غوتلوب فريغه
يرى فريغه أنّ المنطق يمكن كتابته بدقة الرياضيات، وأنّ للكلمة معنًى – أي الكيفية التي تقدّم بها شيئًا – ومرجعًا – أي ما تشير إليه.
التموضع
مؤسس المنطق الحديث؛ ميّز بين المعنى والمرجع.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- كتابة المفاهيم (Begriffsschrift)
- المعنى والمرجع
- المنطقانية
الأساتذة: هيرمان لوتسي, كونو فيشر
التلاميذ: رودولف كارناب
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 4
غوتفريد لايبنتس
تأثّر بـ
Frege presented his Begriffsschrift (1879) as a step towards Leibniz’s universal characteristic and adopted Leibniz’s definition of identity as substitutability salva veritate (Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884). G. Frege, Begriffsschrift (1879), preface; Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); SEP “Leibniz’s Influence on 19th Century Logic”; SEP “Gottlob Frege”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
غوتفريد لايبنتس › 1646–1716
فريدريش أدولف ترندلنبورغ
تأثّر بـ
In the preface to the Begriffsschrift Frege refers to Trendelenburg’s essay on Leibniz’s plan for a universal characteristic when he presents his concept-script as a step toward Leibniz’s ideal. Frege, Begriffsschrift (1879), preface and note 2, in van Heijenoort (ed.), From Frege to Gödel (1967), p. 6; cf. SEP “Gottlob Frege” §2.1
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
فريدريش أدولف ترندلنبورغ › 1802–1872
هيرمان لوتسي تتلمذ على
تتلمذ على
Frege heard Lotze’s lectures on the philosophy of religion at Göttingen, the only philosophy course he took there, though Potter finds no philosophical teacher of central importance in Frege’s education. M. Potter, “Introduction”, in Potter and Ricketts (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Frege (2010), p. 1; SEP “Hermann Lotze” (D. Sullivan) names Frege a direct student
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
تأثّر بـ
Frege’s early set of key sentences about logic is a response to Lotze’s Logic of 1874, taking up the separation of thoughts from ideas but grounding it in the objectivity of truth rather than in value. M. Potter, “Introduction”, Cambridge Companion to Frege (2010), pp. 2–3, after M. Dummett, Frege and Other Philosophers (1991) and F. Hovens, History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (1997)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
هيرمان لوتسي › 1817–1881
كونو فيشر تتلمذ على
تتلمذ على
The only philosophy Frege heard at Jena was Fischer’s lecture course on Kant’s critical philosophy. M. Potter, “Introduction”, Cambridge Companion to Frege (2010), p. 1
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
كونو فيشر › 1824–1907
أثّر في 4
رودولف كارناب علّم
علّم ✓
Carnap attended Frege’s courses in Jena – Begriffsschrift I and II (1910–11, 1913) and Logic in Mathematics (1914) – as one of very few students; he later recalled them as his introduction to modern logic. R. Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
رودولف كارناب › 1891–1970
مايكل دوميت
أثّر في
Dummett read Frege as the founder of analytic philosophy, whose theory of sense makes the theory of meaning the foundation of philosophy (Frege: Philosophy of Language, 1973). M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (1973); Origins of Analytical Philosophy (1993); SEP “Gottlob Frege”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
مايكل دوميت › 1925–2011
ج. ن. موهانتي
أثّر في
Mohanty used Frege’s distinction of sense and reference to compare him with Husserl, arguing in Husserl and Frege (1982) that Husserl reached it independently. J. N. Mohanty, Husserl and Frege (1982)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ج. ن. موهانتي › 1928–2023
جون سورل
أثّر في
Searle developed Frege’s view that proper names have a sense into a cluster theory of names (‘Proper Names’, 1958) and defended a Fregean account of reference (Intentionality, 1983). J. R. Searle, “Proper Names”, Mind 67 (1958); Speech Acts (1969); Intentionality (1983)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
جون سورل › 1932–2025
النقد
نقد متبادل 2
جورج كانتور ⇄ متبادل
انتقد
Frege’s 1892 review of Cantor’s collected papers on the transfinite (and an unpublished draft of 1890) objects to Cantor’s appeal to mental abstraction. Frege, review of Cantor, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100 (1892), 269–272, tr. in Collected Papers (1984), pp. 178–181
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
انتقده
Cantor’s 1885 review of Frege’s Grundlagen objected to Frege’s attempt to define number through extensions of concepts. P. Ebert and M. Rossberg, “Cantor on Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic”, History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2009), 341–348
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جورج كانتور › 1845–1918
جوزيبه بيانو ⇄ متبادل
انتقد
In 1897 Frege compared Peano’s logical notation with his own and defended the superiority of his concept-script. Frege, “Über die Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano und meine eigene” (1897), listed in SEP “Frege’s Logic” (R. Cook, 2023)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
انتقده مختلف عليها
Peano’s 1895 review of Frege’s Grundgesetze I in the Rivista di matematica prompted Frege’s replies of 1896–97; what exactly Peano objected to was not checked. Bibliographic data from the Frege–Peano literature (G. Besler; Rivista di matematica 5, 1895, 122–128 and 6, 1896–99, 53–61); review text not read
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جوزيبه بيانو › 1858–1932
انتقده 4
بيرتراند راسل أثّر في
أثّر في ✓
Russell recognised Frege’s logicism as close to his own, expounded it in an appendix to The Principles of Mathematics (1903) and continued it in Principia Mathematica (1910–13). B. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics (1903), appendix A; A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematica (1910–13); SEP “Bertrand Russell”
انتقده
