أليس كراري
رؤية العالم رؤيةً صحيحة إنجازٌ أخلاقي في ذاتها، وحياة الحيوانات تنطوي على معنًى لا تراه أخلاقٌ باردة منفصلة تكتفي بحساب الأعداد.
التموضع
فيلسوفة أخلاق فتغنشتاينية في المدرسة الجديدة: رؤية العالم رؤية صحيحة عمل أخلاقي بحد ذاتها، والحيوانات «داخل الأخلاق» – وحسابات الإيثار الفعّال تفوتها المظالم البنيوية.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- الإدراك الأخلاقي وموضوعية «أوسع»
- الحيوانات داخل الأخلاق
- نقد الإيثار الفعّال
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 4
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين
تأثّر بـ
Crary co-edited The New Wittgenstein (2000) and drew on Wittgenstein to argue that moral thought pervades our concepts, not only explicit judgements (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary and R. Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein (2000); A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين › 1889–1951
تيودور أدورنو
تأثّر بـ
Crary joined Wittgenstein’s later thought with Frankfurt School critical theory, defending a ‘wide’ conception of rationality on which social critique can be objective (‘Wittgenstein Goes to Frankfurt’, 2018). A. Crary, “Wittgenstein Goes to Frankfurt (and Finds Something Useful to Say)”, Nordic Wittgenstein Review 7 (2018); Inside Ethics (2016)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
تيودور أدورنو › 1903–1969
آيريس مردوك
تأثّر بـ
Crary followed Murdoch in holding that moral work lies in learning to see situations justly, so that the world, rightly perceived, has moral features (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007); I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (1970)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
آيريس مردوك › 1919–1999
هيلاري بوتنام
تأثّر بـ
Crary, whose Harvard undergraduate thesis Putnam supervised, shared his rejection of the fact–value dichotomy, arguing that moral concepts reveal real features of the world (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007); H. Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (2002)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
هيلاري بوتنام › 1926–2016
النقد
ينتقد 1
بيتر سنجر
انتقد
Crary objected that Singer ranks beings by individual capacities, a ‘moral individualism’ that does justice neither to animals nor to people with severe cognitive disabilities (Inside Ethics, 2016). A. Crary, Inside Ethics: On the Demands of Moral Thought (2016)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
بيتر سنجر › وُلد 1946
الأعمال
الحيوانات والبشر «داخل الأخلاق»: تظهر منزلتهم الأخلاقية في فهم لحياتهم أخلاقي أصلًا، لا في قائمة محايدة من القدرات.
الموقف
Crary rejects the widespread view that moral thinking consists in applying principles to morally neutral facts. Following Wittgenstein, Iris Murdoch and Cora Diamond, she argues in “Beyond Moral Judgment” and “Inside Ethics” that the world, rightly perceived, already contains morally significant features: learning to see a situation justly, with the right concepts and sensibilities, is itself moral work, and emotions can be ways of knowing. Applied to animals, this means that what animals are and what we owe them cannot be read off neutral lists of capacities. Animals are “inside ethics” – beings whose lives have a meaning that an attentive observer can perceive – and the same holds for human beings with severe cognitive disabilities, whom capacity-based arguments tend to degrade. “Animal Crisis”, written with Lori Gruen, links the treatment of animals with racism, colonialism and environmental destruction. She is also one of the most prominent critics of effective altruism: in essays and in a volume co-edited with Carol J. Adams and Gruen she argues that its quantifying approach overlooks structural injustice and the knowledge of affected communities, and that longtermism diverts attention from present harms.
الحياة والسياق
Alice Crary (born 1967) studied philosophy at Harvard, where Hilary Putnam supervised her undergraduate thesis on Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell was among her teachers, and took her doctorate at the University of Pittsburgh in 1999 under John McDowell. She has taught at the New School for Social Research in New York since 2000, chaired its philosophy department and is now Walter A. Eberstadt University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy; in 2018–19 she held a professorship at Regent’s Park College, Oxford. Her work connects Wittgensteinian moral philosophy with feminism, animal ethics, disability studies and critical theory.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- The New Wittgenstein (ed. with Rupert Read, 2000)
- Beyond Moral Judgment (2007)
- Animal Crisis (with Lori Gruen, 2022)
- The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does (ed. with Carol J. Adams and Lori Gruen, 2023)
يرد في
بحسب الوضع في نوفمبر 2026 · المصادر · حسّن هذه الصفحة · كيف صُنع Agora