勒内·笛卡尔
怀疑你所能怀疑的一切，有一件事仍然是确定的——正在思考的你存在——而心灵和身体是两种不同的东西。
定位
方法论怀疑引向一个不可动摇的基础：我思故我在。心灵与身体是两种实体。
核心思想
- 我思故我在（cogito ergo sum）
- 方法论怀疑
- 心身二元论
影响
受影响于 4
塞克斯都·恩披里柯
受其影响
Descartes’ doubt in the Meditations (1641) uses the sceptical arguments revived from Sextus; in the Second Replies he says he had seen many ancient sceptical writings. R. Descartes, Meditationes (1641), First Meditation and Second Replies; R. H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle (2003); SEP “Ancient Skepticism”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
塞克斯都·恩披里柯 › 约160–210年
奥古斯丁
受其影响
Shown Augustine’s ‘if I am mistaken, I exist’ (City of God), Descartes acknowledged the parallel but stressed his different use of it (letter to Colvius, 1640). R. Descartes, letter to A. Colvius (Nov. 1640); Augustine, De civitate Dei (si fallor, sum); SEP “Saint Augustine”
依据: AI 草稿
奥古斯丁 › 354–430
米歇尔·德·蒙田
受其影响
Descartes’ Discourse on Method (1637) echoes Montaigne in its first-person form and in the lesson drawn from the diversity of customs, without naming him. R. Descartes, Discours de la méthode (1637), ed. É. Gilson, Discours de la méthode: texte et commentaire (1925); SEP “Michel de Montaigne”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
米歇尔·德·蒙田 › 1533–1592
弗朗西斯科·苏亚雷斯
受其影响 存在争议 ✓
In the Fourth Replies (1641) Descartes cited Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations on material falsity, the one place he names him; how far Suárez shaped him is disputed. R. Descartes, Fourth Replies (1641); F. Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae (1597); R. Ariew, Descartes and the Last Scholastics (1999)
弗朗西斯科·苏亚雷斯 › 1548–1617
影响了 13
尼古拉·马勒伯朗士
影响了 ✓
Reading Descartes’ Treatise on Man in 1664 turned Malebranche to philosophy; The Search after Truth (1674–75) keeps Cartesian dualism and extension as the essence of matter. N. Malebranche, De la recherche de la vérité (1674–75); SEP “Nicolas Malebranche”
尼古拉·马勒伯朗士 › 1638–1715
格奥尔格·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔
影响了 ✓
Hegel made Descartes’ principle of thinking the start of modern philosophy: with him ‘we are at home’ (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1833–36). G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III (ed. K. L. Michelet, 1836), section on Descartes
格奥尔格·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔 › 1770–1831
埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
影响了
In the Cartesian Meditations (1931) Husserl radicalised Descartes’s way to the ego cogito into transcendental phenomenology, rejecting the ego as a thinking substance. E. Husserl, Méditations cartésiennes (1931); Cartesianische Meditationen (1950); SEP “Edmund Husserl”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
埃德蒙德·胡塞尔 › 1859–1938
让-保罗·萨特
影响了
Sartre took the cogito as the starting point of philosophy and in ‘Cartesian Freedom’ (1946) argued that Descartes conceived an absolute freedom but transferred it to God. J.-P. Sartre, “La liberté cartésienne” (1946), in Situations I (1947); L’existentialisme est un humanisme (1946); SEP “Jean-Paul Sartre”
依据: AI 草稿
让-保罗·萨特 › 1905–1980
伊曼纽尔·列维纳斯
影响了
Levinas took Descartes’s idea of the infinite, which exceeds the mind that thinks it, as the structure of the relation to the Other (Totality and Infinity, 1961). E. Levinas, Totalité et infini (1961); R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641), third meditation; SEP “Emmanuel Levinas”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
伊曼纽尔·列维纳斯 › 1906–1995
哈里·法兰克福
影响了 ✓
Frankfurt read Descartes’s Meditations as a defence of reason, asking whether reason can vindicate itself against doubts from demons, dreams and madness (Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen, 1970). H. G. Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes’s Meditations (1970); SEP “René Descartes”
依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata
哈里·法兰克福 › 1929–2023
显示全部 (13)收起
皮埃尔·培尔
影响了
Bayle taught Cartesian philosophy at Sedan and Rotterdam, and in his Dictionary (1697) turned the Cartesian arguments against sensible qualities against the reality of extension itself. P. Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697), “Zénon d’Élée”, “Pyrrhon”; R. H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle (2003); SEP “Pierre Bayle”
