: The Politics and Philosophy of August Cieszkowski (1979)

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    August Cieszkowski › 1814–1894

  • Fryderyk Engels

    wpływ na ✓

    Engels separated Hegel’s revolutionary method from his conservative system (Ludwig Feuerbach, 1886) and drew from the Logic the laws of dialectics set out in Dialectics of Nature. F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach (1886); Dialektik der Natur (written 1873–83, publ. 1925); Anti-Dühring (1878)

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    Fryderyk Engels › 1820–1895

  • Gieorgij Plechanow

    wpływ na

    In an essay for the sixtieth anniversary of Hegel’s death (Die Neue Zeit, 1891) Plekhanov claimed Hegel’s dialectic for materialism; he is credited with coining ‘dialectical materialism’ there. G. Plekhanov, “Zu Hegels sechzigstem Todestag”, Die Neue Zeit (1891); K voprosu o razvitii monističeskogo vzgljada na istoriju (1895)

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    Gieorgij Plechanow › 1856–1918

  • George Herbert Mead

    wpływ na

    Mead lectured on Hegel in Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century (1936); A. Honneth reads his social self as a naturalised version of Hegel’s recognition (1992). G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century (1936); A. Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung (1992); SEP “George Herbert Mead”

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    George Herbert Mead › 1863–1931

  • Benedetto Croce

    wpływ na ✓

    In What Is Living and What Is Dead of Hegel’s Philosophy (1907) Croce limited the dialectic of opposites, adding a ‘nexus of distincts’ among the forms of spirit. B. Croce, Ciò che è vivo e ciò che è morto della filosofia di Hegel (1907); SEP “Benedetto Croce”

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    Benedetto Croce › 1866–1952

  • W.E.B. Du Bois

    wpływ na sporne

    Zamir traced Du Bois’s ‘double consciousness’ (The Souls of Black Folk, 1903) to Hegel’s Phenomenology; others derive it from psychology or Emerson, so the Hegel link is disputed. S. Zamir, Dark Voices: W. E. B. Du Bois and American Thought, 1888–1903 (1995); D. D. Bruce Jr., “W. E. B. Du Bois and the Idea of Double Consciousness”, American Literature 64 (1992); SEP “W. E. B. Du Bois”

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    W.E.B. Du Bois › 1868–1963

  • Kitarō Nishida

    wpływ na

    Nishida measured his logic of place against Hegel’s dialectic in ‘Hegel’s Dialectic as Seen from My Standpoint’ (1931), later reworking it as the dialectic of absolutely contradictory self-identity. Nishida Kitarō, “Watakushi no tachiba kara mita Hēgeru no benshōhō” (1931), in Mu no jikakuteki gentei (1932); SEP “Nishida Kitarō”

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    Kitarō Nishida › 1870–1945

  • Giovanni Gentile

    wpływ na ✓

    In The Reform of Hegelian Dialectic (1913) Gentile moved the dialectic from Hegel’s concepts into the present act of thinking, which produces subject and object together. G. Gentile, La riforma della dialettica hegeliana (1913); H. S. Harris, The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile (1960)

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    Giovanni Gentile › 1875–1944

  • György Lukács

    wpływ na

    Lukács read Marx through Hegel’s categories of totality and subject–object identity in History and Class Consciousness (1923), later tracing Hegel’s economics in The Young Hegel (1948). G. Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein (1923); Der junge Hegel. Über die Beziehungen von Dialektik und Ökonomie (written 1938, publ. 1948); SEP “Georg [György] Lukács”

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    György Lukács › 1885–1971

  • Tanabe Hajime

    wpływ na

    In Hegel’s Philosophy and Dialectic (1932) Tanabe took up Hegel’s dialectic and turned it into ‘absolute mediation’, which he set against Nishida’s place of nothingness. Tanabe Hajime, Hēgeru tetsugaku to benshōhō (1932); SEP “Tanabe Hajime”

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    Tanabe Hajime › 1885–1962

