丹尼尔·丹尼特
意识并不神秘，而是大脑中许多并行过程的工作，没有一个内在的观察者——并不存在一个所有东西在那里汇聚的内在剧场。
定位
意识是可以解释的：没有笛卡尔式剧场，只有“多重草稿”；达尔文的危险思想。
核心思想
- 意向立场
- 多重草稿
- 对感受质的批判
老师: 吉尔伯特·赖尔, W. V. O. 奎因
影响
受影响于 5
查尔斯·达尔文
受其影响
Dennett read Darwin’s natural selection as an algorithmic process that yields design without a designer, a ‘universal acid’ for traditional ideas of purpose (Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 1995). D. C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (1995); C. Darwin, On the Origin of Species (1859)
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
查尔斯·达尔文 › 1809–1882
路德维希·维特根斯坦
受其影响
Dennett, a student of Ryle, drew on Wittgenstein’s attack on private inner objects in denying that experience has ineffable, intrinsic qualia (‘Quining Qualia’, 1988; Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, “Quining Qualia”, in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science (1988); Consciousness Explained (1991)
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951
W. V. O. 奎因 师从
师从 ✓
Dennett studied with Quine at Harvard (BA 1963) and wrote his senior thesis in critical engagement with him; for his doctorate he went to Ryle in Oxford. D. C. Dennett, I’ve Been Thinking (2023)
依据: AI 草稿
W. V. O. 奎因 › 1908–2000
艾伦·图灵
受其影响
Dennett defended Turing’s test as a fair criterion (‘Can Machines Think?’, 1985) and paired Turing with Darwin on competence without comprehension (From Bacteria to Bach and Back, 2017). D. C. Dennett, “Can Machines Think?” (1985), in Brainchildren (1998); From Bacteria to Bach and Back (2017); SEP “The Turing Test”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
艾伦·图灵 › 1912–1954
影响了 1
安迪·克拉克
影响了
Clark took up Dennett’s picture of words as tools that augment cognition, treating public language as an external artefact that reshapes the brain’s computational tasks (‘Magic Words’, 1998). A. Clark, “Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation”, in P. Carruthers and J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought (1998); D. C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995)
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
安迪·克拉克 › 1957年生
批评
受批评于 1
大卫·查尔默斯
受其批评
Chalmers argued that Dennett’s functional account of consciousness addresses only the ‘easy problems’ and denies the explanandum, experience itself (‘Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness’, 1995). D. J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995); The Conscious Mind (1996); reply: D. C. Dennett, “Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness”, JCS 3 (1996)
依据: AI 草稿
大卫·查尔默斯 › 1966年生
批评了 5
勒内·笛卡尔
批评了
Dennett attacked the ‘Cartesian Theater’, a central place in the brain where it all comes together for consciousness, surviving as ‘Cartesian materialism’ (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 5; D. C. Dennett & M. Kinsbourne, “Time and the Observer”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1992)
依据: AI 草稿
勒内·笛卡尔 › 1596–1650
约翰·塞尔
批评了
Dennett called Searle’s Chinese Room an ‘intuition pump’ that directs attention to the rule-following man instead of the whole system (‘The Milk of Human Intentionality’, 1980). D. C. Dennett, “The Milk of Human Intentionality”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980); Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 14
依据: AI 草稿
约翰·塞尔 › 1932–2025
杰里·福多
批评了
Dennett objected to Fodor’s language of thought that ascribing beliefs does not require explicitly stored sentences in the head (‘A Cure for the Common Code?’, 1977). D. C. Dennett, “A Cure for the Common Code?”, Mind 86 (1977), repr. in Brainstorms (1978); The Intentional Stance (1987)
依据: AI 草稿
杰里·福多 › 1935–2017
托马斯·内格尔
批评了
Dennett denied Nagel’s claim that subjective experience escapes objective science: much about what it is like to be a bat can be learned (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 14; T. Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review 83 (1974); Nagel’s reply: “Is Consciousness an Illusion?”, New York Review of Books, 9 March 2017
依据: AI 草稿
托马斯·内格尔 › 1937年生
弗兰克·杰克逊
批评了
Dennett argued that Jackson’s Mary, knowing all physical facts, would learn nothing on seeing colour and would spot a blue-painted banana as a trick (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 12; F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); Jackson later gave up the argument (“Postscript on Qualia”, 1998)
依据: AI 草稿
弗兰克·杰克逊 › 1943年生
作品
立场
Dennett sought to explain the mind entirely within a scientific, Darwinian world view. With the “intentional stance” he argued that attributing beliefs and desires is a strategy for predicting behaviour that works for people, animals and even chess computers – and that this success is all there is to having beliefs. In Consciousness Explained he rejected the “Cartesian theater,” the idea of a central place in the brain where everything comes together for an inner observer; instead, many parallel processes produce “multiple drafts.” He regarded qualia as a confused notion. In Darwin’s Dangerous Idea he described natural selection as a “universal acid” that dissolves traditional ideas of design and purpose. Dennett also defended a compatibilist account of free will.
生平与背景
Dennett was born in Boston in 1942, studied at Harvard and wrote his doctorate at Oxford under Gilbert Ryle. For more than four decades he taught at Tufts University, where he co-directed the Center for Cognitive Studies. He worked closely with cognitive scientists and biologists and became one of the best-known public intellectuals of his time. He died in 2024.
其他主要作品
- Brainstorms (1978)
- The Intentional Stance (1987)
- Consciousness Explained (1991)
- Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995)
- Freedom Evolves (2003)
出现在
- 旅程 ‘意识之谜’ · 第 9 站，共 10 站
- 争论 ‘机器能思考或感受吗？’
- 争论 ‘意识是什么？’
- 争论 ‘我们自由吗？神经科学时代的自由意志’
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