ألفرد آير
لا معنى إلا للعبارات التي يمكن التحقق منها بالتجربة أو التي تصدق بحكم التعريف – والأحكام الأخلاقية تعبّر عن مشاعرنا فحسب.
التموضع
نشر الوضعية المنطقية في إنكلترا: «اللغة والحقيقة والمنطق».
الأفكار الرئيسة
- مبدأ التحقق
- الانفعالية
الأساتذة: غلبرت رايل
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 6
ديفيد هيوم
تأثّر بـ
Ayer modelled his split of analytic and empirical propositions on Hume’s relations of ideas and matters of fact, quoting his ‘commit it then to the flames’ (1936). A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936); Hume (1980); D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ديفيد هيوم › 1711–1776
بيرتراند راسل
تأثّر بـ ✓
Ayer named Russell, with Wittgenstein, as source of Language, Truth and Logic (1936) and used his method of logical construction to reduce material things to sense-contents. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936), preface; Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage (1971); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”
بيرتراند راسل › 1872–1970
موريتز شليك
تأثّر بـ
Ayer, sent to Vienna by Ryle, attended meetings of Schlick’s circle (1932–33) and brought its verification principle and rejection of metaphysics to Britain (Language, Truth and Logic, 1936). A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936); Part of My Life (1977); M. Schlick, “Meaning and Verification”, Philosophical Review 45 (1936); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
موريتز شليك › 1882–1936
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين
تأثّر بـ
Ayer took from the Tractatus (1921) the view that logical truths are tautologies saying nothing about the world and extended it to mathematics (Language, Truth and Logic, 1936). A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936); L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (1921); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين › 1889–1951
رودولف كارناب
تأثّر بـ ✓
Ayer took up Carnap’s elimination of metaphysics by logical analysis of language and his view of philosophy as a department of logic (Language, Truth and Logic, 1936). A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936); R. Carnap, “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache”, Erkenntnis 2 (1932); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في Wikidata · Wikidata
رودولف كارناب › 1891–1970
غلبرت رايل تتلمذ على
تتلمذ على ✓
Ryle was Ayer’s tutor at Christ Church, Oxford (1929–32), and suggested that he spend 1932–33 in Vienna with the Vienna Circle, the background to Language, Truth and Logic (1936). A. J. Ayer, Part of My Life (1977)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
غلبرت رايل › 1900–1976
النقد
انتقده 4
كارل هيمبل
انتقده
Hempel argued that Ayer’s verifiability criterion, even as revised in 1946, either admits metaphysics or excludes scientific laws (‘Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning’, 1950). C. G. Hempel, “Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11 (1950), 41–63; A. Church, review of Ayer, Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (1949)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
كارل هيمبل › 1905–1997
جون لانجشو أوستن
انتقده
Austin attacked the sense-datum theory of Ayer’s Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940), above all the argument from illusion (Sense and Sensibilia, lectures published 1962). J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, ed. G. J. Warnock (1962); A. J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940); Ayer’s reply: “Has Austin Refuted the Sense-Datum Theory?”, Synthese 17 (1967)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جون لانجشو أوستن › 1911–1960
ولفريد سيلارز
انتقده
Sellars’s ‘Myth of the Given’ critique targeted sense-datum theories; he examined Ayer’s view of sense-datum talk as ‘another language’ (‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, 1956, §§ 8–9). W. Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (1956), part II, §§ 8–9; A. J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ولفريد سيلارز › 1912–1989
ريتشارد ميرفين هير
انتقده
Hare objected to emotivist theories like Ayer’s that they cannot tell moral reasoning from persuasion; moral judgements are universalisable prescriptions (The Language of Morals, 1952). R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (1952), ch. 1; Freedom and Reason (1963); A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936), ch. VI
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ريتشارد ميرفين هير › 1919–2002
الأعمال
العبارات الميتافيزيقية والأخلاقية بلا معنى – النزعة الانفعالية.
الموقف
Ayer brought the doctrines of the Vienna Circle to the English-speaking world in a clear, provocative form. A statement, he held, is meaningful only if it is either true by definition, as in logic and mathematics, or in principle verifiable by sense experience. By this test metaphysics and theology are neither true nor false but literally nonsense. Ethical judgments such as “stealing is wrong” describe no facts at all; they express feelings of approval or disapproval and seek to evoke them in others – the position known as emotivism. Ayer later softened many of these claims, but his little book became the classic manifesto of logical positivism and a provocation for generations of students.
الحياة والسياق
Ayer was born in London in 1910, studied at Oxford and in 1933 spent several months with the Vienna Circle. At twenty-five he published Language, Truth and Logic, which made him famous overnight. After serving in the Welsh Guards and in intelligence during the war, he taught at University College London and from 1959 at Oxford; he was knighted in 1970.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940)
- The Problem of Knowledge (1956)
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