ديفيد هيوم
يرى هيوم أنّنا لا نرى قط شيئًا يسبّب شيئًا آخر، بل نرى فقط شيئًا يتبع آخر؛ وأنّ الذات ليست سوى حزمة من الخبرات؛ وأنّ العقل خادم لمشاعرنا.
التموضع
تجريبي جذري: السببية عادة، والذات حزمة من الإدراكات، والعقل عبد الانفعالات.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- نقد السببية
- مشكلة الاستقراء
- التمييز بين «ما هو كائن» و«ما ينبغي أن يكون»
- نظرية الحزمة في الذات
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 8
شيشرون
تأثّر بـ
Hume told Hutcheson (1739) he meant to take his catalogue of virtues from Cicero’s Offices; his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion follow Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods. D. Hume to F. Hutcheson, 17 Sept. 1739, in Letters, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (1932); Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779); SEP “Hume on Religion”
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شيشرون › 106–43 ق.م
توماس هوبز
تأثّر بـ
Paul Russell (1985) argued that the scope and plan of Hume’s Treatise (1739–40) were modelled on Hobbes’ Elements of Law (1640); the thesis is debated. P. Russell, “Hume’s Treatise and Hobbes’s The Elements of Law”, Journal of the History of Ideas 46 (1985); The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise (2008)
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توماس هوبز › 1588–1679
نيكولا مالبرانش
تأثّر بـ
Hume took Malebranche’s argument that no necessary connection between finite causes and effects is perceived, but rejected his conclusion that God is the only true cause (Treatise, 1739). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), “Of the idea of necessary connexion”; An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748); SEP “David Hume”
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نيكولا مالبرانش › 1638–1715
إسحاق نيوتن
تأثّر بـ ✓
Hume subtitled his Treatise (1739) ‘an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects’, modelling his science of man on Newton’s natural philosophy. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), title page; SEP “David Hume”
إسحاق نيوتن › 1643–1727
جورج بيركلي
تأثّر بـ ✓
Hume adopted Berkeley’s account of abstract ideas as particular ideas that stand for others, praising it as a ‘valuable discovery’ (Treatise, 1739). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), “Of abstract ideas”; G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Introduction; SEP “David Hume”
جورج بيركلي › 1685–1753
فرانسيس هاتشسون
تأثّر بـ ✓
Hume grounded the morals of Treatise Book III (1740) in a moral sense, following Hutcheson, and discussed the manuscript with him in letters of 1739–40. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III (1740), “Moral distinctions deriv’d from a moral sense”; letters to F. Hutcheson (1739–40), in Letters, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (1932); SEP “Francis Hutcheson”
فرانسيس هاتشسون › 1694–1746
عرض الكل (8)عرض أقل
بيير بايل
تأثّر بـ
In the Treatise (1739) Hume used Bayle’s Dictionary article ‘Spinoza’ to turn the charge of atheism back on the theologians’ doctrine of an immaterial soul. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), “Of the immateriality of the soul”; P. Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697), “Spinoza”; SEP “Pierre Bayle”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
بيير بايل › 1647–1706
برنارد ماندفيل
تأثّر بـ
Introducing the Treatise (1739), Hume named Mandeville, with Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Butler, among those who began to put the science of man on a new footing. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Introduction; SEP “Bernard Mandeville”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
برنارد ماندفيل › 1670–1733
أثّر في 17
آدم سميث
أثّر في
Smith developed Hume’s account of sympathy into the theory of moral judgement of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), denying that utility is the first source of approval. A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Part IV; D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40); SEP “Adam Smith’s Moral and Political Philosophy”
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آدم سميث › 1723–1790
فريدريش هاينريش ياكوبي
أثّر في ✓
In David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism (1787) Jacobi took over Hume’s ‘belief’ as his own term for the immediate certainty of external things. F. H. Jacobi, David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus (1787); SEP “Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi”
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فريدريش هاينريش ياكوبي › 1743–1819
جيرمي بنثام
أثّر في
On reading Hume’s Treatise, Bentham felt ‘as if scales had fallen’ from his eyes: utility was the test of virtue (A Fragment on Government, 1776). J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government (1776); D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III (1740); SEP “Jeremy Bentham”
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جيرمي بنثام › 1748–1832
أوغست كونت
أثّر في
Comte’s restriction of science to laws of phenomena, renouncing the search for causes, is commonly traced to Hume’s critique of causation (Cours de philosophie positive, 1830–42). A. Comte, Cours de philosophie positive (1830–42); M. Pickering, Auguste Comte: An Intellectual Biography, vol. I (1993); SEP “Auguste Comte”