  • Antonio Gramsci

    wpływ na ✓

    Norberto Bobbio argued (1967) that Gramsci’s concept of civil society, placed in the superstructure, derives from Hegel rather than Marx; the reading is debated. N. Bobbio, “Gramsci e la concezione della società civile” (1967), in Gramsci e la cultura contemporanea (1969); J. Texier, “Gramsci, théoricien des superstructures” (1968)

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    Antonio Gramsci › 1891–1937

  • Max Horkheimer

    wpływ na

    In his inaugural lecture as director of the Institute for Social Research (1931) Horkheimer traced social philosophy back to Hegel’s objective spirit, to be renewed through interdisciplinary research. M. Horkheimer, “Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung” (1931); SEP “Critical Theory”

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    Max Horkheimer › 1895–1973

  • Herbert Marcuse

    wpływ na

    Marcuse interpreted Hegel’s ontology of life (Hegels Ontologie, 1932) and in Reason and Revolution (1941) defended Hegel’s dialectic as critical thought against positivism and fascist readings. H. Marcuse, Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit (1932); Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (1941); SEP “Herbert Marcuse”

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    Herbert Marcuse › 1898–1979

  • Hans-Georg Gadamer

    wpływ na ✓

    Gadamer took Hegel’s concept of experience and his mediation of past and present as models for understanding, while rejecting absolute knowledge (Truth and Method, 1960; Hegels Dialektik, 1971). H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (1960); Hegels Dialektik. Fünf hermeneutische Studien (1971); SEP “Hans-Georg Gadamer”

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    Hans-Georg Gadamer › 1900–2002

  • Jacques Lacan

    wpływ na

    Lacan, who attended Kojève’s Hegel seminar (1933–39), took from the master–slave dialectic that desire is the desire of the other and seeks recognition (‘Subversion du sujet’, 1960). J. Lacan, “Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir dans l’inconscient freudien” (1960), in Écrits (1966); A. Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel (1947); SEP “Jacques Lacan”

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    Jacques Lacan › 1901–1981

  • Simone de Beauvoir

    wpływ na

    Beauvoir used Hegel’s master–slave dialectic in The Second Sex (1949), having set a line attributed to Hegel as the motto of She Came to Stay (1943). S. de Beauvoir, L’Invitée (1943); Le Deuxième Sexe (1949); SEP “Simone de Beauvoir”

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    Simone de Beauvoir › 1908–1986

  • Maurice Merleau-Ponty

    wpływ na

    Merleau-Ponty found an existentialism in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and placed Hegel at the origin of Marxism, Nietzsche, phenomenology and psychoanalysis (‘L’existentialisme chez Hegel’, 1946). M. Merleau-Ponty, “L’existentialisme chez Hegel” (Les Temps modernes, 1946; Sens et non-sens, 1948)

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    Maurice Merleau-Ponty › 1908–1961

  • Kwame Nkrumah

    wpływ na

    Nkrumah drew on Hegel’s dialectic, via Marx, for ‘philosophical consciencism’, a synthesis of traditional, Islamic and Euro-Christian elements of African society (Consciencism, 1964). K. Nkrumah, Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization (1964; rev. 1970)

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    Kwame Nkrumah › 1909–1972

  • Tang Junyi

    wpływ na

    Tang Junyi’s Life, Existence and the Horizons of Mind (1977) orders nine horizons in a sequence recalling Hegel’s Phenomenology, but as mutually responsive rather than superseded stages. Tang Junyi, Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie (1977); IEP “Tang Junyi”

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    Tang Junyi › 1909–1978

  • Maruyama Masao

    wpływ na

    Maruyama took Hegel’s picture of China as an unhistorical, stagnant empire as his starting question, aiming to show that Tokugawa Japan developed modern thought from within (1952). Maruyama Masao, Nihon seiji shisōshi kenkyū (1952), introduction; tr. M. Hane, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan (1974)

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    Maruyama Masao › 1914–1996

  • Paulo Freire

    wpływ na

    Freire drew on Hegel’s master–slave dialectic to argue that only the oppressed, by freeing themselves, can also free their oppressors (Pedagogia do oprimido, written 1968). P. Freire, Pedagogia do oprimido (written 1968); G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807)

