Kartezjusz
Wątp we wszystko, co możesz, a jedna rzecz pozostanie pewna – że ty, który myślisz, istniejesz – a umysł i ciało są dwoma różnymi rodzajami rzeczy.
Umiejscowienie
Metodyczna wątpliwość prowadzi do niewzruszonego fundamentu: myślę, więc jestem. Umysł i ciało to dwie substancje.
Kluczowe idee
- Cogito ergo sum
- Wątpienie metodyczne
- Dualizm umysłu i ciała
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 4
Sekstus Empiryk
pod wpływem
Descartes’ doubt in the Meditations (1641) uses the sceptical arguments revived from Sextus; in the Second Replies he says he had seen many ancient sceptical writings. R. Descartes, Meditationes (1641), First Meditation and Second Replies; R. H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle (2003); SEP “Ancient Skepticism”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Sekstus Empiryk › ok. 160–210
Augustyn z Hippony
pod wpływem
Shown Augustine’s ‘if I am mistaken, I exist’ (City of God), Descartes acknowledged the parallel but stressed his different use of it (letter to Colvius, 1640). R. Descartes, letter to A. Colvius (Nov. 1640); Augustine, De civitate Dei (si fallor, sum); SEP “Saint Augustine”
Źródło: szkic AI
Augustyn z Hippony › 354–430
Michel de Montaigne
pod wpływem
Descartes’ Discourse on Method (1637) echoes Montaigne in its first-person form and in the lesson drawn from the diversity of customs, without naming him. R. Descartes, Discours de la méthode (1637), ed. É. Gilson, Discours de la méthode: texte et commentaire (1925); SEP “Michel de Montaigne”
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Michel de Montaigne › 1533–1592
Franciszek Suárez
pod wpływem sporne ✓
In the Fourth Replies (1641) Descartes cited Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations on material falsity, the one place he names him; how far Suárez shaped him is disputed. R. Descartes, Fourth Replies (1641); F. Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae (1597); R. Ariew, Descartes and the Last Scholastics (1999)
Franciszek Suárez › 1548–1617
Wpływ na 13
Nicolas Malebranche
wpływ na ✓
Reading Descartes’ Treatise on Man in 1664 turned Malebranche to philosophy; The Search after Truth (1674–75) keeps Cartesian dualism and extension as the essence of matter. N. Malebranche, De la recherche de la vérité (1674–75); SEP “Nicolas Malebranche”
Nicolas Malebranche › 1638–1715
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
wpływ na ✓
Hegel made Descartes’ principle of thinking the start of modern philosophy: with him ‘we are at home’ (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1833–36). G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III (ed. K. L. Michelet, 1836), section on Descartes
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel › 1770–1831
Edmund Husserl
wpływ na
In the Cartesian Meditations (1931) Husserl radicalised Descartes’s way to the ego cogito into transcendental phenomenology, rejecting the ego as a thinking substance. E. Husserl, Méditations cartésiennes (1931); Cartesianische Meditationen (1950); SEP “Edmund Husserl”
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Edmund Husserl › 1859–1938
Jean-Paul Sartre
wpływ na
Sartre took the cogito as the starting point of philosophy and in ‘Cartesian Freedom’ (1946) argued that Descartes conceived an absolute freedom but transferred it to God. J.-P. Sartre, “La liberté cartésienne” (1946), in Situations I (1947); L’existentialisme est un humanisme (1946); SEP “Jean-Paul Sartre”
Źródło: szkic AI
Jean-Paul Sartre › 1905–1980
Emmanuel Levinas
wpływ na
Levinas took Descartes’s idea of the infinite, which exceeds the mind that thinks it, as the structure of the relation to the Other (Totality and Infinity, 1961). E. Levinas, Totalité et infini (1961); R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641), third meditation; SEP “Emmanuel Levinas”
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Emmanuel Levinas › 1906–1995
Harry Frankfurt
wpływ na ✓
Frankfurt read Descartes’s Meditations as a defence of reason, asking whether reason can vindicate itself against doubts from demons, dreams and madness (Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen, 1970). H. G. Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes’s Meditations (1970); SEP “René Descartes”
Źródło: także w Wikidanych · Wikidata
Harry Frankfurt › 1929–2023
Pokaż wszystko (13)Pokaż mniej
Pierre Bayle
wpływ na
Bayle taught Cartesian philosophy at Sedan and Rotterdam, and in his Dictionary (1697) turned the Cartesian arguments against sensible qualities against the reality of extension itself. P. Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697), “Zénon d’Élée”, “Pyrrhon”; R. H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle (2003); SEP “Pierre Bayle”