依据: AI 草稿
皮埃尔·培尔 › 1647–1706
玛丽·阿斯特尔
影响了
In A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part II (1697), Astell adapted Descartes’ rules of method to show that women can reason as well as men. M. Astell, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part II (1697); SEP “Mary Astell”
依据: AI 草稿
玛丽·阿斯特尔 › 1666–1731
乔治·贝克莱
影响了
Berkeley accepted the Cartesian starting point that we immediately perceive only our ideas, but used it to deny the material world Descartes had tried to prove (Principles, 1710). G. Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710); Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713); SEP “George Berkeley”
依据: AI 草稿
乔治·贝克莱 › 1685–1753
塔哈·侯赛因
影响了
Taha Hussein opened On Pre-Islamic Poetry (1926) by adopting Descartes’ method: the scholar must set aside what he knows and believes and doubt the transmitted sources. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, Fī l-shiʿr al-jāhilī (1926), introduction; P. Cachia, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn (1956)
依据: AI 草稿
塔哈·侯赛因 › 1889–1973
西蒙娜·韦伊
影响了
Weil’s diploma thesis read Descartes as a philosopher of methodical work, for whom perception and knowledge arise from action on the world (Science et perception dans Descartes, 1930). S. Weil, Science et perception dans Descartes (diplôme d’études supérieures, 1930), in Œuvres complètes I (1988)
依据: AI 草稿
西蒙娜·韦伊 › 1909–1943
雅科·欣蒂卡
影响了
Hintikka argued that Descartes’s cogito is not an inference but a performance: the thought ‘I do not exist’ defeats itself whenever it is thought or uttered (1962). J. Hintikka, “Cogito, ergo sum: Inference or Performance?”, Philosophical Review 71 (1962)
依据: AI 草稿
雅科·欣蒂卡 › 1929–2015
大卫·查尔默斯
影响了
Chalmers revived a Cartesian conceivability argument – if zombies are conceivable, consciousness is not physical – for a dualism of properties rather than substances (The Conscious Mind, 1996). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641), sixth meditation; SEP “Zombies”
依据: AI 草稿
大卫·查尔默斯 › 1966年生
批评
相互批评 1
皮埃尔·伽桑狄 ⇄ 相互
批评了
Descartes replied to Gassendi’s Fifth Objections (1641) addressing him as ‘flesh’ and arguing that Gassendi, wanting to grasp everything through images, confused pure understanding with imagination. Descartes, Fifth Replies (AT VII 347–390); letter to Clerselier, 12 Jan. 1646 (AT IX-1 202–217)
依据: AI 草稿
受其批评
In the Fifth Objections (1641; expanded as Disquisitio metaphysica, 1644) Gassendi doubted innate ideas and asked how an unextended mind could move a body. Descartes, Meditationes (1641), Fifth Objections (AT VII 256–346); P. Gassendi, Disquisitio metaphysica (1644); SEP “Pierre Gassendi”
依据: AI 草稿
皮埃尔·伽桑狄 › 1592–1655
受批评于 28
安托万·阿尔诺 受其影响影响了
受其影响
In the Fourth Replies (1641) Descartes accepted Arnauld’s advice and added to the Synopsis that the Fourth Meditation concerns error in judging truth, not sin. R. Descartes, Meditationes (1641), Synopsis and Fourth Replies; SEP “Antoine Arnauld”
依据: AI 草稿
影响了
Arnauld became a leading Cartesian: the Port-Royal Logic (1662, with Pierre Nicole) builds on Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas and his method. A. Arnauld and P. Nicole, La Logique ou l’art de penser (1662); SEP “Antoine Arnauld”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
受其批评
In the Fourth Objections (1641) Arnauld charged Descartes with circular reasoning about God and clear perception and questioned his denial of souls to animals. Descartes, Meditationes (1641), Fourth Objections (AT VII 197–218); SEP “Antoine Arnauld”
依据: AI 草稿
安托万·阿尔诺 › 1612–1694
波希米亚的伊丽莎白 受其影响影响了
受其影响
Elisabeth’s questions about the union of mind and body and the control of the passions led Descartes to write The Passions of the Soul (1649). R. Descartes, Les Passions de l’âme (1649); Elisabeth–Descartes correspondence (1643–1649); SEP “Elisabeth of Bohemia”
依据: AI 草稿
影响了
From 1643 Elisabeth studied Descartes’ philosophy with him by letter; he dedicated the Principles of Philosophy (1644) to her, and in 1645 they discussed Seneca on happiness. Elisabeth of Bohemia and R. Descartes, The Correspondence, ed. and tr. L. Shapiro (2007); R. Descartes, Principia philosophiae (1644), dedication; SEP “Elisabeth of Bohemia”
依据: AI 草稿
受其批评