In a letter of 16 June 1902 Russell showed that Frege’s Basic Law V yields a contradiction; ‘On Denoting’ (1905) rejected Frege’s distinction of sense and reference. B. Russell to G. Frege, 16 June 1902, in J. van Heijenoort (ed.), From Frege to Gödel (1967); “On Denoting”, Mind 14 (1905); G. Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik II (1903), appendix
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
بيرتراند راسل › 1872–1970
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين أثّر في
أثّر في ✓
Wittgenstein, who visited Frege (1911), thanked ‘the great works of Frege’ in the Tractatus preface and adopted his principle that names have meaning only in propositions (1921). L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (completed 1918; publ. 1921), preface; G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
انتقده
Wittgenstein rejected Frege’s view that sentences name truth-values and that logical constants represent anything; Frege’s assertion sign he called logically meaningless (Tractatus, 1921, 4.0312, 4.431, 4.442). L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), 3.143, 4.0312, 4.431, 4.442; Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953), § 71
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين › 1889–1951
هيلاري بوتنام
انتقده
Putnam’s Twin Earth case denied that the Fregean sense a speaker grasps fixes a term’s extension: ‘meanings just ain’t in the head’ (‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, 1975). H. Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1975), 131–193
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
هيلاري بوتنام › 1926–2016
شاول كريبك
انتقده
Kripke rejected the Fregean view that a name’s descriptive sense fixes its reference: names are rigid designators, tied to bearers by a causal chain (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; book 1980), Lectures I–II
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
شاول كريبك › 1940–2022
ينتقد 4
إيمانويل كانط تأثّر بـ
تأثّر بـ
Frege kept Kant’s view that geometry rests on a priori intuition and recast his analytic–synthetic distinction as concerning how a truth is justified (Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884). G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); SEP “Gottlob Frege”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
انتقد
Frege argued against Kant that arithmetic is analytic, not synthetic a priori, and that Kant underestimated analytic judgements; geometry he left to intuition (Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884). G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), §§ 5, 12–13, 88–90
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إيمانويل كانط › 1724–1804
جون ستيوارت مل
انتقد
Frege rejected Mill’s view of numbers as properties of aggregates and of arithmetic as inductive, mocking it as an arithmetic of pebbles and gingerbread (Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884, §§ 7–11). G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), §§ 7–11, 23–25; J. S. Mill, A System of Logic (1843), book II, ch. 6
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جون ستيوارت مل › 1806–1873
إدموند هوسرل أثّر في
أثّر في مختلف عليها ✓
Husserl discussed Frege’s Grundlagen in Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891); whether Frege’s critical review (1894) prompted his turn against psychologism in the Logical Investigations (1900–01) is disputed. G. Frege, review of E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 103 (1894); D. Føllesdal, Husserl und Frege (1958); J. N. Mohanty, Husserl and Frege (1982); SEP “Edmund Husserl”
انتقد
In his 1894 review of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891) Frege charged it with psychologism, confusing subjective presentations with objective concepts and numbers. G. Frege, review of E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik I, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 103 (1894), 313–332
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إدموند هوسرل › 1859–1938
ديفيد هلبرت
انتقد
Frege objected to Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry (1899) that axioms cannot implicitly define their terms but must be true statements, and that consistency does not prove existence. Frege–Hilbert correspondence, Dec. 1899–1900; G. Frege, “Über die Grundlagen der Geometrie”, Jahresbericht der DMV 12 (1903) and 15 (1906); SEP “The Frege–Hilbert Controversy”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ديفيد هلبرت › 1862–1943
الأعمال
لغة صورية للفكر الخالص – ميلاد المنطق الحديث.
الأعداد موضوعات منطقية – ضد النزعة النفسانية وضد كانط.
نجمة المساء هي نجمة الصباح – لكن ليس بالمعنى نفسه.
الموقف
Frege is the founder of modern logic and of analytic philosophy of language. In his Begriffsschrift he created a formal language that could express mathematical reasoning without gaps, introducing quantifiers and the analysis of sentences into function and argument. He aimed to show that arithmetic can be derived from logic alone, and that numbers are objective logical objects, not mental images. His distinction between sense and reference explains why “the morning star is the evening star” is informative: both expressions refer to Venus but present it in different ways. His insistence on the objectivity of thought, against psychologism, shaped Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap and the whole analytic tradition.
الحياة والسياق
Frege, born in Wismar on the Baltic, studied mathematics, physics and philosophy in Jena and Göttingen and taught mathematics at Jena for his whole career. His work received little recognition during his lifetime. In 1902 a letter from the young Russell showed that his system contained a contradiction, a blow from which his logicist project never recovered. His diary of 1924, published in 1994, reveals virulent antisemitic and anti-democratic views.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884)
- On Sense and Reference (1892)
- Basic Laws of Arithmetic (1893–1903)
- The Thought (1918)
يرد في
- رحلة «المنعطف اللغوي» · المحطة 1 من 10
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