بيرنارد وليمز
لا يمكن حشر الأخلاق في نظرية مرتبة – فالحظ يشكّل ما نُلام عليه، والتزاماتنا الأعمق لها وزنها.
التموضع
الحظ الأخلاقي والنزاهة وحدود النظرية الأخلاقية.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- الحظ الأخلاقي
- النزاهة
- الأسباب الداخلية
التلاميذ: ميراندا فريكر
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 3
أرسطو
تأثّر بـ
Williams began ethics with Socrates’ question how one should live and examined Aristotle’s attempt to ground ethics in human well-being (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 1985). B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985); Shame and Necessity (1993); SEP “Bernard Williams”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أرسطو › 384–322 ق.م
فريدريك نيتشه
تأثّر بـ ✓
Williams used Nietzsche’s genealogy to explain values through their history, but in vindicating rather than debunking form, for the virtues of truth (Truth and Truthfulness, 2002). B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (2002); “Nietzsche’s Minimalist Moral Psychology” (1993); SEP “Bernard Williams”
فريدريك نيتشه › 1844–1900
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين
تأثّر بـ
Williams asked whether Wittgenstein’s later philosophy implies a transcendental idealism of the first-person plural (‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’, 1974) and discussed Wittgensteinian arguments on thick ethical concepts (1985). B. Williams, “Wittgenstein and Idealism” (1974), in Moral Luck (1981); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985); SEP “Bernard Williams”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين › 1889–1951
أثّر في 3
مارثا نوسباوم
أثّر في
Nussbaum took up Williams’s ‘moral luck’ and his doubts about systematic moral theory in her study of Greek tragedy and ethics (The Fragility of Goodness, 1986). M. C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (1986); B. Williams, “Moral Luck”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 50 (1976)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
مارثا نوسباوم › وُلد 1947
ميراندا فريكر علّم
علّم
Fricker’s Oxford DPhil (1996) was co-supervised by Bernard Williams and Sabina Lovibond; in Epistemic Injustice (2007) she takes up Williams’s genealogical method. M. Fricker, personal website (mirandafricker.com, “About”); M. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice (2007)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ميراندا فريكر › وُلد 1966
أميا سرينيفاسان
أثّر في
Srinivasan asked when genealogies of belief undermine and when they vindicate, a contrast set out in Williams’s Truth and Truthfulness (2002), and introduced ‘genealogical luck’ (2019). A. Srinivasan, “Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2019); B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness (2002)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أميا سرينيفاسان › وُلد 1984
النقد
انتقده 2
ديريك بارفيت
انتقده
Parfit rejected Williams’s view that all reasons are internal, grounded in motivations: reasons are given by facts that count in favour of acting (On What Matters, 2011). D. Parfit, “Reasons and Motivation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 71 (1997); On What Matters (2011), vol. 1; B. Williams, “Internal and External Reasons” (1980)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ديريك بارفيت › 1942–2017
كريستين كورسغارد
انتقده
Korsgaard argued against Williams that motivational scepticism about practical reason depends on content scepticism: if pure practical reason exists, it can motivate (‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, 1986). C. M. Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason”, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), 5–25; B. Williams, “Internal and External Reasons” (1980); Williams’s response in Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (1996)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
كريستين كورسغارد › وُلد 1952
ينتقد 4
إيمانويل كانط
انتقد
Williams objected that Kantian impartiality alienates agents from their attachments: a husband rescuing his wife on impartial grounds has ‘one thought too many’ (‘Persons, Character and Morality’, 1976). B. Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality” (1976), in Moral Luck (1981); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), ch. 10
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إيمانويل كانط › 1724–1804
جيرمي بنثام
انتقد
Williams argued that utilitarianism as founded by Bentham sums welfare impersonally and leaves no room for agents’ own projects and integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), ch. 5
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جيرمي بنثام › 1748–1832
جون ستيوارت مل
انتقد
Williams’s critique of utilitarianism, aimed chiefly at Smart, extends to Mill’s: it weighs lives impersonally and leaves no place for integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), chs. 5–6
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جون ستيوارت مل › 1806–1873
جون سمارت
انتقد
Answering Smart, Williams argued that utilitarian ‘negative responsibility’ turns agents into channels for the best outcome and attacks their integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973), §§ 3–5 (the cases of George and Jim)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جون سمارت › 1920–2012
الأعمال
يدافع سمارت عن نفعية الفعل ويهاجمها ويليامز – بحالتي جورج الكيميائي وجيم الذي يُطلب منه إطلاق النار على واحد من عشرين أسيرًا ليُفرج عن التسعة عشر الآخرين.
غوغان وسائق الشاحنة: الأخلاق تتوقف أيضًا على الحظ.
ضد «نظام الأخلاق» – ومع المفاهيم الأخلاقية الكثيفة.
الموقف
Williams was a sharp sceptic of systematic moral theory. Utilitarianism and Kantianism, he argued, look at action from an impersonal standpoint that ignores what gives human lives their shape: personal projects, attachments and integrity. In his famous case of Jim, who is told that if he shoots one villager the other nineteen will be spared, the point is not that the answer is obvious but that the utilitarian ignores what it means for Jim to do it. With the concept of “moral luck” he showed that our moral assessment depends on factors beyond our control. Williams defended “thick” ethical concepts such as cruelty or courage against thin, abstract notions of “ought.” His later work on truthfulness and Greek ethics broadened this into a historically aware philosophy.
الحياة والسياق
Williams was born in Essex in 1929, studied classics and philosophy at Oxford and flew Spitfires in Canada with the Royal Air Force during national service. He taught in London and Cambridge, where he was Knightbridge Professor and Provost of King’s College, then at Berkeley and finally Oxford. He chaired a government committee on obscenity and film censorship and was knighted in 1999.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- Shame and Necessity (1993)
- Truth and Truthfulness (2002)
يرد في
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