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    Paulo Freire › 1921–1997

  • Imre Lakatos

    wpływ na

    Lakatos named Hegel’s dialectic, beside Popper and Pólya, among the sources of his account of mathematics as growing through proofs and counterexamples (‘Proofs and Refutations’, 1963–64). I. Lakatos, “Proofs and Refutations”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (1963–64); Proofs and Refutations (ed. J. Worrall and E. Zahar, 1976); SEP “Imre Lakatos”

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    Imre Lakatos › 1922–1974

  • Frantz Fanon

    wpływ na

    Fanon reread Hegel’s dialectic of lord and bondsman for the colonial situation, where the master wants work, not recognition, from the slave (Peau noire, masques blancs, 1952). F. Fanon, Peau noire, masques blancs (1952), “Le Nègre et Hegel”; SEP “Frantz Fanon”

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    Frantz Fanon › 1925–1961

  • Martin Luther King Jr.

    wpływ na

    King, who studied Hegel in Boston, took from his dialectic that ‘growth comes through struggle’ and sought a synthesis of opposed positions (Stride Toward Freedom, 1958). M. L. King Jr., Stride Toward Freedom (1958), “Pilgrimage to Nonviolence”; C. Carson et al. (eds.), The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr., vol. II (1994)

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    Martin Luther King Jr. › 1929–1968

  • Charles Taylor

    wpływ na

    Taylor read Hegel as joining Enlightenment autonomy with Romantic expressivism (Hegel, 1975) and drew on his theory of recognition for a politics of recognition (1992). C. Taylor, Hegel (1975); Hegel and Modern Society (1979); “The Politics of Recognition”, in A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (1992)

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    Charles Taylor › ur. 1931

  • Julia Kristeva

    wpływ na

    Kristeva reinterpreted Hegel’s negativity as the movement of the drives, which she called rejection and found at work in poetic language (La révolution du langage poétique, 1974). J. Kristeva, La révolution du langage poétique (1974)

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    Julia Kristeva › ur. 1941

  • Steve Biko

    wpływ na

    In “White Racism and Black Consciousness” (1971) Biko framed Black Consciousness with what he called “the Hegelian theory of dialectic materialism”: white racism is the thesis, a solid Black unity the antithesis, and a true humanity without racism the synthesis. S. Biko, “White Racism and Black Consciousness” (1971), in I Write What I Like (1978)

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    Steve Biko › 1946–1977

  • Axel Honneth

    wpływ na ✓

    Honneth reconstructed Hegel’s Jena model of a struggle for recognition (Kampf um Anerkennung, 1992), later reading the Philosophy of Right as a theory of social freedom (2011). A. Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung (1992); Leiden an Unbestimmtheit (2001); Das Recht der Freiheit (2011); SEP “Recognition”

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    Axel Honneth › ur. 1949

  • Slavoj Žižek

    wpływ na ✓

    Žižek read Hegel through Lacan, treating negativity and contradiction as constitutive of the subject and of reality itself (Less Than Nothing, 2012). S. Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (2012); Tarrying with the Negative (1993)

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    Slavoj Žižek › ur. 1949

  • Seyla Benhabib

    wpływ na

    Benhabib’s Critique, Norm, and Utopia (1986) began from Hegel’s critique of Kant and of natural right to reconstruct the normative foundations of critical theory. S. Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory (1986)

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    Seyla Benhabib › ur. 1950

  • Judith Butler

    wpływ na

    Butler’s first book, Subjects of Desire (1987), traced Hegel’s desire for recognition through its French readers; Hegel’s unhappy consciousness returns in The Psychic Life of Power (1997). J. Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France (1987); The Psychic Life of Power (1997)

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    Judith Butler › ur. 1956

  • Rahel Jaeggi

    wpływ na

    Jaeggi took Hegel’s determinate negation as the model of an immanent critique that judges forms of life by their own crises and contradictions (Kritik von Lebensformen, 2014). R. Jaeggi, Kritik von Lebensformen (2014); G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807)

