كارل بوبر
لا تكون النظرية علمية إلا إذا أمكن دحضها بالملاحظة، والمجتمع الحر يعيش بالنقد لا بالخطط الكبرى للتاريخ.
التموضع
العقلانية النقدية: النظريات لا تُتحقَّق بل تُفنَّد؛ والمجتمع المفتوح ضد التاريخانية.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- التفنيد
- المجتمع المفتوح
- العقلانية النقدية
التلاميذ: بول فايراباند
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 5
سقراط
تأثّر بـ ✓
Popper took Socrates’ awareness of his ignorance and his critical questioning as the model of critical rationalism, set against Plato’s ‘spell’ (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945). K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. I: The Spell of Plato (1945); SEP “Karl Popper”
سقراط › 470–399 ق.م
ديفيد هيوم
تأثّر بـ
Popper accepted Hume’s argument that induction cannot be logically justified but rejected his psychology of habit, replacing induction with conjecture and falsification (Objective Knowledge, 1972). K. R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934); Objective Knowledge (1972), “Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution of the Problem of Induction”; SEP “Karl Popper”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ديفيد هيوم › 1711–1776
إيمانويل كانط
تأثّر بـ
Popper called demarcation ‘Kant’s problem’ and reinterpreted Kant’s claim that the intellect prescribes its laws to nature: we propose conjectures, which nature may defeat (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934); “Kant’s Critique and Cosmology” (1954), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963); SEP “Karl Popper”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
إيمانويل كانط › 1724–1804
ألبرت أينشتاين
تأثّر بـ ✓
Popper drew his falsifiability criterion from Einstein’s risky prediction of light deflection, tested in 1919, in contrast to Marx, Freud and Adler (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations” (lecture 1953), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963); Unended Quest (1976); SEP “Karl Popper”
ألبرت أينشتاين › 1879–1955
ألفريد تارسكي
تأثّر بـ
Popper credited Tarski, who explained his theory to him in Vienna (1935), with rehabilitating correspondence truth, and built on it his notion of verisimilitude (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (1963); Objective Knowledge (1972); Unended Quest (1976); SEP “Karl Popper”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ألفريد تارسكي › 1901–1983
أثّر في 1
عبد الكريم سروش
أثّر في
Soroush took up Popper’s fallibilism for his theory that religious knowledge, unlike religion itself, is human, historical and revisable (The Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge, 1990). A. Soroush, Qabz va bast-e teorik-e shariat (1990); M. Sadri & A. Sadri (eds.), Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam (2000)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
عبد الكريم سروش › وُلد 1945
النقد
انتقده 5
تيودور أدورنو
انتقده
In the positivism dispute Adorno objected that Popper’s critical rationalism confines criticism to testing hypotheses rather than to society as a contradictory totality (Tübingen, 1961; Der Positivismusstreit, 1969). T. W. Adorno, “Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften” (reply to K. Popper, Tübingen 1961), in Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (1969)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
تيودور أدورنو › 1903–1969
توماس كون
انتقده
Kuhn objected to Popper that normal science solves puzzles without testing its paradigm, which single anomalies do not overturn (‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, 1970). T. S. Kuhn, “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970); Popper’s reply “Normal Science and Its Dangers”, ibid.