Elisabeth asked Descartes how an unextended thinking soul could move the body, since motion seems to require contact and extension (letter of 6/16 May 1643). Elisabeth to Descartes, 6/16 May 1643 (AT III 660–662); SEP “Elisabeth of Bohemia”
依据: AI 草稿
波希米亚的伊丽莎白 › 1618–1680
约翰·洛克 影响了
影响了 ✓
According to Damaris Masham, Descartes’ writings first gave Locke a relish for philosophy, for he found them intelligible even where he disagreed (letter to Le Clerc, 1705). D. Masham, letter to J. Le Clerc (Jan. 1705); M. Cranston, John Locke: A Biography (1957); SEP “John Locke”
受其批评
Locke denied innate ideas (Essay, 1689, Book I) and, against the Cartesians, that the soul always thinks, since thinking is its action, not its essence (II.i.10). J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689), I.ii–iv, II.i.10–19; SEP “John Locke”
依据: AI 草稿
约翰·洛克 › 1632–1704
巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎 影响了
影响了 ✓
Spinoza’s first published book, Principles of Cartesian Philosophy (1663), set out Descartes’ Principles in geometrical order, with his Metaphysical Thoughts appended. B. Spinoza, Renati Des Cartes Principiorum philosophiae pars I et II, more geometrico demonstratae (1663), with Cogitata metaphysica; SEP “Baruch Spinoza”
受其批评
Spinoza called Descartes’ account of the mind steering the body through the pineal gland ‘more occult than any occult quality’ (Ethics, 1677, V, Preface). B. Spinoza, Ethica (1677), V, Praefatio; II P48–49 (against free will); SEP “Baruch Spinoza”
依据: AI 草稿
巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎 › 1632–1677
艾萨克·牛顿 影响了
影响了 ✓
Newton studied Descartes’ Géométrie and Principia philosophiae (1660s); his first law is close to Descartes’ laws of nature, and his title echoes Descartes’ (Principia, 1687). I. Newton, Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica (1687); R. Descartes, Principia philosophiae (1644); R. S. Westfall, Never at Rest (1980); SEP “Isaac Newton”
依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata
受其批评
Newton argued that Descartes’ vortices cannot account for Kepler’s laws (Principia II, 1687), and rejected his identification of space with body (De gravitatione). I. Newton, Principia (1687) II, scholium to prop. 53; De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum; SEP “Newton’s Philosophy”
依据: AI 草稿
艾萨克·牛顿 › 1643–1727
戈特弗里德·威廉·莱布尼茨 影响了
影响了 ✓
In Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas (1684) Leibniz refined Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas and completed his ontological proof by requiring God’s possibility to be shown. G. W. Leibniz, Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis (Acta Eruditorum, 1684); SEP “Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz”
受其批评
Leibniz argued that Descartes’ law conserving quantity of motion is false: what is conserved is living force, mv² (Brevis demonstratio, 1686; Discourse on Metaphysics, §17). G. W. Leibniz, Brevis demonstratio erroris memorabilis Cartesii (Acta Eruditorum, 1686); Discours de métaphysique (1686), §17
依据: AI 草稿
戈特弗里德·威廉·莱布尼茨 › 1646–1716
显示全部 (28)收起
托马斯·霍布斯
受其批评
Hobbes argued that a thinking thing might be corporeal and that we have no idea of God or of the soul in Descartes’ sense (Third Objections, 1641). Descartes, Meditationes (1641), Third Objections and Replies (AT VII 171–196)
依据: AI 草稿
托马斯·霍布斯 › 1588–1679
玛格丽特·卡文迪什
受其批评
In Philosophical Letters (1664) Cavendish rejected Descartes’ separation of an immaterial mind from inert matter, holding that all matter is self-moving, perceptive and rational. M. Cavendish, Philosophical Letters (1664), Part I; SEP “Margaret Lucas Cavendish”
依据: AI 草稿
玛格丽特·卡文迪什 › 1623–1673
布莱兹·帕斯卡
受其批评
Pascal could not forgive Descartes for wanting to do without God, needing him only for a flick to set the world in motion (Pensées, fr. 1001 Lafuma). B. Pascal, Pensées, ed. Lafuma, fr. 1001 (Brunschvicg 77); fr. 887 (B 78: “Descartes inutile et incertain”)
依据: AI 草稿
布莱兹·帕斯卡 › 1623–1662
安妮·康韦
受其批评
Conway held against Descartes that body and spirit differ only in degree, so matter is not dead extension (Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, 1690). A. Conway, Principia philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae (1690), chs. 7–9; SEP “Anne Conway”