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    Rahel Jaeggi › ur. 1966

Krytyka

Wzajemna krytyka 1

  • Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling ⇄ wzajemnie pod wpływem

    pod wpływem ✓

    Hegel defended Schelling’s philosophy of identity against Fichte in the Difference essay (1801) and co-edited with him the Critical Journal of Philosophy (1802–03). G. W. F. Hegel, Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie (1801); Kritisches Journal der Philosophie (1802–03); SEP “Hegel”

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    krytykuje

    Hegel’s Preface to the Phenomenology (1807) mocked an absolute of pure identity as ‘the night in which all cows are black’; Schelling took it as aimed at him. G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), Preface; Schelling to Hegel, 2 Nov. 1807

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    krytyka ze strony

    Schelling objected that Hegel’s ‘negative’ philosophy of pure concepts cannot reach actual existence, nor explain why the Idea should release itself into nature (Munich lectures, 1833–34). F. W. J. Schelling, Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (Munich lectures, c. 1833–34; publ. 1856), on Hegel; Berlin lectures 1841–42; SEP “Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling”

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    Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling › 1775–1854

Krytyka ze strony 24

  • Ludwig Feuerbach uczeń/uczennica

    uczeń/uczennica ✓

    Feuerbach moved to Berlin in 1824, nominally to study theology with Schleiermacher and Neander but in fact drawn by Hegel, whose lectures he heard for two years; in 1828 he sent Hegel his Erlangen dissertation with a covering letter. SEP “Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach”; L. Feuerbach to G. W. F. Hegel, 22 Nov. 1828

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    krytyka ze strony

    Feuerbach called Hegel’s speculative philosophy the last rational support of theology, inverting subject and predicate by making thought rather than sensuous being primary (Vorläufige Thesen, 1842). L. Feuerbach, Vorläufige Thesen zur Reformation der Philosophie (1842); Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie (1839); SEP “Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach”

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    Ludwig Feuerbach › 1804–1872

  • Søren Kierkegaard wpływ na

    wpływ na ✓

    Kierkegaard’s dissertation On the Concept of Irony (1841) drew heavily on Hegel’s reading of Socratic and Romantic irony and argued in Hegelian terms, before turning against the system. S. Kierkegaard, Om Begrebet Ironi (1841); J. Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered (2003); SEP “Søren Kierkegaard”

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    krytyka ze strony

    Kierkegaard objected that Hegel’s system forgets the existing individual: a logical system is possible, but a system of existence cannot be (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 1846). S. Kierkegaard (Johannes Climacus), Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift (1846), Part Two; SEP “Søren Kierkegaard”

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    Søren Kierkegaard › 1813–1855

  • Karol Marks wpływ na

    wpływ na ✓

    In the Paris Manuscripts (written 1844, printed 1932) Marx credited Hegel’s Phenomenology with grasping the self-creation of humanity as a process and labour as its essence. K. Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (written 1844, printed 1932), “Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt”; SEP “Karl Marx”

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    krytyka ze strony

    Marx held that Hegel mystifies the dialectic by making the Idea the subject of reality; it ‘stands on its head’ and must be inverted (Capital, afterword 1873). K. Marx, Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts (1843); Das Kapital I, Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage (1873); SEP “Karl Marx”

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    Karol Marks › 1818–1883

  • Martin Heidegger

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    Heidegger set existential temporality against Hegel’s concept of time, which he found bound to the ordinary idea of time as a sequence of nows (Being and Time, 1927). M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1927), § 82; lectures Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes (1930/31, GA 32)

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    Martin Heidegger › 1889–1976

  • Theodor Adorno wpływ na

    wpływ na ✓

    In Three Studies on Hegel (1963) Adorno defended the experiential content of Hegel’s dialectic and kept determinate negation as the method of his negative dialectics (1966). T. W. Adorno, Drei Studien zu Hegel (1963), “Erfahrungsgehalt”; Negative Dialektik (1966); SEP “Theodor W. Adorno”

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    krytyka ze strony

    Adorno inverted Hegel’s ‘the true is the whole’ into ‘the whole is the false’ and rejected the identity of concept and object (Minima Moralia §29; Negative Dialectics, 1966). T. W. Adorno, Minima Moralia (1951), §29; Negative Dialektik (1966), Introduction; G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), Preface; SEP “Theodor W. Adorno”