Źródło: szkic AI
Pierre Bayle › 1647–1706
Mary Astell
wpływ na
In A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part II (1697), Astell adapted Descartes’ rules of method to show that women can reason as well as men. M. Astell, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part II (1697); SEP “Mary Astell”
Źródło: szkic AI
Mary Astell › 1666–1731
George Berkeley
wpływ na
Berkeley accepted the Cartesian starting point that we immediately perceive only our ideas, but used it to deny the material world Descartes had tried to prove (Principles, 1710). G. Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710); Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713); SEP “George Berkeley”
Źródło: szkic AI
George Berkeley › 1685–1753
Taha Husajn
wpływ na
Taha Hussein opened On Pre-Islamic Poetry (1926) by adopting Descartes’ method: the scholar must set aside what he knows and believes and doubt the transmitted sources. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, Fī l-shiʿr al-jāhilī (1926), introduction; P. Cachia, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn (1956)
Źródło: szkic AI
Taha Husajn › 1889–1973
Simone Weil
wpływ na
Weil’s diploma thesis read Descartes as a philosopher of methodical work, for whom perception and knowledge arise from action on the world (Science et perception dans Descartes, 1930). S. Weil, Science et perception dans Descartes (diplôme d’études supérieures, 1930), in Œuvres complètes I (1988)
Źródło: szkic AI
Simone Weil › 1909–1943
Jaakko Hintikka
wpływ na
Hintikka argued that Descartes’s cogito is not an inference but a performance: the thought ‘I do not exist’ defeats itself whenever it is thought or uttered (1962). J. Hintikka, “Cogito, ergo sum: Inference or Performance?”, Philosophical Review 71 (1962)
Źródło: szkic AI
Jaakko Hintikka › 1929–2015
David Chalmers
wpływ na
Chalmers revived a Cartesian conceivability argument – if zombies are conceivable, consciousness is not physical – for a dualism of properties rather than substances (The Conscious Mind, 1996). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641), sixth meditation; SEP “Zombies”
Źródło: szkic AI
David Chalmers › ur. 1966
Krytyka
Wzajemna krytyka 1
Pierre Gassendi ⇄ wzajemnie
krytykuje
Descartes replied to Gassendi’s Fifth Objections (1641) addressing him as ‘flesh’ and arguing that Gassendi, wanting to grasp everything through images, confused pure understanding with imagination. Descartes, Fifth Replies (AT VII 347–390); letter to Clerselier, 12 Jan. 1646 (AT IX-1 202–217)
Źródło: szkic AI
krytyka ze strony
In the Fifth Objections (1641; expanded as Disquisitio metaphysica, 1644) Gassendi doubted innate ideas and asked how an unextended mind could move a body. Descartes, Meditationes (1641), Fifth Objections (AT VII 256–346); P. Gassendi, Disquisitio metaphysica (1644); SEP “Pierre Gassendi”
Źródło: szkic AI
Pierre Gassendi › 1592–1655
Krytyka ze strony 28
Antoine Arnauld pod wpływemwpływ na
pod wpływem
In the Fourth Replies (1641) Descartes accepted Arnauld’s advice and added to the Synopsis that the Fourth Meditation concerns error in judging truth, not sin. R. Descartes, Meditationes (1641), Synopsis and Fourth Replies; SEP “Antoine Arnauld”
Źródło: szkic AI
wpływ na
Arnauld became a leading Cartesian: the Port-Royal Logic (1662, with Pierre Nicole) builds on Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas and his method. A. Arnauld and P. Nicole, La Logique ou l’art de penser (1662); SEP “Antoine Arnauld”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
krytyka ze strony
In the Fourth Objections (1641) Arnauld charged Descartes with circular reasoning about God and clear perception and questioned his denial of souls to animals. Descartes, Meditationes (1641), Fourth Objections (AT VII 197–218); SEP “Antoine Arnauld”
Źródło: szkic AI
Antoine Arnauld › 1612–1694
Elżbieta Czeska pod wpływemwpływ na
pod wpływem
Elisabeth’s questions about the union of mind and body and the control of the passions led Descartes to write The Passions of the Soul (1649). R. Descartes, Les Passions de l’âme (1649); Elisabeth–Descartes correspondence (1643–1649); SEP “Elisabeth of Bohemia”
Źródło: szkic AI
wpływ na
From 1643 Elisabeth studied Descartes’ philosophy with him by letter; he dedicated the Principles of Philosophy (1644) to her, and in 1645 they discussed Seneca on happiness. Elisabeth of Bohemia and R. Descartes, The Correspondence, ed. and tr. L. Shapiro (2007); R. Descartes, Principia philosophiae (1644), dedication; SEP “Elisabeth of Bohemia”
