توماس كون
لا ينمو العلم نموًّا مطردًا؛ بل يعمل ضمن إطار مشترك حتى تُجبر الأزمة على ثورة تستبدل به إطارًا جديدًا.
التموضع
يتطور العلم بتحولات النموذج المعرفي (البراديغم) لا بتراكم المعرفة المطّرد.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- النموذج المعرفي (البراديغم)
- الثورة العلمية
- عدم قابلية القياس المشترك
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 4
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين
تأثّر بـ
Kuhn used Wittgenstein’s family resemblance to explain how paradigms can guide research without a shared set of rules (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين › 1889–1951
مايكل بولاني
تأثّر بـ ✓
Kuhn referred to Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge (1958) for tacit knowledge gained through practice rather than rules, on which paradigms as shared exemplars rely (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1958); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
مايكل بولاني › 1891–1976
جان بياجيه
تأثّر بـ ✓
Kuhn named Piaget’s studies of the successive worlds of the growing child among the sources of his idea of scientific revolutions (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, preface). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), preface; SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
جان بياجيه › 1896–1980
ويلارد فان أورمان كواين
تأثّر بـ
Kuhn credited Quine with opening for him the puzzles of the analytic–synthetic distinction, a background to his holistic view of scientific concepts (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, preface). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), preface; W. V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ويلارد فان أورمان كواين › 1908–2000
أثّر في 3
بول فايراباند
أثّر في
At Berkeley Feyerabend commented on Kuhn’s draft of Structure (letters, 1960–61); both introduced ‘incommensurability’ in 1962, and Feyerabend later criticised Kuhn’s normal science (‘Consolations for the Specialist’, 1970). P. Hoyningen-Huene (ed.), “Two Letters of Paul Feyerabend to Thomas S. Kuhn on a Draft of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 26 (1995); P. K. Feyerabend, “Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism” (1962); “Consolations for the Specialist” (1970); SEP “Paul Feyerabend”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
بول فايراباند › 1924–1994
ساندرا هاردينغ
أثّر في
Harding built on the post-Kuhnian view that scientific knowledge is shaped by its historical and social setting to ask about androcentric bias (The Science Question in Feminism, 1986). S. Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (1986); T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); SEP “Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ساندرا هاردينغ › 1935–2025
برونو لاتور
أثّر في
Latour followed Kuhn’s turn from the logic of science to the practice of scientific communities, but studied laboratories ethnographically rather than paradigms (Laboratory Life, with S. Woolgar, 1979). B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life (1979); B. Latour, Science in Action (1987); T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
برونو لاتور › 1947–2022
النقد
انتقده 2
دونالد ديفيدسن
انتقده
Davidson rejected the incommensurable conceptual schemes he found in Kuhn: an untranslatable language could not be recognised as language (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 47 (1974), 5–20
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
دونالد ديفيدسن › 1917–2003
إمره لاكاتوش
انتقده
Lakatos objected that Kuhn makes theory change a matter of ‘mob psychology’ and proposed rationally reconstructed research programmes instead (‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, 1970). I. Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970), 91–196
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إمره لاكاتوش › 1922–1974
ينتقد 1
كارل بوبر
انتقد
Kuhn objected to Popper that normal science solves puzzles without testing its paradigm, which single anomalies do not overturn (‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, 1970). T. S. Kuhn, “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970); Popper’s reply “Normal Science and Its Dangers”, ibid.
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
كارل بوبر › 1902–1994
الأعمال
العلم العادي، والشذوذ، وتحوّل النموذج الإرشادي.
الموقف
Kuhn challenged the image of science as a steady accumulation of truths. Most of the time, he argued, scientists practise “normal science”: they solve puzzles within a paradigm – a shared framework of theories, methods and exemplary achievements that is not itself questioned. When anomalies pile up, a crisis can arise, and finally a scientific revolution in which a new paradigm replaces the old, as with Copernicus, Newton or Einstein. Since paradigms define different problems and standards, they are partly “incommensurable”: there is no neutral measure to compare them. Kuhn thus put history and sociology at the centre of philosophy of science; “paradigm shift” became a household word.
الحياة والسياق
Kuhn was born in Cincinnati in 1922 and took his doctorate in physics at Harvard. Teaching science to humanities students led him to the history of science, where he discovered how differently Aristotle had thought about motion. He taught at Harvard, Berkeley, Princeton and MIT; his book on scientific revolutions became one of the most cited academic works of the century.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- The Copernican Revolution (1957)
- The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)
- The Essential Tension (1977)
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