Agoraساحة مفتوحة للفكر

جون سورل

1932–2025

مدخل أولتبسيط مقصود – واللمحة تقول أكثر

الحاسوب الذي يعالج الرموز لا يفهمها أكثر مما يفهمها شخص يتبع القواعد في «غرفة صينية» – والعقول أكثر من برامج.

التموضع

الفلسفة التحليلية · أمريكا الشمالية · اللغة, العقل والوعي, المجتمع والتاريخ

الغرفة الصينية: النحو ليس دلالة – حجة ضد الذكاء الاصطناعي القوي.

الأفكار الرئيسة

  • الغرفة الصينية
  • القصدية
  • الأنطولوجيا الاجتماعية

الأساتذة: جون لانجشو أوستن, بي. إف. ستروسون

افتح في خريطة النجوم

التأثير

تأثّر بـ 5

  • غوتلوب فريغه

    تأثّر بـ

    Searle developed Frege’s view that proper names have a sense into a cluster theory of names (‘Proper Names’, 1958) and defended a Fregean account of reference (Intentionality, 1983). J. R. Searle, “Proper Names”, Mind 67 (1958); Speech Acts (1969); Intentionality (1983)

    التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO

    غوتلوب فريغه › 1848–1925

  • لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين

    تأثّر بـ ✓

    Searle acknowledged the later Wittgenstein, especially On Certainty, as a source of his thesis that intentional states work only against a non-representational Background (Intentionality, 1983). J. R. Searle, Intentionality (1983); The Construction of Social Reality (1995); L. Wittgenstein, Über Gewißheit (publ. 1969)

    التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في Wikidata · Wikidata · InPhO

    لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين › 1889–1951

  • جون لانجشو أوستن تتلمذ على

    تتلمذ على

    At Oxford, where he studied from 1952 as a Rhodes Scholar, Searle was taught by Austin as well as by Strawson, Berlin and Hampshire; his Speech Acts (1969) developed Austin’s theory, although he said Austin’s attention to linguistic minutiae left him unmoved. J. R. Searle, interview with T. Crane, CRASSH, University of Cambridge (9 June 2014)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    جون لانجشو أوستن › 1911–1960

  • هربرت بول جرايس

    تأثّر بـ

    Searle adopted Grice’s analysis of meaning through the intended recognition of intentions but held that it must include linguistic conventions (Speech Acts, 1969). J. R. Searle, Speech Acts (1969); H. P. Grice, “Meaning”, Philosophical Review 66 (1957); SEP “Paul Grice”

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    هربرت بول جرايس › 1913–1988

  • بي. إف. ستروسون تتلمذ على

    تتلمذ على

    Strawson was Searle’s tutor at Oxford; Searle credited him without hesitation with having truly taught him how to do philosophy, recalled tutorials for which his essay was due a day in advance, and the two became close friends. J. R. Searle, interview with T. Crane, CRASSH, University of Cambridge (9 June 2014)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    بي. إف. ستروسون › 1919–2006

النقد

انتقده 3

  • شاول كريبك

    انتقده

    Kripke rejected Searle’s cluster theory of names: no weighted set of descriptions fixes reference, since the bearer might satisfy none of them (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lecture I; J. R. Searle, “Proper Names”, Mind 67 (1958)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    شاول كريبك › 1940–2022

  • دانيال دينيت

    انتقده

    Dennett called Searle’s Chinese Room an ‘intuition pump’ that directs attention to the rule-following man instead of the whole system (‘The Milk of Human Intentionality’, 1980). D. C. Dennett, “The Milk of Human Intentionality”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980); Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 14

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    دانيال دينيت › 1942–2024

  • ديفيد تشالمرز

    انتقده

    Chalmers rejected Searle’s Chinese Room argument: by the principle of organisational invariance, a system with the right functional organisation would be conscious (The Conscious Mind, 1996, ch. 9). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996), chs. 7, 9; J. R. Searle, “Consciousness and the Philosophers”, New York Review of Books, 6 March 1997, and the ensuing exchange

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    ديفيد تشالمرز › وُلد 1966

ينتقد 2

  • آلان تورنغ

    انتقد

    Searle’s Chinese Room targeted the Turing test as a criterion of understanding: a program passing it by symbol manipulation need not understand anything (‘Minds, Brains, and Programs’, 1980). J. R. Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980), 417–457; A. M. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Mind 59 (1950)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    آلان تورنغ › 1912–1954

  • جاك دريدا

    انتقد

    Searle replied that Derrida’s ‘Signature Event Context’ misreads Austin: iterability does not undermine intention, and setting aside parasitic speech is a research strategy (‘Reiterating the Differences’, 1977). J. R. Searle, “Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida”, Glyph 1 (1977), 198–208; J. Derrida, “Limited Inc a b c …”, Glyph 2 (1977)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    جاك دريدا › 1930–2004

الأعمال

الموقف

Searle systematised Austin’s speech act theory, showing how promises, assertions and orders follow constitutive rules. He then turned to the mind: intentionality – the directedness of thoughts toward the world – is a biological feature of brains, as real as digestion. His most famous argument is the Chinese Room: a person who follows rules for manipulating Chinese symbols without understanding Chinese could produce perfect answers, yet would understand nothing. Hence computers that only process syntax do not thereby possess semantics, and “strong AI” is false. Searle did not deny that a machine could think – brains, he said, are machines – only that running a program could ever be enough; critics answer that the whole system, not the person in the room, might understand. Later he explained how social reality – money, marriages, states – arises from collective acceptance of the form “X counts as Y in context C.”

الحياة والسياق

Searle was born in Denver in 1932 and studied at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, where he was influenced by J. L. Austin and Peter Strawson. From 1959 he taught at the University of California, Berkeley, for most of his career. He became widely known beyond philosophy through public debates on artificial intelligence and his controversy with Jacques Derrida. In 2019 the university revoked his emeritus status after finding that he had violated its policies on sexual harassment and retaliation. He died in 2025.

أعمال رئيسة أخرى

  • Minds, Brains, and Programs (1980)
  • Intentionality (1983)
  • The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992)
  • The Construction of Social Reality (1995)

يرد في

المصادر: Wikipedia · Wikidata

بحسب الوضع في نوفمبر 2026 · المصادر · حسّن هذه الصفحة · كيف صُنع Agora

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