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أوغست كونت › 1798–1857
بيرتراند راسل
أثّر في ✓
Russell restated Hume’s problem of induction, holding that the inductive principle can be neither proved nor disproved by experience (The Problems of Philosophy, 1912). B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1912), “On Induction”; A History of Western Philosophy (1945); SEP “Bertrand Russell”
بيرتراند راسل › 1872–1970
كارل بوبر
أثّر في
Popper accepted Hume’s argument that induction cannot be logically justified but rejected his psychology of habit, replacing induction with conjecture and falsification (Objective Knowledge, 1972). K. R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934); Objective Knowledge (1972), “Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution of the Problem of Induction”; SEP “Karl Popper”
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كارل بوبر › 1902–1994
عرض الكل (17)عرض أقل
جون ميلار
أثّر في
Millar, who met Hume at Lord Kames’ house and later taught his nephew, was by John Craig’s account ‘convinced of the truth’ of Hume’s metaphysical opinions. J. Craig, “Account of the Life and Writings of John Millar”, in J. Millar, The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks (4th ed., 1806)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جون ميلار › 1735–1801
ألكسيوس ماينونج
أثّر في
Meinong’s first works, Hume-Studien I (1877) on abstraction and nominalism and II (1882) on relations, began from Hume’s theory and prepared his own theory of relations. A. Meinong, Hume-Studien I: Zur Geschichte und Kritik des modernen Nominalismus (1877); Hume-Studien II: Zur Relationstheorie (1882); SEP “Alexius Meinong”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ألكسيوس ماينونج › 1853–1920
إدوارد ويسترمارك
أثّر في
Westermarck placed his theory that moral judgements express disinterested emotions of approval and disapproval in Hume’s tradition, naming Hume a forerunner (Ethical Relativity, 1932). E. Westermarck, Ethical Relativity (1932); The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (1906–08); T. Stroup, Westermarck’s Ethics (1982); SEP “Hume’s Moral Philosophy”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إدوارد ويسترمارك › 1862–1939
ألبرت أينشتاين
أثّر في ✓
Einstein said that reading Hume’s critique of concepts, with Mach, helped him question absolute simultaneity in special relativity (letter to Schlick, 1915; Autobiographical Notes, 1949). A. Einstein, “Autobiographical Notes”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (1949); Einstein to M. Schlick, 14 Dec. 1915; SEP “Einstein’s Philosophy of Science”
ألبرت أينشتاين › 1879–1955
ألفرد آير
أثّر في
Ayer modelled his split of analytic and empirical propositions on Hume’s relations of ideas and matters of fact, quoting his ‘commit it then to the flames’ (1936). A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936); Hume (1980); D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ألفرد آير › 1910–1989
بي. إف. ستروسون
أثّر في
Strawson took from Hume a naturalist answer to scepticism: belief in bodies and induction are inescapable natural commitments that neither need nor admit justification (Skepticism and Naturalism, 1985). P. F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (1985); SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
بي. إف. ستروسون › 1919–2006
جون رولز
أثّر في
Rawls took the circumstances of justice – moderate scarcity and limited altruism – from Hume as the conditions under which justice is needed (A Theory of Justice, 1971). J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature III (1740); An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جون رولز › 1921–2002
جيل دولوز
أثّر في ✓
In Empiricism and Subjectivity (1953) Deleuze read Hume as showing how a subject is constituted within the given through habit and association, and stressed his externality of relations. G. Deleuze, Empirisme et subjectivité (1953); SEP “Gilles Deleuze”; SEP “David Hume”
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جيل دولوز › 1925–1995
شاول كريبك
أثّر في ✓
Kripke modelled the ‘sceptical solution’ he ascribed to Wittgenstein on Hume’s treatment of causation: a sceptical paradox about meaning is answered by community practice, not facts (1982). S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982); D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748); SEP “Rule-Following and Intentionality”
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شاول كريبك › 1940–2022
ديفيد لويس
أثّر في
Lewis named his thesis of ‘Humean supervenience’ after Hume, the denier of necessary connections: everything supervenes on the local distribution of particular qualities (Philosophical Papers II, 1986). D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol. II (1986), introduction; “Humean Supervenience Debugged”, Mind 103 (1994); SEP “David Lewis”
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ديفيد لويس › 1941–2001
ديريك بارفيت
أثّر في
Parfit’s reductionism about persons – identity is psychological and physical continuity, no further fact – is commonly compared with Hume’s bundle view (Reasons and Persons, 1984). D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984); D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), “Of personal identity”; SEP “Personal Identity”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ديريك بارفيت › 1942–2017
النقد
انتقده 5
توماس ريد
انتقده
