شاول كريبك
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التموضع
التسمية والضرورة: الأسماء معيِّنات جامدة؛ وثمة حقائق ضرورية بعدية.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- المعيِّنات الجامدة
- العوالم الممكنة
- مفارقة اتّباع القاعدة
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 3
ديفيد هيوم
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Kripke modelled the ‘sceptical solution’ he ascribed to Wittgenstein on Hume’s treatment of causation: a sceptical paradox about meaning is answered by community practice, not facts (1982). S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982); D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748); SEP “Rule-Following and Intentionality”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في Wikidata · Wikidata
ديفيد هيوم › 1711–1776
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين
تأثّر بـ ✓
Kripke presented Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks as a sceptical paradox – no fact fixes that ‘plus’ means addition – stressing it was the argument ‘as it struck Kripke’ (1982). S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Rule-Following and Intentionality”
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين › 1889–1951
روث بركان ماركوس
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Kripke’s models for quantified modal logic (1959, 1963) took up Barcan’s systems and formula (1946); whether rigid designation derives from her ‘tags’ (1961) is disputed. R. C. Barcan, “A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (1946); R. Barcan Marcus, “Modalities and Intensional Languages”, Synthese 13 (1961); S. A. Kripke, “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic” (1963); Naming and Necessity (lectures 1970; publ. 1972, 1980); Q. Smith and S. Soames, Synthese 104 (1995); SEP “Ruth Barcan Marcus”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
روث بركان ماركوس › 1921–2012
أثّر في 1
ديفيد تشالمرز
أثّر في
Chalmers took up Kripke’s modal argument against mind–brain identity and explained a posteriori necessities like ‘water is H₂O’ with two-dimensional semantics (The Conscious Mind, 1996). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980); SEP “Zombies”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ديفيد تشالمرز › وُلد 1966
النقد
انتقده 1
ديفيد لويس
انتقده
Lewis rejected Kripke’s view that possible worlds are stipulated and share individuals, defending counterpart theory against the ‘Humphrey objection’ (On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986, ch. 4). D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (1986), ch. 4; “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968); S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ديفيد لويس › 1941–2001
ينتقد 5
غوتلوب فريغه
انتقد
Kripke rejected the Fregean view that a name’s descriptive sense fixes its reference: names are rigid designators, tied to bearers by a causal chain (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; book 1980), Lectures I–II
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
غوتلوب فريغه › 1848–1925
بيرتراند راسل
انتقد
Kripke rejected Russell’s view that ordinary names are disguised descriptions: ‘Aristotle’ names Aristotle even in worlds where he did nothing we describe him by (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lectures I–II; B. Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” (1911)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
بيرتراند راسل › 1872–1970
ألفريد تارسكي
انتقد
Kripke judged Tarski’s language hierarchy unfit for natural language and built, via fixed points, a language containing its own truth predicate (‘Outline of a Theory of Truth’, 1975). S. Kripke, “Outline of a Theory of Truth”, Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), 690–716
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ألفريد تارسكي › 1901–1983
ويلارد فان أورمان كواين
انتقد
Kripke rejected Quine’s claim that quantified modal logic and essentialism are unintelligible: with rigid designators, de re necessity is coherent and intuitively grounded (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lecture I; “Identity and Necessity” (1971)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ويلارد فان أورمان كواين › 1908–2000
جون سورل
انتقد
Kripke rejected Searle’s cluster theory of names: no weighted set of descriptions fixes reference, since the bearer might satisfy none of them (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lecture I; J. R. Searle, “Proper Names”, Mind 67 (1958)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جون سورل › 1932–2025
الأعمال
- 1972التسمية والضرورة
الأسماء مُعيِّنات صلبة – ضد نظرية الوصف.
المفارقة الشكّية في اتباع القاعدة.
الموقف
Early on Kripke gave modal logic – the logic of necessity and possibility – what became its standard semantics in terms of possible worlds. In Naming and Necessity he overturned the dominant view of Frege and Russell that proper names abbreviate descriptions. Names, he argued, are “rigid designators”: “Aristotle” refers to the same person in every possible world, whatever that person might have done. Reference is fixed by a causal chain reaching back to an initial “baptism.” From this followed the striking thesis that there are necessary truths known only by experience, such as “water is H₂O.” His later reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations provoked a long debate. Kripke helped make metaphysics respectable again in analytic philosophy.
الحياة والسياق
Kripke was born in 1940 on Long Island and grew up in Omaha. While still a teenager he published a completeness proof for modal logic that made his name. He studied at Harvard and taught at Rockefeller University and Princeton, later at the City University of New York. His lectures on naming, given at Princeton in 1970, were published in 1972 and as a book in 1980.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic (1963)
- Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
- Naming and Necessity (1980)
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