Johann Gottlieb Fichte
Według Fichtego ja nie jest rzeczą, lecz aktem: tworzy samo siebie własną aktywnością, a świat jest oporem, którego potrzebuje do wolności.
Umiejscowienie
Ja stanowi siebie i nie-ja: Wissenschaftslehre jako filozofia wolności.
Kluczowe idee
- Tathandlung (czyn-działanie)
- Ja i nie-ja
- Uznanie
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 3
Baruch Spinoza
pod wpływem ✓
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre (1794) put the absolute I where Spinoza had put substance, and Fichte saw in Spinoza’s system the consistent form of dogmatism. J. G. Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (1794); Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre (1797); SEP “Johann Gottlieb Fichte”
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Baruch Spinoza › 1632–1677
Jean-Jacques Rousseau
pod wpływem ✓
Fichte’s Lectures on the Scholar’s Vocation (1794) examined Rousseau’s claims about the arts and sciences, honouring him but turning his longing for the past into forward striving. J. G. Fichte, Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten (1794); SEP “Johann Gottlieb Fichte”
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau › 1712–1778
Immanuel Kant
pod wpływem ✓
Fichte’s Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation (1792), published anonymously, was taken for Kant’s; his Wissenschaftslehre (1794) sought to derive Kant’s results from a single principle. J. G. Fichte, Versuch einer Critik aller Offenbarung (1792); Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (1794); SEP “Johann Gottlieb Fichte”
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Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804
Wpływ na 4
Novalis
wpływ na
In the Fichte Studies (1795–96) Novalis worked through the Wissenschaftslehre note by note and developed from it the reflections that later led to his ‘magical idealism’. Novalis, Fichte-Studien (1795–96); SEP “Novalis”
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Novalis › 1772–1801
Friedrich Schlegel
wpływ na
Schlegel counted Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, with the French Revolution and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, among the great ‘tendencies of the age’ (Athenaeum, 1798) and based his irony on Fichtean self-reflection. F. Schlegel, Athenaeum fragments (1798); SEP “Friedrich Schlegel”
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Friedrich Schlegel › 1772–1829
Michaił Bakunin
wpływ na
In his Moscow years Bakunin translated Fichte’s lectures on the vocation of the scholar (1794) into Russian (1836) and passed through a Fichtean idealism before turning to Hegel. J. G. Fichte, Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten (1794), Russian tr. M. Bakunin (1836); E. H. Carr, Michael Bakunin (1937); A. Kelly, Mikhail Bakunin (1982)
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Michaił Bakunin › 1814–1876
Kitarō Nishida
wpływ na
In Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness (1917) Nishida took up Fichte’s self-positing act (Tathandlung) to work out self-awareness as the unity of intuition and reflection. Nishida Kitarō, Jikaku ni okeru chokkan to hansei (1917), tr. V. H. Viglielmo et al., Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness (1987); SEP “Nishida Kitarō”
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Kitarō Nishida › 1870–1945
Krytyka
Krytyka ze strony 5
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel wpływ na
wpływ na ✓
Hegel took over the concept of recognition introduced in Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right (1796) and made it central to his Jena writings and the Phenomenology (1807). J. G. Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts (1796); G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807); L. Siep, Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie (1979); SEP “Hegel”
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krytyka ze strony
Hegel argued that Fichte’s identity of I and not-I remains a mere ought, a ‘subjective subject-object’ without Schelling’s objective side (Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System, 1801). G. W. F. Hegel, Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie (1801); Glauben und Wissen (1802), C; SEP “Hegel”
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Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel › 1770–1831
Friedrich Hölderlin wpływ na
wpływ na
Hölderlin heard Fichte’s lectures in Jena in the winter of 1794–95 and studied the Wissenschaftslehre closely; his own philosophical sketches start from its problem of the absolute I. J. G. Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (1794); F. Hölderlin, letters from Jena (1794–95); D. Henrich, Der Grund im Bewußtsein (1992)
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krytyka ze strony
Hölderlin objected that Fichte’s absolute I, lacking any object, could have no consciousness, and placed Being before the division of subject and object (‘Urtheil und Seyn’, 1795). F. Hölderlin, “Urtheil und Seyn” (1795); letter to Hegel, 26 Jan. 1795; D. Henrich, Der Grund im Bewußtsein (1992)
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Friedrich Hölderlin › 1770–1843
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling wpływ na
wpływ na ✓
In Of the I as Principle of Philosophy (1795) Schelling started from Fichte’s absolute I; his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) still followed the Wissenschaftslehre’s method. F. W. J. Schelling, Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie (1795); System des transcendentalen Idealismus (1800); SEP “Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling”
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krytyka ze strony
Schelling objected that Fichte reduced nature to a mere obstacle for the striving I, whereas nature is itself productive (Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses, 1806). F. W. J. Schelling, Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der verbesserten Fichteschen Lehre (1806); Fichte–Schelling correspondence 1800–1801; SEP “Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling”
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Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling › 1775–1854
Arthur Schopenhauer
krytyka ze strony
Schopenhauer held that Fichte, deriving the object from the subject, made the mirror-image error of materialism (The World as Will and Representation, 1819, I §7). A. Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I (1819), §7; SEP “Arthur Schopenhauer”
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Arthur Schopenhauer › 1788–1860
Isaiah Berlin
krytyka ze strony
Berlin counted Fichte among the ‘enemies of human liberty’: his true self, merged with the nation, made positive liberty a licence for coercion (Freedom and Its Betrayal, 1952). I. Berlin, Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty (BBC lectures 1952; publ. 2002); “Two Concepts of Liberty” (1958)
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Isaiah Berlin › 1909–1997
Dzieła
Ja stanowi siebie – filozofia z jednej zasady.
Stanowisko
Fichte wanted to complete Kant by deriving all philosophy from a single principle. That principle is the self-positing “I”: before any object is known, the self is an activity that posits itself – a “deed-act” (Tathandlung) rather than a fact. The world appears as the “not-I” against which this freedom meets resistance and so becomes concrete. Fichte also showed that self-consciousness requires other free beings who summon us to act, making recognition a condition of selfhood and of right. His thought launched German Idealism, provoked Schelling and Hegel, and his idea of mutual recognition passed through Hegel to today’s theories of recognition.
Życie i kontekst
Fichte grew up poor in Upper Lusatia and owed his schooling to a patron. His first book, published anonymously, was taken for a work of Kant and made him famous overnight. He taught at Jena until the “atheism dispute” of 1799 forced him out, then lived in Berlin, where he gave his patriotic Addresses to the German Nation and became the new university’s first elected rector.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation (1792)
- Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge (1794)
- Foundations of Natural Right (1796)
- The Vocation of Man (1800)
- Addresses to the German Nation (1808)
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