Reid argued that Hume’s scepticism follows from the theory of ideas and answered it with first principles of common sense (Inquiry into the Human Mind, 1764). T. Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), Dedication, chs. I and VII; SEP “Thomas Reid”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
توماس ريد › 1710–1796
إيمانويل كانط أثّر في
أثّر في ✓
Kant generalised Hume’s question about cause and effect into the problem of how synthetic judgements a priori are possible (Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd ed. 1787, Introduction). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2nd ed. 1787), Introduction; Prolegomena (1783); SEP “Kant and Hume on Causality”
انتقده
Kant credited Hume with interrupting his dogmatic slumber but rejected deriving causality from habit, making it an a priori category (Prolegomena, 1783, Preface). I. Kant, Prolegomena (1783), Preface (AA IV 257–260); Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 19–20, B 127–128
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إيمانويل كانط › 1724–1804
كاثرين ماكولاي
انتقده
Macaulay’s History of England (1763–1783) set a republican account of the Stuart era against Hume’s History, which in Macaulay’s view excused arbitrary royal power. C. Macaulay, The History of England from the Accession of James I to that of the Brunswick Line (8 vols., 1763–1783); SEP “Catharine Macaulay”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
كاثرين ماكولاي › 1731–1791
ماري شيبرد
انتقده
Against Hume, Shepherd held that reason, not custom, shows that nothing begins to exist without a cause (Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, 1824). M. Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect (1824); SEP “Mary Shepherd”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ماري شيبرد › 1777–1847
ألسدير ماكنتاير
انتقده
MacIntyre read Hume’s grounding of morals in the passions, and his is–ought gap, as part of the failed Enlightenment project of justifying morality (After Virtue, 1981). A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981), chs. 4–5; Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ألسدير ماكنتاير › 1929–2025
ينتقد 3
رينيه ديكارت
انتقد
Hume objected that Descartes’ antecedent universal doubt would be incurable, since no principle could restore trust in our faculties once all were suspended (Enquiry, 1748, XII). D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), XII.i; SEP “David Hume”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
رينيه ديكارت › 1596–1650
جون لوك تأثّر بـ
تأثّر بـ ✓
Hume took over Locke’s principle that all ideas come from experience, recasting it as the thesis that every simple idea copies a prior impression (Treatise, 1739). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739); J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689); SEP “David Hume”
انتقد
Hume objected that Locke drew the idea of power from reasoning, though no reasoning can yield a new simple idea (Treatise, 1739, 1.3.14; Enquiry VII). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), 1.3.14; An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), VII, note; J. Locke, Essay II.xxi
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جون لوك › 1632–1704
آدم فيرغسون
انتقد
Hume judged the draft of Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society unfit for the public in style and reasoning (letter to Hugh Blair, 1766). D. Hume to H. Blair, 11 Feb. 1766, in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (1932), vol. II
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
آدم فيرغسون › 1723–1816
الأعمال
الانطباعات والأفكار، والسببية بوصفها عادة، والذات حزمةً.
صيغة مشدَّدة لمشكلتي السببية والاستقراء.
نقد لحجة النظام.
الموقف
Hume wanted to build a science of human nature on experience. All our ideas derive from impressions, and when we examine causation we find no necessary connection, only constant conjunction and our habit of expecting the effect – so induction has no rational justification. The self, too, is no substance, but a bundle of perceptions. In ethics reason is “the slave of the passions”: morality rests on feeling and sympathy, and no “ought” follows from an “is”. His Dialogues dismantle the argument from design. Kant said that Hume’s scepticism woke him from his “dogmatic slumber”, and he remains a key influence on empiricism and analytic philosophy. In a footnote added to “Of National Characters” in 1753 he wrote that he was “apt to suspect” Black people to be “naturally inferior to the whites” – a passage contested already in his lifetime (by James Beattie, among others) and central to debates about racism in the Enlightenment.
الحياة والسياق
Born in Edinburgh in 1711, Hume wrote his first major work while staying in France and published it in his late twenties. Its poor reception and his reputation as a sceptic cost him professorships in Edinburgh and Glasgow. He became famous instead as an essayist and as the author of a History of England, worked as librarian of the Advocates’ Library in Edinburgh and as a diplomat in Paris, and died in Edinburgh in 1776.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)
- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)
- An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751)
- The History of England (1754–1762)
- Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779)
يرد في
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