Źródło: szkic AI
krytyka ze strony
Elisabeth asked Descartes how an unextended thinking soul could move the body, since motion seems to require contact and extension (letter of 6/16 May 1643). Elisabeth to Descartes, 6/16 May 1643 (AT III 660–662); SEP “Elisabeth of Bohemia”
Źródło: szkic AI
Elżbieta Czeska › 1618–1680
John Locke wpływ na
wpływ na ✓
According to Damaris Masham, Descartes’ writings first gave Locke a relish for philosophy, for he found them intelligible even where he disagreed (letter to Le Clerc, 1705). D. Masham, letter to J. Le Clerc (Jan. 1705); M. Cranston, John Locke: A Biography (1957); SEP “John Locke”
krytyka ze strony
Locke denied innate ideas (Essay, 1689, Book I) and, against the Cartesians, that the soul always thinks, since thinking is its action, not its essence (II.i.10). J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689), I.ii–iv, II.i.10–19; SEP “John Locke”
Źródło: szkic AI
John Locke › 1632–1704
Baruch Spinoza wpływ na
wpływ na ✓
Spinoza’s first published book, Principles of Cartesian Philosophy (1663), set out Descartes’ Principles in geometrical order, with his Metaphysical Thoughts appended. B. Spinoza, Renati Des Cartes Principiorum philosophiae pars I et II, more geometrico demonstratae (1663), with Cogitata metaphysica; SEP “Baruch Spinoza”
krytyka ze strony
Spinoza called Descartes’ account of the mind steering the body through the pineal gland ‘more occult than any occult quality’ (Ethics, 1677, V, Preface). B. Spinoza, Ethica (1677), V, Praefatio; II P48–49 (against free will); SEP “Baruch Spinoza”
Źródło: szkic AI
Baruch Spinoza › 1632–1677
Isaac Newton wpływ na
wpływ na ✓
Newton studied Descartes’ Géométrie and Principia philosophiae (1660s); his first law is close to Descartes’ laws of nature, and his title echoes Descartes’ (Principia, 1687). I. Newton, Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica (1687); R. Descartes, Principia philosophiae (1644); R. S. Westfall, Never at Rest (1980); SEP “Isaac Newton”
Źródło: także w Wikidanych · Wikidata
krytyka ze strony
Newton argued that Descartes’ vortices cannot account for Kepler’s laws (Principia II, 1687), and rejected his identification of space with body (De gravitatione). I. Newton, Principia (1687) II, scholium to prop. 53; De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum; SEP “Newton’s Philosophy”
Źródło: szkic AI
Isaac Newton › 1643–1727
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz wpływ na
wpływ na ✓
In Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas (1684) Leibniz refined Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas and completed his ontological proof by requiring God’s possibility to be shown. G. W. Leibniz, Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis (Acta Eruditorum, 1684); SEP “Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz”
krytyka ze strony
Leibniz argued that Descartes’ law conserving quantity of motion is false: what is conserved is living force, mv² (Brevis demonstratio, 1686; Discourse on Metaphysics, §17). G. W. Leibniz, Brevis demonstratio erroris memorabilis Cartesii (Acta Eruditorum, 1686); Discours de métaphysique (1686), §17
Źródło: szkic AI
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz › 1646–1716
Pokaż wszystko (28)Pokaż mniej
Thomas Hobbes
krytyka ze strony
Hobbes argued that a thinking thing might be corporeal and that we have no idea of God or of the soul in Descartes’ sense (Third Objections, 1641). Descartes, Meditationes (1641), Third Objections and Replies (AT VII 171–196)
Źródło: szkic AI
Thomas Hobbes › 1588–1679
Margaret Cavendish
krytyka ze strony
In Philosophical Letters (1664) Cavendish rejected Descartes’ separation of an immaterial mind from inert matter, holding that all matter is self-moving, perceptive and rational. M. Cavendish, Philosophical Letters (1664), Part I; SEP “Margaret Lucas Cavendish”
Źródło: szkic AI
Margaret Cavendish › 1623–1673
Blaise Pascal
krytyka ze strony
Pascal could not forgive Descartes for wanting to do without God, needing him only for a flick to set the world in motion (Pensées, fr. 1001 Lafuma). B. Pascal, Pensées, ed. Lafuma, fr. 1001 (Brunschvicg 77); fr. 887 (B 78: “Descartes inutile et incertain”)
Źródło: szkic AI
Blaise Pascal › 1623–1662
Anne Conway
krytyka ze strony
Conway held against Descartes that body and spirit differ only in degree, so matter is not dead extension (Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, 1690). A. Conway, Principia philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae (1690), chs. 7–9; SEP “Anne Conway”
Źródło: szkic AI
