希拉里·普特南

Agora

希拉里·普特南

1926–2016

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

我们的词语意味着什么，部分取决于世界和我们的共同体，而不仅仅取决于我们头脑里的东西。

定位

分析哲学 · 北美 · 语言, 心灵与意识, 认识论

缸中之脑与孪生地球：“意义不在头脑之中。”

核心思想

语义外在主义
功能主义
内在实在论

老师: 汉斯·赖欣巴哈

学生: 杰里·福多

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影响

受影响于 7

威廉·詹姆斯

受其影响 ✓
Putnam took up James’s natural realism about perception and his pragmatism, which joins fallibilism with antiscepticism (‘James’s Theory of Perception’, 1990; Pragmatism: An Open Question, 1995). H. Putnam, “James’s Theory of Perception”, in Realism with a Human Face (1990); Pragmatism: An Open Question (1995); SEP “William James”
依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata · InPhO
威廉·詹姆斯 › 1842–1910
约翰·杜威

受其影响 ✓
Putnam took up Dewey’s experimental view of democracy and his rejection of a fact–value dichotomy (‘A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy’, 1990; The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, 2002). H. Putnam, “A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy”, Southern California Law Review 63 (1990), in Renewing Philosophy (1992); The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (2002); SEP “John Dewey”
依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata · InPhO
约翰·杜威 › 1859–1952
路德维希·维特根斯坦

受其影响 ✓
Putnam drew on Wittgenstein, read not as an anti-realist, for his natural realism of perception and his account of religious language (Renewing Philosophy, 1992; The Threefold Cord, 1999). H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (1992); The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (1999); “Was Wittgenstein Really an Anti-realist about Mathematics?” (2001)
依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata · InPhO
路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普

受其影响
Putnam, who worked with Carnap on inductive logic (1953–54), illustrated his conceptual relativity with a ‘Carnapian’ world of three individuals (The Many Faces of Realism, 1987). H. Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (1987); “‘Degree of Confirmation’ and Inductive Logic”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”
依据: AI 草稿
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普 › 1891–1970
汉斯·赖欣巴哈师从

师从
Putnam took his PhD at UCLA in 1951 under Reichenbach with a dissertation on the meaning of the concept of probability in application to finite sequences. H. Putnam, The Meaning of the Concept of Probability in Application to Finite Sequences (diss. UCLA 1951; printed 1990)
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
汉斯·赖欣巴哈 › 1891–1953
W. V. O. 奎因

受其影响
Putnam developed Quine’s point that mathematics is indispensable to science into an argument for mathematical realism (Philosophy of Logic, 1971), known as the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument. H. Putnam, Philosophy of Logic (1971); “The Analytic and the Synthetic” (1962); SEP “Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
W. V. O. 奎因 › 1908–2000
艾伦·图灵

受其影响
Putnam modelled mental states on the states of a Turing machine, founding machine functionalism (‘Minds and Machines’, 1960; ‘Psychological Predicates’, 1967). H. Putnam, “Minds and Machines”, in S. Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind (1960); “Psychological Predicates” (1967), repr. as “The Nature of Mental States”; SEP “Functionalism”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
艾伦·图灵 › 1912–1954

影响了 2

杰里·福多教过

教过
Fodor took his PhD at Princeton in 1960 under Putnam with a dissertation in the philosophy of language, The Uses of ‘Use’. Mathematics Genealogy Project, entry J. A. Fodor (Princeton 1960)
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
杰里·福多 › 1935–2017
爱丽丝·克拉里

影响了
Crary, whose Harvard undergraduate thesis Putnam supervised, shared his rejection of the fact–value dichotomy, arguing that moral concepts reveal real features of the world (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007); H. Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (2002)
依据: AI 草稿
爱丽丝·克拉里 › 1967年生

批评

批评了 3

勒内·笛卡尔

批评了
Putnam argued that the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, a modern version of Descartes’ demon, refutes itself: envatted brains could not even refer to vats (Reason, Truth and History, 1981). H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (1981), ch. 1 “Brains in a Vat”; R. Descartes, Meditationes (1641), I
依据: AI 草稿
勒内·笛卡尔 › 1596–1650
戈特洛布·弗雷格

批评了
Putnam’s Twin Earth case denied that the Fregean sense a speaker grasps fixes a term’s extension: ‘meanings just ain’t in the head’ (‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, 1975). H. Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1975), 131–193
依据: AI 草稿
戈特洛布·弗雷格 › 1848–1925
J. J. C. 斯马特

批评了
Putnam objected to Smart’s identity of sensations and brain processes that pain can be realised in different systems, so mental states are functional states (‘Psychological Predicates’, 1967). H. Putnam, “Psychological Predicates” (1967), repr. as “The Nature of Mental States”; J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959)
依据: AI 草稿
J. J. C. 斯马特 › 1920–2012

作品

1975“意义”的意义
孪生地球：意义并不在头脑之中。
1981理性、真理与历史
缸中之脑——以及我们为什么不可能是这样的脑。

立场

Putnam shaped several debates at once. In philosophy of mind he proposed functionalism: mental states are defined by their causal role, not by the material that realises them – which is why minds could in principle run on different “hardware.” In philosophy of language his Twin Earth thought experiment showed that what our words mean depends on the world and the linguistic community, not only on what is in our heads: “meanings just ain’t in the head.” Later he turned against metaphysical realism and argued with the “brains in a vat” scenario that the sceptical hypothesis refutes itself. Putnam’s path from scientific realism to a pragmatist “internal realism” makes him one of the most stimulating thinkers of analytic philosophy.

生平与背景

Putnam was born in Chicago in 1926 and took his doctorate at UCLA under Hans Reichenbach. After teaching at Princeton and MIT he spent most of his career at Harvard from 1965. He worked across mathematical logic, philosophy of science, mind and language, and was known for openly revising his own positions; he was also politically active in the 1960s.