هيلاري بوتنام
ما تعنيه كلماتنا يتوقف جزئيًا على العالم وعلى جماعتنا، لا على ما في رؤوسنا وحده.
التموضع
أدمغة في جرة والأرض التوأم: «المعاني ببساطة ليست في الرأس.»
الأفكار الرئيسة
- الخارجانية الدلالية
- الوظيفية
- الواقعية الداخلية
الأساتذة: هانز رايخينباخ
التلاميذ: جيري فودور
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 7
ويليام جيمس
تأثّر بـ ✓
Putnam took up James’s natural realism about perception and his pragmatism, which joins fallibilism with antiscepticism (‘James’s Theory of Perception’, 1990; Pragmatism: An Open Question, 1995). H. Putnam, “James’s Theory of Perception”, in Realism with a Human Face (1990); Pragmatism: An Open Question (1995); SEP “William James”
ويليام جيمس › 1842–1910
جون ديوي
تأثّر بـ ✓
Putnam took up Dewey’s experimental view of democracy and his rejection of a fact–value dichotomy (‘A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy’, 1990; The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, 2002). H. Putnam, “A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy”, Southern California Law Review 63 (1990), in Renewing Philosophy (1992); The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (2002); SEP “John Dewey”
جون ديوي › 1859–1952
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين
تأثّر بـ ✓
Putnam drew on Wittgenstein, read not as an anti-realist, for his natural realism of perception and his account of religious language (Renewing Philosophy, 1992; The Threefold Cord, 1999). H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (1992); The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (1999); “Was Wittgenstein Really an Anti-realist about Mathematics?” (2001)
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين › 1889–1951
رودولف كارناب
تأثّر بـ
Putnam, who worked with Carnap on inductive logic (1953–54), illustrated his conceptual relativity with a ‘Carnapian’ world of three individuals (The Many Faces of Realism, 1987). H. Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (1987); “‘Degree of Confirmation’ and Inductive Logic”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
رودولف كارناب › 1891–1970
هانز رايخينباخ تتلمذ على
تتلمذ على
Putnam took his PhD at UCLA in 1951 under Reichenbach with a dissertation on the meaning of the concept of probability in application to finite sequences. H. Putnam, The Meaning of the Concept of Probability in Application to Finite Sequences (diss. UCLA 1951; printed 1990)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
هانز رايخينباخ › 1891–1953
ويلارد فان أورمان كواين
تأثّر بـ
Putnam developed Quine’s point that mathematics is indispensable to science into an argument for mathematical realism (Philosophy of Logic, 1971), known as the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument. H. Putnam, Philosophy of Logic (1971); “The Analytic and the Synthetic” (1962); SEP “Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ويلارد فان أورمان كواين › 1908–2000
آلان تورنغ
تأثّر بـ
Putnam modelled mental states on the states of a Turing machine, founding machine functionalism (‘Minds and Machines’, 1960; ‘Psychological Predicates’, 1967). H. Putnam, “Minds and Machines”, in S. Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind (1960); “Psychological Predicates” (1967), repr. as “The Nature of Mental States”; SEP “Functionalism”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
آلان تورنغ › 1912–1954
أثّر في 2
جيري فودور علّم
علّم
Fodor took his PhD at Princeton in 1960 under Putnam with a dissertation in the philosophy of language, The Uses of ‘Use’. Mathematics Genealogy Project, entry J. A. Fodor (Princeton 1960)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
جيري فودور › 1935–2017
أليس كراري
أثّر في
Crary, whose Harvard undergraduate thesis Putnam supervised, shared his rejection of the fact–value dichotomy, arguing that moral concepts reveal real features of the world (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007); H. Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (2002)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أليس كراري › وُلد 1967
النقد
ينتقد 3
رينيه ديكارت
انتقد
Putnam argued that the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, a modern version of Descartes’ demon, refutes itself: envatted brains could not even refer to vats (Reason, Truth and History, 1981). H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (1981), ch. 1 “Brains in a Vat”; R. Descartes, Meditationes (1641), I
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
رينيه ديكارت › 1596–1650
غوتلوب فريغه
انتقد
Putnam’s Twin Earth case denied that the Fregean sense a speaker grasps fixes a term’s extension: ‘meanings just ain’t in the head’ (‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, 1975). H. Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1975), 131–193
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
غوتلوب فريغه › 1848–1925
جون سمارت
انتقد
Putnam objected to Smart’s identity of sensations and brain processes that pain can be realised in different systems, so mental states are functional states (‘Psychological Predicates’, 1967). H. Putnam, “Psychological Predicates” (1967), repr. as “The Nature of Mental States”; J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جون سمارت › 1920–2012
الأعمال
الأرض التوأم: المعاني ببساطة ليست في الرأس.
أدمغة في جِرار – ولماذا لا يمكن أن نكون أدمغة كهذه.
الموقف
Putnam shaped several debates at once. In philosophy of mind he proposed functionalism: mental states are defined by their causal role, not by the material that realises them – which is why minds could in principle run on different “hardware.” In philosophy of language his Twin Earth thought experiment showed that what our words mean depends on the world and the linguistic community, not only on what is in our heads: “meanings just ain’t in the head.” Later he turned against metaphysical realism and argued with the “brains in a vat” scenario that the sceptical hypothesis refutes itself. Putnam’s path from scientific realism to a pragmatist “internal realism” makes him one of the most stimulating thinkers of analytic philosophy.
الحياة والسياق
Putnam was born in Chicago in 1926 and took his doctorate at UCLA under Hans Reichenbach. After teaching at Princeton and MIT he spent most of his career at Harvard from 1965. He worked across mathematical logic, philosophy of science, mind and language, and was known for openly revising his own positions; he was also politically active in the 1960s.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- Minds and Machines (1960)
- Representation and Reality (1988)
يرد في
- رحلة «لغز الوعي» · المحطة 6 من 10
- نقاش «هل تستطيع الآلات أن تفكّر أو تشعر؟»
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