Agoraساحة مفتوحة للفكر

جيري فودور

1935–2017

مدخل أولتبسيط مقصود – واللمحة تقول أكثر

التفكير حسابٌ في لغة داخلية من الرموز، والإدراك واللغة يعملان بوحدات متخصصة فطرية في معظمها.

التموضع

الفلسفة التحليلية · أمريكا الشمالية · العقل والوعي, اللغة, العلم

فيلسوف علم الإدراك في معهد ماساتشوستس للتقنية ورتجرز: التفكير حساب على تمثيلات ذهنية في «لغة للفكر»؛ ويعمل الإدراك الحسي بوحدات متخصصة.

الأفكار الرئيسة

  • لغة الفكر
  • النظرية الحاسوبية للعقل
  • نمطية العقل
  • الفطرية المفهومية

الأساتذة: هيلاري بوتنام

افتح في خريطة النجوم

التأثير

تأثّر بـ 2

  • آلان تورنغ

    تأثّر بـ

    Fodor built his computational theory of mind on Turing’s model of computation: thinking is rule-governed manipulation of symbols in a language of thought (The Language of Thought, 1975). J. A. Fodor, The Language of Thought (1975); The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way (2000); SEP “The Computational Theory of Mind”

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    آلان تورنغ › 1912–1954

  • هيلاري بوتنام تتلمذ على

    تتلمذ على

    Fodor took his PhD at Princeton in 1960 under Putnam with a dissertation in the philosophy of language, The Uses of ‘Use’. Mathematics Genealogy Project, entry J. A. Fodor (Princeton 1960)

    التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO

    هيلاري بوتنام › 1926–2016

النقد

انتقده 2

  • دانيال دينيت

    انتقده

    Dennett objected to Fodor’s language of thought that ascribing beliefs does not require explicitly stored sentences in the head (‘A Cure for the Common Code?’, 1977). D. C. Dennett, “A Cure for the Common Code?”, Mind 86 (1977), repr. in Brainstorms (1978); The Intentional Stance (1987)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    دانيال دينيت › 1942–2024

  • آندي كلارك

    انتقده

    Clark defended connectionist models against Fodor and Pylyshyn’s claim that only a classical language of thought can explain the systematicity of cognition (Microcognition, 1989). A. Clark, Microcognition (1989); Associative Engines (1993); J. Fodor & Z. Pylyshyn, “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture”, Cognition 28 (1988)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    آندي كلارك › وُلد 1957

ينتقد 3

  • تشارلز داروين

    انتقد

    With Piattelli-Palmarini, Fodor argued that natural selection cannot distinguish traits selected for from coextensive ‘free riders’ and so does not explain adaptation (What Darwin Got Wrong, 2010). J. Fodor & M. Piattelli-Palmarini, What Darwin Got Wrong (2010), part II

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    تشارلز داروين › 1809–1882

  • لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين

    انتقد

    With Chihara, Fodor attacked Wittgensteinian criteria for mental concepts (1965) and later argued that learning a language presupposes an innate language of thought (The Language of Thought, 1975). C. Chihara & J. Fodor, “Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein”, American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965); J. Fodor, The Language of Thought (1975), ch. 2

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين › 1889–1951

  • غلبرت رايل

    انتقد

    Against Ryle’s logical behaviourism Fodor argued that psychology must posit inner mental states that cause behaviour, not mere dispositions to behave (Psychological Explanation, 1968). J. Fodor, Psychological Explanation (1968); “The Mind–Body Problem”, Scientific American 244 (1981)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    غلبرت رايل › 1900–1976

الأعمال

الموقف

Fodor was the leading defender of the computational theory of mind. Against behaviourism, in Psychological Explanation (1968), and against Wittgensteinian views of mental concepts, in a 1965 paper with Charles Chihara, he argued that psychology must postulate inner mental states that cause behaviour. The Language of Thought (1975) claimed that these states are representations in an inner language with its own syntax and semantics – “mentalese” – and that thinking is the computation of such symbols. Only this, he argued, explains why thought is productive and systematic: whoever can think that John loves Mary can also think that Mary loves John. With Zenon Pylyshyn he used this argument in 1988 against connectionist models of the mind. The Modularity of Mind (1983) distinguished fast, encapsulated input systems for perception and language from central processes such as belief fixation, which are holistic and, he thought, beyond the reach of current cognitive science. He also held that most lexical concepts are innate and criticised semantic holism. His late book What Darwin Got Wrong (2010, with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini) argued that natural selection cannot explain why particular traits were selected; most biologists rejected it.

الحياة والسياق

Jerry Fodor was born in New York City in 1935. He studied at Columbia University and took his doctorate at Princeton in 1960 under Hilary Putnam. From 1959 to 1986 he taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he worked closely with linguists and psychologists in the circle around Noam Chomsky. After two years at the City University of New York he moved in 1988 to Rutgers University, where he remained until his retirement in 2016. He wrote many essays and reviews for the London Review of Books. He died in New York in 2017.

أعمال رئيسة أخرى

  • Psychological Explanation (1968)
  • Psychosemantics (1987)
  • Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (1998)
  • The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way (2000)
  • What Darwin Got Wrong (with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010)

المصادر: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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