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理查德·罗蒂

1931–2007

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

心灵不是实在的镜子;哲学应当放弃对基础的寻求,成为一场促进团结的对话。

定位

实用主义与美国哲学 · 北美 · 认识论, 语言, 政治与法

自然之镜被打碎了:哲学不应是一种奠基,而应是一场对话。

核心思想

  • 反表象主义
  • 自由主义的反讽
  • 以团结取代客观性

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影响

受影响于 9

  • 威廉·詹姆斯

    受其影响

    In Consequences of Pragmatism (1982) Rorty made James’s ‘what is good in the way of belief’ the core of a pragmatism without a theory of truth. R. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (1982), Introduction; W. James, Pragmatism (1907); SEP “Richard Rorty”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    威廉·詹姆斯 › 1842–1910

  • 约翰·杜威

    受其影响 ✓

    Rorty set Dewey beside Wittgenstein and Heidegger as models of a philosophy that gives up the mind as mirror of nature (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979). R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); SEP “Richard Rorty”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata · InPhO

    约翰·杜威 › 1859–1952

  • 马丁·海德格尔

    受其影响 ✓

    Rorty read Heidegger’s history of metaphysics as an ally of pragmatism against foundationalism, while rejecting his nostalgia for Being (‘Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey’, 1976). R. Rorty, “Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey” (1976), in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); Essays on Heidegger and Others (1991); SEP “Richard Rorty”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata · InPhO

    马丁·海德格尔 › 1889–1976

  • 路德维希·维特根斯坦

    受其影响

    Rorty took from the later Wittgenstein the idea of philosophy as therapy, not theory, and read him as dissolving rather than solving traditional problems (‘Keeping Philosophy Pure’, 1976). R. Rorty, “Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay on Wittgenstein” (1976), in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); SEP “Richard Rorty”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951

  • 汉斯-格奥尔格·伽达默尔

    受其影响

    In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) Rorty took Gadamer’s notion of Bildung as a model for ‘edifying’ philosophy, with hermeneutics in place of epistemology. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), “Hermeneutics and Edification”; H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (1960); SEP “Richard Rorty”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    汉斯-格奥尔格·伽达默尔 › 1900–2002

  • W. V. O. 奎因

    受其影响

    In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) Rorty combined Quine’s attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction with Sellars’s on the Given to argue for epistemological behaviourism. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951); SEP “Richard Rorty”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    W. V. O. 奎因 › 1908–2000

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  • 威尔弗里德·塞拉斯

    受其影响

    Rorty took Sellars’s critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’ (1956) as a key argument against foundationalism, later introducing the 1997 edition of the essay. W. Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956), introd. R. Rorty (1997); R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); SEP “Richard Rorty”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    威尔弗里德·塞拉斯 › 1912–1989

  • 唐纳德·戴维森

    受其影响

    Rorty read Davidson’s rejection of the scheme–content distinction and his account of truth as support for pragmatism (‘Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth’, 1986), though Davidson declined the label. R. Rorty, “Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth” (1986), in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991); D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); SEP “Richard Rorty”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    唐纳德·戴维森 › 1917–2003

  • 詹尼·瓦蒂莫

    受其影响

    Rorty found in Vattimo’s ‘weak thought’ and his reading of secularisation as the fulfilment of Christianity an ally of post-metaphysical liberalism (The Future of Religion, 2005). R. Rorty and G. Vattimo, The Future of Religion, ed. S. Zabala (2005); SEP “Richard Rorty”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    詹尼·瓦蒂莫 › 1936–2023

批评

受批评于 1

  • 恩里克·杜塞尔

    受其批评

    In The Underside of Modernity (1996), after their debate in the early 1990s, Dussel objected to Rorty’s pragmatism that its “we” of liberal ironists cannot hear the interpellation of the excluded Other, the starting point of a philosophy of liberation. E. Dussel, The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation (1996, ed. and tr. E. Mendieta); Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty y la filosofía de la liberación (1993)

    依据: AI 草稿

    恩里克·杜塞尔 › 1934–2023

批评了 4

  • 勒内·笛卡尔

    批评了

    Rorty argued that Descartes invented the mind as an inner mirror of nature, founding a philosophy centred on epistemology (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979, ch. 1). R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), ch. 1; SEP “Richard Rorty”

    依据: AI 草稿

    勒内·笛卡尔 › 1596–1650

  • 伊曼努尔·康德

    批评了

    Rorty held that Kant turned philosophy into a tribunal of pure reason and made epistemology the foundation of culture (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979, ch. 3). R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Introduction, ch. 3

    依据: AI 草稿

    伊曼努尔·康德 › 1724–1804

  • 克利福德·格尔茨

    批评了

    Against Geertz’s warning, Rorty defended ethnocentrism: a liberal culture can only start from its own beliefs, but is distinguished by widening its sympathies (‘On Ethnocentrism’, 1986). R. Rorty, “On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz”, Michigan Quarterly Review 25 (1986); in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991), 203–210; C. Geertz, “The Uses of Diversity” (1986)

    依据: AI 草稿

    克利福德·格尔茨 › 1926–2006

  • 翁贝托·埃科

    批评了

    Rorty rejected Eco’s distinction between interpreting and using a text, holding that all readings simply put texts to use (‘The Pragmatist’s Progress’, in Eco, Interpretation and Overinterpretation, 1992). R. Rorty, “The Pragmatist’s Progress”, in U. Eco et al., Interpretation and Overinterpretation (1992; Tanner Lectures, Cambridge 1990)

    依据: AI 草稿

    翁贝托·埃科 › 1932–2016

作品

立场

In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Rorty attacked the idea that the mind or language mirrors reality and that philosophy’s task is to secure the foundations of knowledge. Knowledge, he argued, is a matter of justification within a community, not of correspondence with the world. Drawing on Dewey, Wittgenstein and Heidegger, he urged philosophy to give up the search for ultimate truth and become an edifying conversation. His ideal is the “liberal ironist”, who knows that her deepest beliefs are contingent yet holds that cruelty is the worst thing we do. Solidarity should replace objectivity as the goal. He revived pragmatism and sparked fierce debates.

生平与背景

Rorty grew up in New York as the son of left-wing writers, entered the University of Chicago at fifteen and earned his doctorate at Yale. He taught at Princeton, then at the University of Virginia and Stanford, increasingly outside philosophy departments. As a provocative public intellectual he became one of the best-known American philosophers of his time.

其他主要作品

  • Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)
  • Consequences of Pragmatism (1982)
  • Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989)
  • Achieving Our Country (1998)

来源: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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