Agora思想的公共广场

大卫·查尔默斯

1966年生

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

即使对大脑所做的一切给出完整的说明，也无法解释为什么其中任何一件事是被体验到的——这就是意识的困难问题。

定位

分析哲学 · 大洋洲 · 心灵与意识

意识的“难问题”：为什么信息处理会带有某种感受？

核心思想

  • 难问题
  • 僵尸论证
  • 延展心灵

在星图中打开

影响

受影响于 5

  • 勒内·笛卡尔

    受其影响

    Chalmers revived a Cartesian conceivability argument – if zombies are conceivable, consciousness is not physical – for a dualism of properties rather than substances (The Conscious Mind, 1996). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641), sixth meditation; SEP “Zombies”

    依据: AI 草稿

    勒内·笛卡尔 › 1596–1650

  • 伯特兰·罗素

    受其影响 ✓

    Chalmers took up Russell’s view that physics reveals only structure, leaving intrinsic natures that may ground consciousness, as ‘Russellian monism’ (‘Consciousness and its Place in Nature’, 2002). D. J. Chalmers, “Consciousness and its Place in Nature” (2002); “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”, Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 8 (2013); B. Russell, The Analysis of Matter (1927); SEP “Russellian Monism”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata

    伯特兰·罗素 › 1872–1970

  • 托马斯·内格尔

    受其影响

    Chalmers defined consciousness with Nagel’s phrase that there is ‘something it is like’ to be a subject and made explaining it the ‘hard problem’ (1995). D. J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995); The Conscious Mind (1996); T. Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review 83 (1974)

    依据: AI 草稿

    托马斯·内格尔 › 1937年生

  • 索尔·克里普克

    受其影响

    Chalmers took up Kripke’s modal argument against mind–brain identity and explained a posteriori necessities like ‘water is H₂O’ with two-dimensional semantics (The Conscious Mind, 1996). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980); SEP “Zombies”

    依据: AI 草稿

    索尔·克里普克 › 1940–2022

  • 弗兰克·杰克逊

    受其影响

    Chalmers used Jackson’s knowledge argument about Mary against materialism (The Conscious Mind, 1996) and defended with Jackson the a priori entailment of macroscopic truths by physical ones (2001). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); D. J. Chalmers and F. Jackson, “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation”, Philosophical Review 110 (2001); F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); SEP “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”

    依据: AI 草稿

    弗兰克·杰克逊 › 1943年生

批评

批评了 2

  • 约翰·塞尔

    批评了

    Chalmers rejected Searle’s Chinese Room argument: by the principle of organisational invariance, a system with the right functional organisation would be conscious (The Conscious Mind, 1996, ch. 9). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996), chs. 7, 9; J. R. Searle, “Consciousness and the Philosophers”, New York Review of Books, 6 March 1997, and the ensuing exchange

    依据: AI 草稿

    约翰·塞尔 › 1932–2025

  • 丹尼尔·丹尼特

    批评了

    Chalmers argued that Dennett’s functional account of consciousness addresses only the ‘easy problems’ and denies the explanandum, experience itself (‘Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness’, 1995). D. J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995); The Conscious Mind (1996); reply: D. C. Dennett, “Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness”, JCS 3 (1996)

    依据: AI 草稿

    丹尼尔·丹尼特 › 1942–2024

作品

立场

Chalmers distinguished the “easy problems” of consciousness – explaining how the brain discriminates stimuli, integrates information and controls behaviour – from the “hard problem”: why all this processing is accompanied by subjective experience at all. His zombie argument runs: a being physically identical to us but without experience is conceivable; what is conceivable in this way is possible; so the physical facts do not fix the facts about consciousness, and physicalism is false. Chalmers therefore defends a naturalistic dualism and takes panpsychist ideas seriously. Critics mostly attack the step from conceivability to possibility. With Andy Clark he also proposed the thesis of the “extended mind”: notebooks or smartphones can, under certain conditions, be part of our mind. In Reality+ he argued that virtual worlds are genuine realities.

生平与背景

Chalmers was born in Sydney in 1966 and studied mathematics in Adelaide and at Oxford before taking his doctorate in philosophy and cognitive science under Douglas Hofstadter at Indiana University. He taught at the Australian National University and New York University, where he co-directs the Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness. His talk on the “hard problem” at the first Tucson conference on consciousness in 1994 made his name beyond philosophy.

其他主要作品

  • Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (1995)
  • The Conscious Mind (1996)
  • The Extended Mind (with Andy Clark, 1998)
  • Constructing the World (2012)
  • Reality+ (2022)

出现在

来源: Wikipedia · Wikidata

截至 2026年11月 · 来源 · 改进本页 · Agora 是如何制作的

在星图中打开