David Hume
Według Hume’a nigdy nie widzimy, jak jedna rzecz powoduje drugą, widzimy tylko jedną po drugiej; ja jest tylko wiązką doświadczeń; a rozum służy naszym uczuciom.
Umiejscowienie
Radykalny empirysta: przyczynowość jest nawykiem, ja – wiązką spostrzeżeń, a rozum niewolnikiem namiętności.
Kluczowe idee
- Krytyka przyczynowości
- Problem indukcji
- Rozróżnienie jest–powinien
- Teoria wiązki ja
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 8
Cyceron
pod wpływem
Hume told Hutcheson (1739) he meant to take his catalogue of virtues from Cicero’s Offices; his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion follow Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods. D. Hume to F. Hutcheson, 17 Sept. 1739, in Letters, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (1932); Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779); SEP “Hume on Religion”
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Cyceron › 106–43 p.n.e.
Thomas Hobbes
pod wpływem
Paul Russell (1985) argued that the scope and plan of Hume’s Treatise (1739–40) were modelled on Hobbes’ Elements of Law (1640); the thesis is debated. P. Russell, “Hume’s Treatise and Hobbes’s The Elements of Law”, Journal of the History of Ideas 46 (1985); The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise (2008)
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Thomas Hobbes › 1588–1679
Nicolas Malebranche
pod wpływem
Hume took Malebranche’s argument that no necessary connection between finite causes and effects is perceived, but rejected his conclusion that God is the only true cause (Treatise, 1739). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), “Of the idea of necessary connexion”; An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748); SEP “David Hume”
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Nicolas Malebranche › 1638–1715
Isaac Newton
pod wpływem ✓
Hume subtitled his Treatise (1739) ‘an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects’, modelling his science of man on Newton’s natural philosophy. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), title page; SEP “David Hume”
Isaac Newton › 1643–1727
George Berkeley
pod wpływem ✓
Hume adopted Berkeley’s account of abstract ideas as particular ideas that stand for others, praising it as a ‘valuable discovery’ (Treatise, 1739). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), “Of abstract ideas”; G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Introduction; SEP “David Hume”
George Berkeley › 1685–1753
Francis Hutcheson
pod wpływem ✓
Hume grounded the morals of Treatise Book III (1740) in a moral sense, following Hutcheson, and discussed the manuscript with him in letters of 1739–40. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III (1740), “Moral distinctions deriv’d from a moral sense”; letters to F. Hutcheson (1739–40), in Letters, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (1932); SEP “Francis Hutcheson”
Francis Hutcheson › 1694–1746
Pokaż wszystko (8)Pokaż mniej
Pierre Bayle
pod wpływem
In the Treatise (1739) Hume used Bayle’s Dictionary article ‘Spinoza’ to turn the charge of atheism back on the theologians’ doctrine of an immaterial soul. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), “Of the immateriality of the soul”; P. Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697), “Spinoza”; SEP “Pierre Bayle”
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Pierre Bayle › 1647–1706
Bernard Mandeville
pod wpływem
Introducing the Treatise (1739), Hume named Mandeville, with Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Butler, among those who began to put the science of man on a new footing. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Introduction; SEP “Bernard Mandeville”
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Bernard Mandeville › 1670–1733
Wpływ na 17
Adam Smith
wpływ na
Smith developed Hume’s account of sympathy into the theory of moral judgement of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), denying that utility is the first source of approval. A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Part IV; D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40); SEP “Adam Smith’s Moral and Political Philosophy”
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Adam Smith › 1723–1790
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi
wpływ na ✓
In David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism (1787) Jacobi took over Hume’s ‘belief’ as his own term for the immediate certainty of external things. F. H. Jacobi, David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus (1787); SEP “Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi”
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Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi › 1743–1819
Jeremy Bentham
wpływ na
On reading Hume’s Treatise, Bentham felt ‘as if scales had fallen’ from his eyes: utility was the test of virtue (A Fragment on Government, 1776). J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government (1776); D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III (1740); SEP “Jeremy Bentham”
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Jeremy Bentham › 1748–1832
Auguste Comte
wpływ na
Comte’s restriction of science to laws of phenomena, renouncing the search for causes, is commonly traced to Hume’s critique of causation (Cours de philosophie positive, 1830–42). A. Comte, Cours de philosophie positive (1830–42); M. Pickering, Auguste Comte: An Intellectual Biography, vol. I (1993); SEP “Auguste Comte”
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Auguste Comte › 1798–1857
