Agoraساحة مفتوحة للفكر

دانيال دينيت

1942–2024

مدخل أولتبسيط مقصود – واللمحة تقول أكثر

الوعي ليس لغزًا بل عمل عمليات كثيرة متوازية في الدماغ، بلا مراقب داخلي – فلا مسرح داخلي يجتمع فيه كل شيء.

التموضع

الفلسفة التحليلية · أمريكا الشمالية · العقل والوعي, العلم, الدين

يمكن تفسير الوعي: لا مسرح ديكارتي بل «مسودات متعددة»؛ وفكرة داروين الخطيرة.

الأفكار الرئيسة

  • الموقف القصدي
  • المسودات المتعددة
  • نقد الكيفيات الحسية (qualia)

الأساتذة: غلبرت رايل, ويلارد فان أورمان كواين

افتح في خريطة النجوم

التأثير

تأثّر بـ 5

  • تشارلز داروين

    تأثّر بـ

    Dennett read Darwin’s natural selection as an algorithmic process that yields design without a designer, a ‘universal acid’ for traditional ideas of purpose (Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 1995). D. C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (1995); C. Darwin, On the Origin of Species (1859)

    التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO

    تشارلز داروين › 1809–1882

  • لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين

    تأثّر بـ

    Dennett, a student of Ryle, drew on Wittgenstein’s attack on private inner objects in denying that experience has ineffable, intrinsic qualia (‘Quining Qualia’, 1988; Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, “Quining Qualia”, in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science (1988); Consciousness Explained (1991)

    التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO

    لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين › 1889–1951

  • غلبرت رايل تتلمذ على

    تتلمذ على

    Dennett wrote his Oxford DPhil (1965) under Ryle; the revised thesis became Content and Consciousness (1969). D. C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (1969), preface; I’ve Been Thinking (2023)

    التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO

    غلبرت رايل › 1900–1976

  • ويلارد فان أورمان كواين تتلمذ على

    تتلمذ على ✓

    Dennett studied with Quine at Harvard (BA 1963) and wrote his senior thesis in critical engagement with him; for his doctorate he went to Ryle in Oxford. D. C. Dennett, I’ve Been Thinking (2023)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    ويلارد فان أورمان كواين › 1908–2000

  • آلان تورنغ

    تأثّر بـ

    Dennett defended Turing’s test as a fair criterion (‘Can Machines Think?’, 1985) and paired Turing with Darwin on competence without comprehension (From Bacteria to Bach and Back, 2017). D. C. Dennett, “Can Machines Think?” (1985), in Brainchildren (1998); From Bacteria to Bach and Back (2017); SEP “The Turing Test”

    التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO

    آلان تورنغ › 1912–1954

أثّر في 1

  • آندي كلارك

    أثّر في

    Clark took up Dennett’s picture of words as tools that augment cognition, treating public language as an external artefact that reshapes the brain’s computational tasks (‘Magic Words’, 1998). A. Clark, “Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation”, in P. Carruthers and J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought (1998); D. C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995)

    التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO

    آندي كلارك › وُلد 1957

النقد

انتقده 1

  • ديفيد تشالمرز

    انتقده

    Chalmers argued that Dennett’s functional account of consciousness addresses only the ‘easy problems’ and denies the explanandum, experience itself (‘Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness’, 1995). D. J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995); The Conscious Mind (1996); reply: D. C. Dennett, “Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness”, JCS 3 (1996)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    ديفيد تشالمرز › وُلد 1966

ينتقد 5

  • رينيه ديكارت

    انتقد

    Dennett attacked the ‘Cartesian Theater’, a central place in the brain where it all comes together for consciousness, surviving as ‘Cartesian materialism’ (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 5; D. C. Dennett & M. Kinsbourne, “Time and the Observer”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1992)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    رينيه ديكارت › 1596–1650

  • جون سورل

    انتقد

    Dennett called Searle’s Chinese Room an ‘intuition pump’ that directs attention to the rule-following man instead of the whole system (‘The Milk of Human Intentionality’, 1980). D. C. Dennett, “The Milk of Human Intentionality”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980); Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 14

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    جون سورل › 1932–2025

  • جيري فودور

    انتقد

    Dennett objected to Fodor’s language of thought that ascribing beliefs does not require explicitly stored sentences in the head (‘A Cure for the Common Code?’, 1977). D. C. Dennett, “A Cure for the Common Code?”, Mind 86 (1977), repr. in Brainstorms (1978); The Intentional Stance (1987)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    جيري فودور › 1935–2017

  • توماس ناغل

    انتقد

    Dennett denied Nagel’s claim that subjective experience escapes objective science: much about what it is like to be a bat can be learned (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 14; T. Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review 83 (1974); Nagel’s reply: “Is Consciousness an Illusion?”, New York Review of Books, 9 March 2017

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    توماس ناغل › وُلد 1937

  • فرانك كاميرون جاكسون

    انتقد

    Dennett argued that Jackson’s Mary, knowing all physical facts, would learn nothing on seeing colour and would spot a blue-painted banana as a trick (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 12; F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); Jackson later gave up the argument (“Postscript on Qualia”, 1998)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    فرانك كاميرون جاكسون › وُلد 1943

الأعمال

الموقف

Dennett sought to explain the mind entirely within a scientific, Darwinian world view. With the “intentional stance” he argued that attributing beliefs and desires is a strategy for predicting behaviour that works for people, animals and even chess computers – and that this success is all there is to having beliefs. In Consciousness Explained he rejected the “Cartesian theater,” the idea of a central place in the brain where everything comes together for an inner observer; instead, many parallel processes produce “multiple drafts.” He regarded qualia as a confused notion. In Darwin’s Dangerous Idea he described natural selection as a “universal acid” that dissolves traditional ideas of design and purpose. Dennett also defended a compatibilist account of free will.

الحياة والسياق

Dennett was born in Boston in 1942, studied at Harvard and wrote his doctorate at Oxford under Gilbert Ryle. For more than four decades he taught at Tufts University, where he co-directed the Center for Cognitive Studies. He worked closely with cognitive scientists and biologists and became one of the best-known public intellectuals of his time. He died in 2024.

أعمال رئيسة أخرى

  • Brainstorms (1978)
  • Consciousness Explained (1991)
  • Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995)
  • Freedom Evolves (2003)

يرد في

المصادر: Wikipedia · Wikidata

بحسب الوضع في نوفمبر 2026 · المصادر · حسّن هذه الصفحة · كيف صُنع Agora

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