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    Theodor Adorno › 1903–1969

  • Leopoldo Zea wpływ na

    wpływ na

    Zea modelled his philosophy of Latin American history on Hegel’s dialectic, as a movement from imitation to the ‘assumption’ of its past (Filosofía de la historia americana, 1978). L. Zea, Filosofía de la historia americana (1978); América en la historia (1957)

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    krytyka ze strony

    Zea rejected Hegel’s placing of America outside world history as a land of the future and claimed its own history for America (América en la historia, 1957). L. Zea, América en la historia (1957); G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, introduction (“Land der Zukunft”)

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    Leopoldo Zea › 1912–2004

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  • Arthur Schopenhauer

    krytyka ze strony

    Schopenhauer derided Hegel’s philosophy as obscure verbiage serving state and church, and denied that history is the rational self-unfolding of spirit (World as Will II, 1844, ch. 38). A. Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung II (1844), ch. 38; Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (1841), Preface; “Über die Universitäts-Philosophie”, Parerga I (1851)

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    Arthur Schopenhauer › 1788–1860

  • Antonio Rosmini

    krytyka ze strony

    Rosmini rejected Hegel’s dialectic of being, nothing and becoming, holding that it introduces contradiction into being itself (Saggio storico-critico sulle categorie e la dialettica, posth. 1883). A. Rosmini, Saggio storico-critico sulle categorie e la dialettica (posth., Turin 1883); C. Palazzolo, “Rosmini’s Criticism of the Hegelian Dialectics”, Rosmini Studies (2019)

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    Antonio Rosmini › 1797–1855

  • Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg

    krytyka ze strony

    Trendelenburg’s Logical Investigations (1840) and The Logical Question in Hegel’s System (1843) contested Hegel’s claim to an absolute method. Wikipedia, “Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg” (read); Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Trendelenburg” (not accessible)

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    Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg › 1802–1872

  • Jacob Burckhardt

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    Burckhardt rejected Hegel’s philosophy of history as the rational plan of world spirit, holding that the purposes of eternal wisdom remain hidden from us (lectures 1868–73). J. Burckhardt, Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen (publ. 1905), introduction

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    Jacob Burckhardt › 1818–1897

  • William James

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    James rejected Hegel’s monistic absolute, which leaves no room for real plurality and novelty, though he valued Hegel’s vision of dialectical movement (A Pluralistic Universe, 1909). W. James, “On Some Hegelisms” (1882), in The Will to Believe (1897); A Pluralistic Universe (1909), Lecture III; SEP “William James”

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    William James › 1842–1910

  • Bertrand Russell

    krytyka ze strony

    Russell rejected Hegel’s doctrine that only the whole is real: if all relations were internal, nothing could be known without knowing everything (History of Western Philosophy, 1945). B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (1945), ch. 22; Our Knowledge of the External World (1914), Lecture II

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    Bertrand Russell › 1872–1970

  • George Edward Moore

    krytyka ze strony

    Moore broke with British Hegelianism and rejected the Hegelian doctrine that parts of an organic whole have no meaning apart from it (Principia Ethica, 1903, § 22). G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903), §§ 18–22; “The Refutation of Idealism” (1903)

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    George Edward Moore › 1873–1958

  • Karl Popper

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    Popper read Hegel as a historicist apologist of the Prussian state whose dialectic prepared modern totalitarianism (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945, vol. 2, ch. 12). K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), vol. 2, ch. 12 “Hegel and the New Tribalism”; critique of this reading: W. Kaufmann, “The Hegel Myth and Its Method”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951)

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    Karl Popper › 1902–1994

  • Isaiah Berlin

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    Berlin held that Hegel’s identification of freedom with understanding rational necessity, embodied in the state, turned positive liberty into a justification of coercion (‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, 1958). I. Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” (1958); Freedom and Its Betrayal (BBC lectures 1952; publ. 2002)

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    Isaiah Berlin › 1909–1997