Bertrand Russell
wpływ na ✓
Russell restated Hume’s problem of induction, holding that the inductive principle can be neither proved nor disproved by experience (The Problems of Philosophy, 1912). B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1912), “On Induction”; A History of Western Philosophy (1945); SEP “Bertrand Russell”
Bertrand Russell › 1872–1970
Karl Popper
wpływ na
Popper accepted Hume’s argument that induction cannot be logically justified but rejected his psychology of habit, replacing induction with conjecture and falsification (Objective Knowledge, 1972). K. R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934); Objective Knowledge (1972), “Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution of the Problem of Induction”; SEP “Karl Popper”
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Karl Popper › 1902–1994
Pokaż wszystko (17)Pokaż mniej
John Millar
wpływ na
Millar, who met Hume at Lord Kames’ house and later taught his nephew, was by John Craig’s account ‘convinced of the truth’ of Hume’s metaphysical opinions. J. Craig, “Account of the Life and Writings of John Millar”, in J. Millar, The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks (4th ed., 1806)
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John Millar › 1735–1801
Alexius Meinong
wpływ na
Meinong’s first works, Hume-Studien I (1877) on abstraction and nominalism and II (1882) on relations, began from Hume’s theory and prepared his own theory of relations. A. Meinong, Hume-Studien I: Zur Geschichte und Kritik des modernen Nominalismus (1877); Hume-Studien II: Zur Relationstheorie (1882); SEP “Alexius Meinong”
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Alexius Meinong › 1853–1920
Edvard Westermarck
wpływ na
Westermarck placed his theory that moral judgements express disinterested emotions of approval and disapproval in Hume’s tradition, naming Hume a forerunner (Ethical Relativity, 1932). E. Westermarck, Ethical Relativity (1932); The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (1906–08); T. Stroup, Westermarck’s Ethics (1982); SEP “Hume’s Moral Philosophy”
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Edvard Westermarck › 1862–1939
Albert Einstein
wpływ na ✓
Einstein said that reading Hume’s critique of concepts, with Mach, helped him question absolute simultaneity in special relativity (letter to Schlick, 1915; Autobiographical Notes, 1949). A. Einstein, “Autobiographical Notes”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (1949); Einstein to M. Schlick, 14 Dec. 1915; SEP “Einstein’s Philosophy of Science”
Albert Einstein › 1879–1955
Alfred Jules Ayer
wpływ na
Ayer modelled his split of analytic and empirical propositions on Hume’s relations of ideas and matters of fact, quoting his ‘commit it then to the flames’ (1936). A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936); Hume (1980); D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”
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Alfred Jules Ayer › 1910–1989
Peter Frederick Strawson
wpływ na
Strawson took from Hume a naturalist answer to scepticism: belief in bodies and induction are inescapable natural commitments that neither need nor admit justification (Skepticism and Naturalism, 1985). P. F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (1985); SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”
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Peter Frederick Strawson › 1919–2006
John Rawls
wpływ na
Rawls took the circumstances of justice – moderate scarcity and limited altruism – from Hume as the conditions under which justice is needed (A Theory of Justice, 1971). J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature III (1740); An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751)
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John Rawls › 1921–2002
Gilles Deleuze
wpływ na ✓
In Empiricism and Subjectivity (1953) Deleuze read Hume as showing how a subject is constituted within the given through habit and association, and stressed his externality of relations. G. Deleuze, Empirisme et subjectivité (1953); SEP “Gilles Deleuze”; SEP “David Hume”
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Gilles Deleuze › 1925–1995
Saul Kripke
wpływ na ✓
Kripke modelled the ‘sceptical solution’ he ascribed to Wittgenstein on Hume’s treatment of causation: a sceptical paradox about meaning is answered by community practice, not facts (1982). S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982); D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748); SEP “Rule-Following and Intentionality”
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Saul Kripke › 1940–2022
David Lewis
wpływ na
Lewis named his thesis of ‘Humean supervenience’ after Hume, the denier of necessary connections: everything supervenes on the local distribution of particular qualities (Philosophical Papers II, 1986). D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol. II (1986), introduction; “Humean Supervenience Debugged”, Mind 103 (1994); SEP “David Lewis”
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David Lewis › 1941–2001
Derek Parfit
wpływ na
Parfit’s reductionism about persons – identity is psychological and physical continuity, no further fact – is commonly compared with Hume’s bundle view (Reasons and Persons, 1984). D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984); D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), “Of personal identity”; SEP “Personal Identity”
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Derek Parfit › 1942–2017
Krytyka
Krytyka ze strony 5
Thomas Reid
krytyka ze strony