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
توماس كون › 1922–1996
إمره لاكاتوش أثّر في
أثّر في ✓
Lakatos, Popper’s colleague at the LSE from 1960, applied his critical rationalism to mathematics, whose growth he traced through proofs and counterexamples (‘Proofs and Refutations’, 1963–64). I. Lakatos, “Proofs and Refutations”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (1963–64); SEP “Imre Lakatos”
انتقده
Against Popper’s naive falsificationism, Lakatos argued that single refutations decide nothing; research programmes are judged as progressive or degenerating (‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, 1970). I. Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” (1970); “Popper on Demarcation and Induction”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1974)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إمره لاكاتوش › 1922–1974
بول فايراباند علّم
علّم ✓
Feyerabend came to the London School of Economics in 1952–53 on a British Council scholarship to study with Popper – he had hoped to work with Wittgenstein, who died in 1951 – and defended Popper’s views for some years before turning against them. P. Feyerabend, Killing Time (1995)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في Wikidata · Wikidata
انتقده
Feyerabend argued that Popper’s falsificationism, applied strictly, would have wiped out science, since every theory conflicts with some known facts (Against Method, 1975, ch. 5). P. Feyerabend, Against Method (1975), ch. 5; “Consolations for the Specialist”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
بول فايراباند › 1924–1994
يورغن هابرماس
انتقده
Habermas attacked Popper’s critical rationalism as a ‘positivistically halved rationalism’ that confines reason to method and leaves the choice of values to decision (1963–64, in Der Positivismusstreit, 1969). J. Habermas, “Analytische Wissenschaftstheorie und Dialektik” (1963); “Gegen einen positivistisch halbierten Rationalismus” (1964, reply to H. Albert); both in Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (1969)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
يورغن هابرماس › 1929–2026
ينتقد 9
أفلاطون
انتقد
Popper read Plato’s ideal state as a closed society and his historicism and holism as an intellectual source of modern totalitarianism (The Spell of Plato, 1945). K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1: The Spell of Plato (1945); critique: R. B. Levinson, In Defense of Plato (1953)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أفلاطون › 428–348 ق.م
أرسطو
انتقد
Popper attacked Aristotle’s ‘methodological essentialism’, the search for definitions of essences, as a root of Hegelian historicism (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945). K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2 (1945), ch. 11 (“The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism”)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أرسطو › 384–322 ق.م
جورج فيلهلم فريدريش هيغل
انتقد
Popper read Hegel as a historicist apologist of the Prussian state whose dialectic prepared modern totalitarianism (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945, vol. 2, ch. 12). K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), vol. 2, ch. 12 “Hegel and the New Tribalism”; critique of this reading: W. Kaufmann, “The Hegel Myth and Its Method”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جورج فيلهلم فريدريش هيغل › 1770–1831
كارل ماركس
انتقد
Popper argued that Marx’s historicism claims to predict history; when its prophecies failed, they were reinterpreted, making the theory immune to criticism (The Open Society, 1945). K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), vol. 2; Conjectures and Refutations (1963), ch. 1; The Poverty of Historicism (1957)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
كارل ماركس › 1818–1883
سيغموند فرويد
انتقد
Popper argued that psychoanalysis can interpret any behaviour in its own terms; its constant confirmations show that it cannot be tested (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963, ch. 1). K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (1963), ch. 1 “Science: Conjectures and Refutations”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
سيغموند فرويد › 1856–1939
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين
انتقد
Popper rejected Wittgenstein’s view that there are no genuine philosophical problems, and objected that the Tractatus’ criterion of meaning would also exclude natural laws (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 4, 10; “The Nature of Philosophical Problems and Their Roots in Science” (1952), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين › 1889–1951
عرض الكل (9)عرض أقل
أتو نويرات
انتقد
Popper welcomed Neurath’s view that protocol sentences are revisable, but objected that without rules for discarding them empiricism is thrown overboard (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), § 26; O. Neurath, “Protokollsätze”, Erkenntnis 3 (1932/33)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أتو نويرات › 1882–1945
رودولف كارناب
انتقد
Popper rejected Carnap’s verifiability criterion of meaning and inductive logic, proposing falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation, not of meaning (‘The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics’, 1963). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 4–6; “The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963), with Carnap’s reply
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
رودولف كارناب › 1891–1970
هانز رايخينباخ
انتقد
Popper rejected Reichenbach’s probability logic of induction: no principle of induction can be justified without infinite regress, and hypotheses cannot be assigned probabilities (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 1, 80–81; H. Reichenbach, Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre (1935)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
هانز رايخينباخ › 1891–1953
الأعمال
قابلية التكذيب بدل التحقق – حلٌّ لمشكلة الاستقراء؟
ضد أفلاطون وهيغل وماركس: التاريخانية تهدد الحرية.
الموقف
Popper started from Hume’s problem of induction: no number of observed white swans proves that all swans are white. Science therefore cannot verify its theories – but it can refute them. A theory is scientific if it forbids something and thus risks being falsified; theories that explain everything, like certain forms of Marxism or psychoanalysis in his view, explain nothing. Knowledge grows through bold conjectures and rigorous attempts at refutation. Popper carried this critical rationalism into politics: against Plato, Hegel and Marx he defended the “open society,” in which institutions can be corrected without bloodshed and no one claims to know the course of history. His ideas influenced scientists and politicians far beyond philosophy.
الحياة والسياق
Popper was born in Vienna in 1902, worked as a teacher and took his doctorate in 1928 with a thesis on the method of the psychology of thought; he stood close to the Vienna Circle without belonging to it. In 1937 he fled the rise of National Socialism to New Zealand, where he wrote The Open Society. From 1946 he taught at the London School of Economics; he was knighted in 1965 and died in London in 1994.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934)
- The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945)
- The Poverty of Historicism (1957)
- Conjectures and Refutations (1963)
- Objective Knowledge (1972)
يرد في
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