Agoraساحة مفتوحة للفكر

بي. إف. ستروسون

1919–2006

مدخل أولتبسيط مقصود – واللمحة تقول أكثر

إذا لم يكن ثمة ملكٌ على فرنسا فإن القول «ملك فرنسا أصلع» ليس كاذبًا بل يخطئ المرمى – وممارستنا في اللوم والاستياء لا تحتاج إلى سند ميتافيزيقي.

التموضع

الفلسفة التحليلية · أوروبا الشمالية · اللغة, الميتافيزيقا, نظرية المعرفة, الأخلاق

فيلسوف من أكسفورد: خلافًا لراسل، تفترض جملة «ملك فرنسا الحالي أصلع» مسبقًا وجود ملك بدل أن تقرّره؛ و«ميتافيزيقا وصفية» للأجسام والأشخاص؛ والمسؤولية مؤسَّسة على مواقف انفعالية كالاستياء.

الأفكار الرئيسة

  • الافتراض المسبق («في الإحالة»)
  • الميتافيزيقا الوصفية
  • الأشخاص جزئيات أساسية
  • المواقف الانفعالية

الأساتذة: هربرت بول جرايس

التلاميذ: جون سورل

افتح في خريطة النجوم

التأثير

تأثّر بـ 3

  • ديفيد هيوم

    تأثّر بـ

    Strawson took from Hume a naturalist answer to scepticism: belief in bodies and induction are inescapable natural commitments that neither need nor admit justification (Skepticism and Naturalism, 1985). P. F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (1985); SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    ديفيد هيوم › 1711–1776

  • إيمانويل كانط

    تأثّر بـ

    Strawson reconstructed the analytic core of Kant’s Critique – the conditions of any experience intelligible to us – while rejecting transcendental idealism (The Bounds of Sense, 1966). P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (1966); Individuals (1959); SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”

    التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO

    إيمانويل كانط › 1724–1804

  • هربرت بول جرايس تتلمذ على

    تتلمذ على

    Grice was one of Strawson’s two philosophy tutors, with J. D. Mabbott, when Strawson read PPE at St John’s College, Oxford (1937–40); they later wrote ‘In Defense of a Dogma’ (1956) together. SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”; P. F. Strawson, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson (1998)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    هربرت بول جرايس › 1913–1988

أثّر في 1

  • جون سورل علّم

    علّم

    Strawson was Searle’s tutor at Oxford; Searle credited him without hesitation with having truly taught him how to do philosophy, recalled tutorials for which his essay was due a day in advance, and the two became close friends. J. R. Searle, interview with T. Crane, CRASSH, University of Cambridge (9 June 2014)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    جون سورل › 1932–2025

النقد

ينتقد 2

  • بيرتراند راسل

    انتقد

    Strawson objected that Russell’s theory of descriptions confuses sentences with uses: ‘The King of France is bald’ presupposes, not asserts, that a king exists (‘On Referring’, 1950). P. F. Strawson, “On Referring”, Mind 59 (1950), 320–344; Russell’s reply: “Mr. Strawson on Referring”, Mind 66 (1957)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    بيرتراند راسل › 1872–1970

  • ويلارد فان أورمان كواين

    انتقد

    In ‘In Defense of a Dogma’ (1956), written with Grice, Strawson argued that Quine’s doubts about analyticity would make the notions of synonymy and meaning itself unintelligible. H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson, “In Defense of a Dogma”, Philosophical Review 65 (1956); P. F. Strawson, “Propositions, Concepts and Logical Truths”, Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1957)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    ويلارد فان أورمان كواين › 1908–2000

الأعمال

الموقف

“On Referring” (1950) challenged Russell’s theory of descriptions. Russell had analysed “The King of France is bald” as asserting that there is exactly one king of France and that he is bald, which makes the sentence false. Strawson replied that sentences do not refer – people use them to refer – and that the use of the sentence presupposes that there is a king; if there is none, the question of truth or falsity does not arise. Introduction to Logical Theory (1952) argued that the logical constants do not match the words of ordinary language, a view Grice later answered with his theory of implicature. In Individuals (1959) Strawson contrasted the “revisionary metaphysics” of Descartes or Leibniz with a “descriptive metaphysics” that lays bare the actual structure of our thought, as Aristotle and Kant had done. For us material bodies and persons are the basic particulars, and a person is not a mind attached to a body but something to which both mental and physical predicates apply. The Bounds of Sense (1966) reconstructed Kant’s Critique without transcendental idealism. “Freedom and Resentment” (1962) shifted the debate on free will: our practices of resentment, gratitude and blame are part of human life and need no metaphysical justification.

الحياة والسياق

Peter Frederick Strawson was born in Ealing, London, in 1919 and studied philosophy, politics and economics at St John’s College, Oxford, where H. P. Grice was his tutor. He served in the Royal Artillery and the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers from 1940 to 1946, leaving as a captain. After a year at Bangor he became a fellow of University College, Oxford, in 1948, and from 1968 to 1987 was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College. He was knighted in 1977. Among those he supervised was John Searle; his son Galen Strawson is also a philosopher. He died in London in 2006.

أعمال رئيسة أخرى

  • Introduction to Logical Theory (1952)
  • In Defense of a Dogma (with H. P. Grice, 1956)
  • Freedom and Resentment (1962)
  • The Bounds of Sense (1966)
  • Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (1985)

يرد في

المصادر: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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