ريتشارد رورتي
العقل ليس مرآة للواقع؛ وينبغي للفلسفة أن تتخلى عن البحث عن الأسس وأن تصير محادثة تعزز التضامن.
التموضع
تتحطم «مرآة الطبيعة»: ينبغي أن تكون الفلسفة محادثة لا أساسًا.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- مناهضة التمثيلية
- السخرية الليبرالية
- التضامن بدل الموضوعية
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 9
ويليام جيمس
تأثّر بـ
In Consequences of Pragmatism (1982) Rorty made James’s ‘what is good in the way of belief’ the core of a pragmatism without a theory of truth. R. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (1982), Introduction; W. James, Pragmatism (1907); SEP “Richard Rorty”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ويليام جيمس › 1842–1910
جون ديوي
تأثّر بـ ✓
Rorty set Dewey beside Wittgenstein and Heidegger as models of a philosophy that gives up the mind as mirror of nature (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979). R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); SEP “Richard Rorty”
جون ديوي › 1859–1952
مارتن هايدغر
تأثّر بـ ✓
Rorty read Heidegger’s history of metaphysics as an ally of pragmatism against foundationalism, while rejecting his nostalgia for Being (‘Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey’, 1976). R. Rorty, “Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey” (1976), in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); Essays on Heidegger and Others (1991); SEP “Richard Rorty”
مارتن هايدغر › 1889–1976
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين
تأثّر بـ
Rorty took from the later Wittgenstein the idea of philosophy as therapy, not theory, and read him as dissolving rather than solving traditional problems (‘Keeping Philosophy Pure’, 1976). R. Rorty, “Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay on Wittgenstein” (1976), in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); SEP “Richard Rorty”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين › 1889–1951
هانز جورج جادامير
تأثّر بـ
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) Rorty took Gadamer’s notion of Bildung as a model for ‘edifying’ philosophy, with hermeneutics in place of epistemology. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), “Hermeneutics and Edification”; H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (1960); SEP “Richard Rorty”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
هانز جورج جادامير › 1900–2002
ويلارد فان أورمان كواين
تأثّر بـ
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) Rorty combined Quine’s attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction with Sellars’s on the Given to argue for epistemological behaviourism. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951); SEP “Richard Rorty”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ويلارد فان أورمان كواين › 1908–2000
عرض الكل (9)عرض أقل
ولفريد سيلارز
تأثّر بـ
Rorty took Sellars’s critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’ (1956) as a key argument against foundationalism, later introducing the 1997 edition of the essay. W. Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956), introd. R. Rorty (1997); R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); SEP “Richard Rorty”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ولفريد سيلارز › 1912–1989
دونالد ديفيدسن
تأثّر بـ
Rorty read Davidson’s rejection of the scheme–content distinction and his account of truth as support for pragmatism (‘Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth’, 1986), though Davidson declined the label. R. Rorty, “Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth” (1986), in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991); D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); SEP “Richard Rorty”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
دونالد ديفيدسن › 1917–2003
جياني فاتيمو
تأثّر بـ
Rorty found in Vattimo’s ‘weak thought’ and his reading of secularisation as the fulfilment of Christianity an ally of post-metaphysical liberalism (The Future of Religion, 2005). R. Rorty and G. Vattimo, The Future of Religion, ed. S. Zabala (2005); SEP “Richard Rorty”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
جياني فاتيمو › 1936–2023
النقد
انتقده 1
إنريكي دوسل
انتقده
In The Underside of Modernity (1996), after their debate in the early 1990s, Dussel objected to Rorty’s pragmatism that its “we” of liberal ironists cannot hear the interpellation of the excluded Other, the starting point of a philosophy of liberation. E. Dussel, The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation (1996, ed. and tr. E. Mendieta); Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty y la filosofía de la liberación (1993)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إنريكي دوسل › 1934–2023
ينتقد 4
رينيه ديكارت
انتقد
Rorty argued that Descartes invented the mind as an inner mirror of nature, founding a philosophy centred on epistemology (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979, ch. 1). R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), ch. 1; SEP “Richard Rorty”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
رينيه ديكارت › 1596–1650
إيمانويل كانط
انتقد
Rorty held that Kant turned philosophy into a tribunal of pure reason and made epistemology the foundation of culture (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979, ch. 3). R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Introduction, ch. 3
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إيمانويل كانط › 1724–1804
كليفورد جيرتز
انتقد
Against Geertz’s warning, Rorty defended ethnocentrism: a liberal culture can only start from its own beliefs, but is distinguished by widening its sympathies (‘On Ethnocentrism’, 1986). R. Rorty, “On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz”, Michigan Quarterly Review 25 (1986); in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991), 203–210; C. Geertz, “The Uses of Diversity” (1986)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
كليفورد جيرتز › 1926–2006
أومبرتو إكو
انتقد
Rorty rejected Eco’s distinction between interpreting and using a text, holding that all readings simply put texts to use (‘The Pragmatist’s Progress’, in Eco, Interpretation and Overinterpretation, 1992). R. Rorty, “The Pragmatist’s Progress”, in U. Eco et al., Interpretation and Overinterpretation (1992; Tanner Lectures, Cambridge 1990)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أومبرتو إكو › 1932–2016
الأعمال
وداعًا لنظرية المعرفة بوصفها «مرآة» للواقع.
الساخر الليبرالي: صناعة الذات في الخاص، وتجنب القسوة في العام.
الموقف
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Rorty attacked the idea that the mind or language mirrors reality and that philosophy’s task is to secure the foundations of knowledge. Knowledge, he argued, is a matter of justification within a community, not of correspondence with the world. Drawing on Dewey, Wittgenstein and Heidegger, he urged philosophy to give up the search for ultimate truth and become an edifying conversation. His ideal is the “liberal ironist”, who knows that her deepest beliefs are contingent yet holds that cruelty is the worst thing we do. Solidarity should replace objectivity as the goal. He revived pragmatism and sparked fierce debates.
الحياة والسياق
Rorty grew up in New York as the son of left-wing writers, entered the University of Chicago at fifteen and earned his doctorate at Yale. He taught at Princeton, then at the University of Virginia and Stanford, increasingly outside philosophy departments. As a provocative public intellectual he became one of the best-known American philosophers of his time.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- Consequences of Pragmatism (1982)
- Achieving Our Country (1998)
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