依据: AI 草稿
安妮·康韦 › 1631–1679
詹巴蒂斯塔·维柯
受其批评
Vico objected that Descartes’ cogito gives consciousness, not knowledge, of being, for we know truly only what we make (De antiquissima Italorum sapientia, 1710). G. Vico, De antiquissima Italorum sapientia (1710), ch. I; De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1709); SEP “Giambattista Vico”
依据: AI 草稿
詹巴蒂斯塔·维柯 › 1668–1744
安东·威廉·阿莫
受其批评
Amo turned against Cartesian interaction: the mind, active and immaterial, cannot sense or suffer, so sensation belongs to the living, organic body (De humanae mentis apatheia, 1734). A. W. Amo, Dissertatio inauguralis philosophica de humanae mentis apatheia (Wittenberg, 1734); S. Menn & J. E. H. Smith (eds.), Anton Wilhelm Amo’s Philosophical Dissertations on Mind and Body (2020)
依据: AI 草稿
安东·威廉·阿莫 › 约1703–1759年
大卫·休谟
受其批评
Hume objected that Descartes’ antecedent universal doubt would be incurable, since no principle could restore trust in our faculties once all were suspended (Enquiry, 1748, XII). D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), XII.i; SEP “David Hume”
依据: AI 草稿
大卫·休谟 › 1711–1776
伊曼努尔·康德
受其批评
Kant rejected Descartes’ inference from ‘I think’ to a simple thinking substance (Paralogisms) and argued that inner experience presupposes outer objects (Refutation of Idealism, B 274–279). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 341–405 / B 399–432 (Paralogisms); B 274–279 (Refutation of Idealism)
依据: AI 草稿
伊曼努尔·康德 › 1724–1804
查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔士
受其批评
Peirce rejected Cartesian doubt – ‘let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts’ (‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’, 1868). C. S. Peirce, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”, Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2 (1868); SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
依据: AI 草稿
查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔士 › 1839–1914
加斯东·巴什拉
受其批评
Bachelard called for a ‘non-Cartesian epistemology’: modern physics replaces Descartes’ simple, clear and distinct ideas with complex constructions (Le nouvel esprit scientifique, 1934, ch. 6). G. Bachelard, Le nouvel esprit scientifique (1934), ch. 6 ‘L’épistémologie non-cartésienne’
依据: AI 草稿
加斯东·巴什拉 › 1884–1962
马丁·海德格尔
受其批评
Heidegger objected that Descartes leaves the being of the ‘sum’ unexamined and reduces the world to measurable extension, missing being-in-the-world (Being and Time, 1927, §§ 6, 19–21). M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1927), §§ 6, 19–21; SEP “Martin Heidegger”
依据: AI 草稿
马丁·海德格尔 › 1889–1976
诺贝特·埃利亚斯
受其批评
Elias traced the image of the individual as a homo clausus, sealed off from others, to Descartes’ cogito, and opposed it with figurations (Civilizing Process, 1969 introduction). N. Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation, 2nd ed. (1969), Introduction; Die Gesellschaft der Individuen (1987), Part II
依据: AI 草稿
诺贝特·埃利亚斯 › 1897–1990
吉尔伯特·赖尔
受其批评
Ryle called the Cartesian ‘official doctrine’ of mind and body the dogma of the ‘Ghost in the Machine’, a category mistake (The Concept of Mind, 1949). G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949), ch. 1
依据: AI 草稿
吉尔伯特·赖尔 › 1900–1976
莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂
受其批评
Merleau-Ponty rejected Descartes’ split between thinking mind and extended body, analysing perception through the lived body (Phenomenology of Perception, 1945); Eye and Mind (1961) contests his Optics. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (1945); L’Œil et l’esprit (1961), part III, on Descartes’ Dioptrique; SEP “Maurice Merleau-Ponty”
依据: AI 草稿
莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂 › 1908–1961
希拉里·普特南
受其批评
Putnam argued that the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, a modern version of Descartes’ demon, refutes itself: envatted brains could not even refer to vats (Reason, Truth and History, 1981). H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (1981), ch. 1 “Brains in a Vat”; R. Descartes, Meditationes (1641), I
依据: AI 草稿
希拉里·普特南 › 1926–2016
阿尼瓦尔·基哈诺
受其批评