Anne Conway › 1631–1679
Giambattista Vico
krytyka ze strony
Vico objected that Descartes’ cogito gives consciousness, not knowledge, of being, for we know truly only what we make (De antiquissima Italorum sapientia, 1710). G. Vico, De antiquissima Italorum sapientia (1710), ch. I; De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1709); SEP “Giambattista Vico”
Źródło: szkic AI
Giambattista Vico › 1668–1744
Anton Wilhelm Amo
krytyka ze strony
Amo turned against Cartesian interaction: the mind, active and immaterial, cannot sense or suffer, so sensation belongs to the living, organic body (De humanae mentis apatheia, 1734). A. W. Amo, Dissertatio inauguralis philosophica de humanae mentis apatheia (Wittenberg, 1734); S. Menn & J. E. H. Smith (eds.), Anton Wilhelm Amo’s Philosophical Dissertations on Mind and Body (2020)
Źródło: szkic AI
Anton Wilhelm Amo › ok. 1703–1759
David Hume
krytyka ze strony
Hume objected that Descartes’ antecedent universal doubt would be incurable, since no principle could restore trust in our faculties once all were suspended (Enquiry, 1748, XII). D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), XII.i; SEP “David Hume”
Źródło: szkic AI
David Hume › 1711–1776
Immanuel Kant
krytyka ze strony
Kant rejected Descartes’ inference from ‘I think’ to a simple thinking substance (Paralogisms) and argued that inner experience presupposes outer objects (Refutation of Idealism, B 274–279). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 341–405 / B 399–432 (Paralogisms); B 274–279 (Refutation of Idealism)
Źródło: szkic AI
Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804
Charles Sanders Peirce
krytyka ze strony
Peirce rejected Cartesian doubt – ‘let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts’ (‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’, 1868). C. S. Peirce, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”, Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2 (1868); SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
Źródło: szkic AI
Charles Sanders Peirce › 1839–1914
Gaston Bachelard
krytyka ze strony
Bachelard called for a ‘non-Cartesian epistemology’: modern physics replaces Descartes’ simple, clear and distinct ideas with complex constructions (Le nouvel esprit scientifique, 1934, ch. 6). G. Bachelard, Le nouvel esprit scientifique (1934), ch. 6 ‘L’épistémologie non-cartésienne’
Źródło: szkic AI
Gaston Bachelard › 1884–1962
Martin Heidegger
krytyka ze strony
Heidegger objected that Descartes leaves the being of the ‘sum’ unexamined and reduces the world to measurable extension, missing being-in-the-world (Being and Time, 1927, §§ 6, 19–21). M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1927), §§ 6, 19–21; SEP “Martin Heidegger”
Źródło: szkic AI
Martin Heidegger › 1889–1976
Norbert Elias
krytyka ze strony
Elias traced the image of the individual as a homo clausus, sealed off from others, to Descartes’ cogito, and opposed it with figurations (Civilizing Process, 1969 introduction). N. Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation, 2nd ed. (1969), Introduction; Die Gesellschaft der Individuen (1987), Part II
Źródło: szkic AI
Norbert Elias › 1897–1990
Gilbert Ryle
krytyka ze strony
Ryle called the Cartesian ‘official doctrine’ of mind and body the dogma of the ‘Ghost in the Machine’, a category mistake (The Concept of Mind, 1949). G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949), ch. 1
Źródło: szkic AI
Gilbert Ryle › 1900–1976
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
krytyka ze strony
Merleau-Ponty rejected Descartes’ split between thinking mind and extended body, analysing perception through the lived body (Phenomenology of Perception, 1945); Eye and Mind (1961) contests his Optics. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (1945); L’Œil et l’esprit (1961), part III, on Descartes’ Dioptrique; SEP “Maurice Merleau-Ponty”
Źródło: szkic AI
Maurice Merleau-Ponty › 1908–1961
Hilary Putnam
krytyka ze strony
Putnam argued that the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, a modern version of Descartes’ demon, refutes itself: envatted brains could not even refer to vats (Reason, Truth and History, 1981). H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (1981), ch. 1 “Brains in a Vat”; R. Descartes, Meditationes (1641), I
Źródło: szkic AI
Hilary Putnam › 1926–2016
Aníbal Quijano
krytyka ze strony