Reid argued that Hume’s scepticism follows from the theory of ideas and answered it with first principles of common sense (Inquiry into the Human Mind, 1764). T. Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), Dedication, chs. I and VII; SEP “Thomas Reid”
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Thomas Reid › 1710–1796
Immanuel Kant wpływ na
wpływ na ✓
Kant generalised Hume’s question about cause and effect into the problem of how synthetic judgements a priori are possible (Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd ed. 1787, Introduction). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2nd ed. 1787), Introduction; Prolegomena (1783); SEP “Kant and Hume on Causality”
krytyka ze strony
Kant credited Hume with interrupting his dogmatic slumber but rejected deriving causality from habit, making it an a priori category (Prolegomena, 1783, Preface). I. Kant, Prolegomena (1783), Preface (AA IV 257–260); Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 19–20, B 127–128
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Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804
Catharine Macaulay
krytyka ze strony
Macaulay’s History of England (1763–1783) set a republican account of the Stuart era against Hume’s History, which in Macaulay’s view excused arbitrary royal power. C. Macaulay, The History of England from the Accession of James I to that of the Brunswick Line (8 vols., 1763–1783); SEP “Catharine Macaulay”
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Catharine Macaulay › 1731–1791
Mary Shepherd
krytyka ze strony
Against Hume, Shepherd held that reason, not custom, shows that nothing begins to exist without a cause (Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, 1824). M. Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect (1824); SEP “Mary Shepherd”
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Mary Shepherd › 1777–1847
Alasdair MacIntyre
krytyka ze strony
MacIntyre read Hume’s grounding of morals in the passions, and his is–ought gap, as part of the failed Enlightenment project of justifying morality (After Virtue, 1981). A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981), chs. 4–5; Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988)
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Alasdair MacIntyre › 1929–2025
Krytykuje 3
Kartezjusz
krytykuje
Hume objected that Descartes’ antecedent universal doubt would be incurable, since no principle could restore trust in our faculties once all were suspended (Enquiry, 1748, XII). D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), XII.i; SEP “David Hume”
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Kartezjusz › 1596–1650
John Locke pod wpływem
pod wpływem ✓
Hume took over Locke’s principle that all ideas come from experience, recasting it as the thesis that every simple idea copies a prior impression (Treatise, 1739). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739); J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689); SEP “David Hume”
krytykuje
Hume objected that Locke drew the idea of power from reasoning, though no reasoning can yield a new simple idea (Treatise, 1739, 1.3.14; Enquiry VII). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), 1.3.14; An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), VII, note; J. Locke, Essay II.xxi
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John Locke › 1632–1704
Adam Ferguson
krytykuje
Hume judged the draft of Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society unfit for the public in style and reasoning (letter to Hugh Blair, 1766). D. Hume to H. Blair, 11 Feb. 1766, in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (1932), vol. II
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Adam Ferguson › 1723–1816
Dzieła
Impresje i idee, przyczynowość jako zwyczaj, ja jako wiązka.
Wyostrzona wersja problemów przyczynowości i indukcji.
Krytyka argumentu z projektu.
Stanowisko
Hume wanted to build a science of human nature on experience. All our ideas derive from impressions, and when we examine causation we find no necessary connection, only constant conjunction and our habit of expecting the effect – so induction has no rational justification. The self, too, is no substance, but a bundle of perceptions. In ethics reason is “the slave of the passions”: morality rests on feeling and sympathy, and no “ought” follows from an “is”. His Dialogues dismantle the argument from design. Kant said that Hume’s scepticism woke him from his “dogmatic slumber”, and he remains a key influence on empiricism and analytic philosophy. In a footnote added to “Of National Characters” in 1753 he wrote that he was “apt to suspect” Black people to be “naturally inferior to the whites” – a passage contested already in his lifetime (by James Beattie, among others) and central to debates about racism in the Enlightenment.
Życie i kontekst
Born in Edinburgh in 1711, Hume wrote his first major work while staying in France and published it in his late twenties. Its poor reception and his reputation as a sceptic cost him professorships in Edinburgh and Glasgow. He became famous instead as an essayist and as the author of a History of England, worked as librarian of the Advocates’ Library in Edinburgh and as a diplomat in Paris, and died in Edinburgh in 1776.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)
- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)
- An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751)
- The History of England (1754–1762)
- Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779)
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