Quijano traced the Eurocentric paradigm of knowledge to the Cartesian separation of a knowing subject, as reason, from its object and from the body – a dualism that in his account allowed the colonised to be classed as nature and body; critics dispute that Eurocentrism derives from Descartes. A. Quijano, “Colonialidad y modernidad/racionalidad”, Perú Indígena 13:29 (1992); “Colonialidad del poder, eurocentrismo y América Latina”, in E. Lander (ed.), La colonialidad del saber (2000)
依据: AI 草稿
阿尼瓦尔·基哈诺 › 1928–2018
理查德·罗蒂
受其批评
Rorty argued that Descartes invented the mind as an inner mirror of nature, founding a philosophy centred on epistemology (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979, ch. 1). R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), ch. 1; SEP “Richard Rorty”
依据: AI 草稿
理查德·罗蒂 › 1931–2007
汤姆·雷根
受其批评
Regan rejected Descartes’ denial of consciousness to animals as unfounded: many mammals are ‘subjects-of-a-life’ with beliefs, desires and inherent value (The Case for Animal Rights, 1983, ch. 1). T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983), ch. 1; R. Descartes, Discours de la méthode (1637), part V
依据: AI 草稿
汤姆·雷根 › 1938–2017
丹尼尔·丹尼特
受其批评
Dennett attacked the ‘Cartesian Theater’, a central place in the brain where it all comes together for consciousness, surviving as ‘Cartesian materialism’ (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 5; D. C. Dennett & M. Kinsbourne, “Time and the Observer”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1992)
依据: AI 草稿
丹尼尔·丹尼特 › 1942–2024
安迪·克拉克
受其批评
Clark rejected the Cartesian picture of the mind as an inner, disembodied reasoner: cognition is embodied and can extend into tools and environment (Being There, 1997). A. Clark, Being There (1997); A. Clark & D. J. Chalmers, “The Extended Mind”, Analysis 58 (1998); Supersizing the Mind (2008)
依据: AI 草稿
安迪·克拉克 › 1957年生
托马斯·梅青格
受其批评
Metzinger argued that the Cartesian intuition of an irreducible self stems from the mind’s representational structure: there are no selves, only transparent self-models (Being No One, 2003). T. Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (2003); The Ego Tunnel (2009)
依据: AI 草稿
托马斯·梅青格 › 1958年生
布赖恩·伯克哈特
受其批评
Burkhart read Descartes’ thinking I as a subject without land or culture, an example of the Western ‘delocality’ that served colonisation (Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land, 2019). B. Burkhart, Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land (2019); cf. E. Dussel, 1492: El encubrimiento del otro (1992) on ego cogito and ego conquiro
依据: AI 草稿
布赖恩·伯克哈特 › 同时代
批评了 1
亚里士多德
批评了
Descartes rejected the scholastic-Aristotelian substantial forms and real qualities, explaining nature by extension and motion and banishing final causes from physics (letter to Regius, January 1642; Meditations IV). Descartes to Regius, Jan. 1642 (AT III 491–510); Meditationes IV (AT VII 55); Principia philosophiae IV §§198–203; SEP “Descartes’ Physics”
依据: AI 草稿
亚里士多德 › 公元前384—前322年
作品
立场
Descartes wanted to rebuild knowledge on a foundation that could not be doubted. He doubted everything – the senses, the body, even mathematics, imagining an evil demon deceiving him – until one certainty remained: while I doubt, I think, and so I exist. From this “I think, therefore I am” he argued for God as guarantor of clear and distinct ideas, and for the reality of the external world. Mind, a thinking thing, and body, an extended thing, are two distinct substances – which raised the lasting puzzle of how they interact, a puzzle Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia pressed on him in 1643 and that he never fully solved. With analytic geometry and a mechanical physics he laid foundations for modern science; he is often called the father of modern philosophy and of rationalism.
生平与背景
Born in 1596 in La Haye in Touraine, Descartes was educated by the Jesuits at La Flèche and studied law. He served as a volunteer soldier, and in 1619 had the insight that led him to a new method. He spent most of his productive life in the Dutch Republic. Invited by Queen Christina, he went to Stockholm in 1649 and died there in 1650.
其他主要作品
- Rules for the Direction of the Mind (c. 1628)
- Discourse on the Method (1637)
- Meditations on First Philosophy (1641)
- Principles of Philosophy (1644)
- The Passions of the Soul (1649)
出现在
截至 2026年11月 · 来源 · 改进本页 · Agora 是如何制作的