  • Albert Camus

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    Camus argued in The Rebel (1951) that Hegel made history the sole judge of value, so that his heirs could justify ‘rational terror’ in its name. A. Camus, L’Homme révolté (1951), Part III, “Le terrorisme d’État et la terreur rationnelle”; SEP “Albert Camus”

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    Albert Camus › 1913–1960

  • Louis Althusser

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    Althusser denied that Marx merely inverted Hegel’s dialectic, contrasting Hegel’s simple contradiction and expressive totality with an overdetermined, structured whole (‘Contradiction and Overdetermination’, 1962). L. Althusser, “Contradiction et surdétermination” (1962), in Pour Marx (1965); SEP “Louis Althusser”

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    Louis Althusser › 1918–1990

  • Jean-François Lyotard

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    Lyotard treated Hegel’s speculative unity of knowledge as one of the grand narratives of legitimation that have lost their credibility (The Postmodern Condition, 1979, §§ 9–10). J.-F. Lyotard, La condition postmoderne (1979), §§ 9–10; Le différend (1983)

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    Jean-François Lyotard › 1924–1998

  • Gilles Deleuze

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    Deleuze rejected Hegel’s dialectic for subordinating difference to identity and negation, opposing to it a Nietzschean affirmation of difference (Nietzsche and Philosophy, 1962; Difference and Repetition, 1968). G. Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie (1962); Différence et répétition (1968), Introduction and ch. I; SEP “Gilles Deleuze”

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    Gilles Deleuze › 1925–1995

  • Carla Lonzi

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    Lonzi rejected Hegel’s assignment of women to the family, outside history, arguing that the theories of emancipation were written from a male standpoint (Sputiamo su Hegel, 1970). C. Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel (Scritti di Rivolta Femminile, 1970); G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), VI.A.a; Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1820), § 166

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    Carla Lonzi › 1931–1982

  • Enrique Dussel

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    Dussel read Hegel’s lectures on world history, which leave America and Africa outside history, as expressing the Eurocentric myth of modernity (1492: El encubrimiento del otro, 1992). E. Dussel, 1492: El encubrimiento del otro (1992), ch. 1; G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, introduction

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    Enrique Dussel › 1934–2023

  • Paul Gilroy

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    In The Black Atlantic (1993, ch. 2) Gilroy read Frederick Douglass’s fight with the slave-breaker Covey as a revision of Hegel’s master–slave allegory: the slave prefers the possibility of death to continued bondage – a starting point for an account of modernity from the standpoint of the enslaved. P. Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (1993), ch. 2 “Masters, Mistresses, Slaves and the Antinomies of Modernity”

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    Paul Gilroy › ur. 1956

  • Achille Mbembe

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    In Critique of Black Reason (2013) Mbembe read Hegel’s account of Africa in Reason in History – figures lacking language and self-awareness – as the culmination of a Western race discourse that defined Africa by absence. A. Mbembe, Critique de la raison nègre (2013; English Critique of Black Reason, 2017), ch. 1 “The Subject of Race”

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    Achille Mbembe › ur. 1957

  • Glen Sean Coulthard

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    In Red Skin, White Masks (2014) Coulthard followed Fanon’s critique of Hegel’s master–slave parable: in colonial settings, recognition granted by the state reproduces domination instead of overcoming it. G. S. Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (2014), ch. 1 and conclusion

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    Glen Sean Coulthard › ur. 1974

Krytykuje 7

  • Kapila

    krytykuje

    Hegel discussed Kapila’s Samkhya after Colebrooke’s essays in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy and judged that in Indian philosophy the Idea never becomes objective: the subject is lost in abstract substance instead of reaching freedom. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (ed. Michelet 1833), “Indian Philosophy”; H. T. Colebrooke, “On the Philosophy of the Hindus”, Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society 1 (1827)

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    Kapila › postać legendarna

  • Konfucjusz

    krytykuje

    In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel judged Confucius’ teaching a merely popular, practical morality without speculative philosophy – Cicero’s De officiis, he said, was better than all the books of Confucius. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (lectures 1819–31, ed. Michelet 1833), Introduction, “Chinese Philosophy”

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    Konfucjusz › według tradycji 551–479 p.n.e.

