乔治·贝克莱
在心灵之外没有物质世界；事物只作为被感知的东西而存在，而上帝永远感知着一切。
定位
存在就是被感知：不存在独立于心灵的物质。
核心思想
- 存在即被感知（esse est percipi）
- 非物质论
影响
受影响于 2
勒内·笛卡尔
受其影响
Berkeley accepted the Cartesian starting point that we immediately perceive only our ideas, but used it to deny the material world Descartes had tried to prove (Principles, 1710). G. Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710); Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713); SEP “George Berkeley”
依据: AI 草稿
勒内·笛卡尔 › 1596–1650
尼古拉·马勒伯朗士
受其影响 ✓
Like Malebranche, Berkeley made God the cause of our ideas of sense, but in the Three Dialogues (1713) he distinguished his view from seeing all things in God. G. Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713); Philosophical Commentaries (1707–08); SEP “George Berkeley”
依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata
尼古拉·马勒伯朗士 › 1638–1715
影响了 2
大卫·休谟
影响了 ✓
Hume adopted Berkeley’s account of abstract ideas as particular ideas that stand for others, praising it as a ‘valuable discovery’ (Treatise, 1739). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), “Of abstract ideas”; G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Introduction; SEP “David Hume”
大卫·休谟 › 1711–1776
查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔士
影响了 ✓
Peirce reviewed Fraser’s edition of Berkeley’s Works (1871) and later, writing to James (1903), gave Berkeley more right than anyone to be called the introducer of pragmatism. C. S. Peirce, review of A. C. Fraser (ed.), The Works of George Berkeley, North American Review (1871); letter to W. James (1903); L. Friedman, “Pragmatism: The Unformulated Method of Bishop Berkeley”, Journal of the History of Philosophy (2003)
依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata
查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔士 › 1839–1914
批评
受批评于 5
托马斯·里德
受其批评
Reid traced Berkeley’s denial of matter to the ‘ideal system’, the assumption that we perceive only ideas, which he rejected for common-sense direct realism (Inquiry, 1764). T. Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), Dedication, ch. I; Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), II.10; SEP “Thomas Reid”
依据: AI 草稿
托马斯·里德 › 1710–1796
德尼·狄德罗
受其批评
In the Letter on the Blind (1749) Diderot called Berkeley’s idealism the most absurd of all systems, yet the hardest to combat. D. Diderot, Lettre sur les aveugles (1749); SEP “Denis Diderot”
依据: AI 草稿
德尼·狄德罗 › 1713–1784
伊曼努尔·康德
受其批评
Kant set his transcendental idealism apart from Berkeley’s ‘dogmatic’ idealism, which he said degrades bodies to mere illusion (Critique of Pure Reason, 1787, B 71, B 274). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787), B 69–71, B 274; Prolegomena (1783), Appendix; SEP “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism”
依据: AI 草稿
伊曼努尔·康德 › 1724–1804
玛丽·谢泼德
受其批评
Against Berkeley, Shepherd held that reason infers external objects as continuing causes of our sensations (Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, 1827). M. Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe (1827); SEP “Mary Shepherd”
依据: AI 草稿
玛丽·谢泼德 › 1777–1847
G. E. 摩尔
受其批评
In ‘The Refutation of Idealism’ (1903) Moore attacked the principle esse est percipi, distinguishing the act of awareness from its object, which need not exist only when perceived. G. E. Moore, “The Refutation of Idealism”, Mind 12 (1903), 433–453; G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), § 3
依据: AI 草稿
G. E. 摩尔 › 1873–1958
批评了 3
约翰·洛克 受其影响
受其影响 ✓
In the New Theory of Vision (1709) Berkeley took up Molyneux’s question from Locke’s Essay, agreeing with Locke’s negative answer and building his theory of vision on it. G. Berkeley, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709); J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (2nd ed., 1694); SEP “Molyneux’s Problem”
批评了
Berkeley rejected Locke’s abstract general ideas – a triangle neither oblique nor right-angled – and his distinction of primary and secondary qualities (Principles, 1710). G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Introduction §§6–20, Part I §§9–15; J. Locke, Essay IV.vii.9; SEP “George Berkeley”
依据: AI 草稿
约翰·洛克 › 1632–1704
艾萨克·牛顿
批评了
Berkeley attacked Newton’s fluxions as ‘ghosts of departed quantities’ (The Analyst, 1734) and rejected absolute space and motion (Principles, 1710, §§110–117; De motu, 1721). G. Berkeley, The Analyst (1734), §35; Principles (1710), §§110–117; De motu (1721); SEP “George Berkeley”
依据: AI 草稿
艾萨克·牛顿 › 1643–1727
伯纳德·曼德维尔
批评了
Berkeley’s Alciphron (1732, Dialogue II) attacked Mandeville’s thesis that private vices are public benefits, voiced by the free-thinker Lysicles; Mandeville replied in A Letter to Dion. G. Berkeley, Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1732), Dialogue II; B. Mandeville, A Letter to Dion (1732)
依据: AI 草稿
伯纳德·曼德维尔 › 1670–1733
作品
- 1710人类知识原理
Esse est percipi（存在即被感知）——物质是多余的假设。
立场
Berkeley pushed Locke’s empiricism to a surprising conclusion: there is no matter existing independently of minds. Everything we know of things are ideas – colours, shapes, sounds – and an idea can only exist in being perceived: to be is to be perceived (esse est percipi). The notion of an unperceived material substance is not only unprovable but incoherent. Yet the world does not vanish when we look away, because God perceives everything constantly and produces in us the orderly ideas we call nature. Berkeley meant this to defeat scepticism and atheism. His immaterialism forced every later empiricist, from Hume to Mill, to confront the question of the external world.
生平与背景
Born in 1685 near Kilkenny in Ireland, Berkeley studied and taught at Trinity College, Dublin, where he wrote his main philosophical works while still in his twenties. He travelled in Europe and spent three years in Rhode Island pursuing a plan to found a college in Bermuda. From 1734 he was Anglican bishop of Cloyne. He died in Oxford in 1753.
其他主要作品
- An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709)
- A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710)
- Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713)
- Alciphron (1732)
- Siris (1744)
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