Quijano traced the Eurocentric paradigm of knowledge to the Cartesian separation of a knowing subject, as reason, from its object and from the body – a dualism that in his account allowed the colonised to be classed as nature and body; critics dispute that Eurocentrism derives from Descartes. A. Quijano, “Colonialidad y modernidad/racionalidad”, Perú Indígena 13:29 (1992); “Colonialidad del poder, eurocentrismo y América Latina”, in E. Lander (ed.), La colonialidad del saber (2000)
Źródło: szkic AI
Aníbal Quijano › 1928–2018
Richard Rorty
krytyka ze strony
Rorty argued that Descartes invented the mind as an inner mirror of nature, founding a philosophy centred on epistemology (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979, ch. 1). R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), ch. 1; SEP “Richard Rorty”
Źródło: szkic AI
Richard Rorty › 1931–2007
Tom Regan
krytyka ze strony
Regan rejected Descartes’ denial of consciousness to animals as unfounded: many mammals are ‘subjects-of-a-life’ with beliefs, desires and inherent value (The Case for Animal Rights, 1983, ch. 1). T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983), ch. 1; R. Descartes, Discours de la méthode (1637), part V
Źródło: szkic AI
Tom Regan › 1938–2017
Daniel Dennett
krytyka ze strony
Dennett attacked the ‘Cartesian Theater’, a central place in the brain where it all comes together for consciousness, surviving as ‘Cartesian materialism’ (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 5; D. C. Dennett & M. Kinsbourne, “Time and the Observer”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1992)
Źródło: szkic AI
Daniel Dennett › 1942–2024
Andy Clark
krytyka ze strony
Clark rejected the Cartesian picture of the mind as an inner, disembodied reasoner: cognition is embodied and can extend into tools and environment (Being There, 1997). A. Clark, Being There (1997); A. Clark & D. J. Chalmers, “The Extended Mind”, Analysis 58 (1998); Supersizing the Mind (2008)
Źródło: szkic AI
Andy Clark › ur. 1957
Thomas Metzinger
krytyka ze strony
Metzinger argued that the Cartesian intuition of an irreducible self stems from the mind’s representational structure: there are no selves, only transparent self-models (Being No One, 2003). T. Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (2003); The Ego Tunnel (2009)
Źródło: szkic AI
Thomas Metzinger › ur. 1958
Brian Burkhart
krytyka ze strony
Burkhart read Descartes’ thinking I as a subject without land or culture, an example of the Western ‘delocality’ that served colonisation (Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land, 2019). B. Burkhart, Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land (2019); cf. E. Dussel, 1492: El encubrimiento del otro (1992) on ego cogito and ego conquiro
Źródło: szkic AI
Brian Burkhart › osoba współczesna
Krytykuje 1
Arystoteles
krytykuje
Descartes rejected the scholastic-Aristotelian substantial forms and real qualities, explaining nature by extension and motion and banishing final causes from physics (letter to Regius, January 1642; Meditations IV). Descartes to Regius, Jan. 1642 (AT III 491–510); Meditationes IV (AT VII 55); Principia philosophiae IV §§198–203; SEP “Descartes’ Physics”
Źródło: szkic AI
Arystoteles › 384–322 p.n.e.
Dzieła
Cztery reguły myślenia i pierwsze „myślę, więc jestem”.
Radykalna wątpliwość, cogito, dowody na istnienie Boga i dualizm umysłu i ciała.
Stanowisko
Descartes wanted to rebuild knowledge on a foundation that could not be doubted. He doubted everything – the senses, the body, even mathematics, imagining an evil demon deceiving him – until one certainty remained: while I doubt, I think, and so I exist. From this “I think, therefore I am” he argued for God as guarantor of clear and distinct ideas, and for the reality of the external world. Mind, a thinking thing, and body, an extended thing, are two distinct substances – which raised the lasting puzzle of how they interact, a puzzle Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia pressed on him in 1643 and that he never fully solved. With analytic geometry and a mechanical physics he laid foundations for modern science; he is often called the father of modern philosophy and of rationalism.
Życie i kontekst
Born in 1596 in La Haye in Touraine, Descartes was educated by the Jesuits at La Flèche and studied law. He served as a volunteer soldier, and in 1619 had the insight that led him to a new method. He spent most of his productive life in the Dutch Republic. Invited by Queen Christina, he went to Stockholm in 1649 and died there in 1650.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- Rules for the Direction of the Mind (c. 1628)
- Discourse on the Method (1637)
- Meditations on First Philosophy (1641)
- Principles of Philosophy (1644)
- The Passions of the Soul (1649)
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