  • Budda Siakjamuni

    krytykuje

    In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Hegel treated Buddhism as the “religion of being-within-self”, whose principle is nothingness – a stage of spirit he placed below the religions of freedom. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (1824, 1827), Part II, “Die Religion des Insichseins”

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    Budda Siakjamuni › ok. 480–400 p.n.e. · datowane umownie 563–483 p.n.e.

  • Immanuel Kant pod wpływem

    pod wpływem ✓

    Hegel took from Kant’s antinomies the insight that contradiction belongs to reason itself, and from the unity of apperception his concept of the concept (Science of Logic, 1812–16). G. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik (1812–16), “Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen”; SEP “Hegel”

    Źródło: także w Wikidanych · Wikidata · InPhO

    krytykuje

    Hegel likened Kant’s critique of knowledge to learning to swim before entering the water and called his moral law empty formalism (Encyclopaedia §10; Philosophy of Right §135). G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie (1830), §10; Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1820), §135; SEP “Hegel”

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    Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804

  • Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi

    krytykuje

    Hegel judged Jacobi’s immediate knowledge through faith a philosophy of subjectivity that renounces conceptual knowledge of the absolute (Faith and Knowledge, 1802; Encyclopaedia, §§61–78). G. W. F. Hegel, Glauben und Wissen (1802), B; Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830), §§61–78

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    Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi › 1743–1819

  • Johann Gottlieb Fichte pod wpływem

    pod wpływem ✓

    Hegel took over the concept of recognition introduced in Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right (1796) and made it central to his Jena writings and the Phenomenology (1807). J. G. Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts (1796); G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807); L. Siep, Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie (1979); SEP “Hegel”

    Źródło: także w Wikidanych · Wikidata

    krytykuje

    Hegel argued that Fichte’s identity of I and not-I remains a mere ought, a ‘subjective subject-object’ without Schelling’s objective side (Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System, 1801). G. W. F. Hegel, Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie (1801); Glauben und Wissen (1802), C; SEP “Hegel”

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    Johann Gottlieb Fichte › 1762–1814

  • Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher

    krytykuje

    Hegel objected that if religion were the feeling of absolute dependence, a dog would be the best Christian (Foreword to Hinrichs, 1822), aiming at Schleiermacher’s Christian Faith. G. W. F. Hegel, Foreword to H. F. W. Hinrichs, Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft (1822); F. Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube (1821–22)

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    Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher › 1768–1834

Dzieła

  • Formacyjna droga świadomości do wiedzy absolutnej – z panem i niewolnikiem.

  • Byt, nicość, stawanie się: samoruch pojęć.

  • Rodzina, społeczeństwo obywatelskie, państwo – to, co rzeczywiste, jest rozumne.

Stanowisko

Hegel’s great idea is that reality is not a fixed set of things but a process of development in which contradictions drive thought and history forward. In this dialectic each position reveals its one-sidedness, is negated, and is “sublated” (aufgehoben) – cancelled, preserved and raised to a higher level. The Phenomenology traces consciousness from mere sense-certainty through the struggle of master and slave to absolute knowing; the Logic unfolds the categories themselves. History, for Hegel, is the progress of the consciousness of freedom, realised in the rational institutions of family, civil society and state. Marx, existentialism, the Frankfurt School and much of modern philosophy define themselves with or against him. His lectures on the philosophy of history placed Europe at the summit and said of Africa that “it is no historical part of the World” (in J. Sibree’s translation); postcolonial critics see here a template of Eurocentrism.

Życie i kontekst

Hegel studied at the Tübingen seminary with Hölderlin and Schelling, worked as a house tutor, and finished the Phenomenology in Jena as Napoleon’s army arrived in 1806. After posts as newspaper editor in Bamberg and headmaster in Nuremberg he taught in Heidelberg and from 1818 in Berlin, where he became the dominant philosopher of his age. He died there in a cholera epidemic.

Dalsze główne dzieła

  • Phenomenology of Spirit (1807)
  • Science of Logic (1812–1816)
  • Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817)
  • Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820)

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