ديفيد لويس
كل عالم ممكن حقيقي تمامًا كعالمنا – والحديث عن الإمكانات حديث عمّا يحدث في تلك العوالم الأخرى.
التموضع
الواقعية الجهية: جميع العوالم الممكنة موجودة بالحقيقة نفسها التي يوجد بها عالمنا.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- الواقعية الجهية
- الأعراف
- الإشراف الهيومي
الأساتذة: ويلارد فان أورمان كواين
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 5
غوتفريد لايبنتس
تأثّر بـ
Lewis took up Leibniz’s possible worlds but as concrete, real worlds; his world-bound individuals with counterparts are often compared to Leibniz’s view (On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986). D. Lewis, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968); On the Plurality of Worlds (1986); SEP “David Lewis”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
غوتفريد لايبنتس › 1646–1716
ديفيد هيوم
تأثّر بـ
Lewis named his thesis of ‘Humean supervenience’ after Hume, the denier of necessary connections: everything supervenes on the local distribution of particular qualities (Philosophical Papers II, 1986). D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol. II (1986), introduction; “Humean Supervenience Debugged”, Mind 103 (1994); SEP “David Lewis”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ديفيد هيوم › 1711–1776
رودولف كارناب
تأثّر بـ
Lewis adapted the Ramsey–Carnap method for theoretical terms to define mental states by their causal roles (‘How to Define Theoretical Terms’, 1970; ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, 1972). D. Lewis, “How to Define Theoretical Terms”, Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970); “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972); SEP “David Lewis”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
رودولف كارناب › 1891–1970
ويلارد فان أورمان كواين تتلمذ على
تتلمذ على
Lewis wrote his Harvard dissertation (1967) under Quine; it became Convention (1969), which answers Quine’s doubts about whether language can rest on convention. D. Lewis, Convention (1969), preface
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ويلارد فان أورمان كواين › 1908–2000
جون سمارت
تأثّر بـ
Lewis gave Smart’s identity of experiences and brain processes a new argument: experiences are defined by their causal roles, and the occupants of these roles are physical (1966). D. Lewis, “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جون سمارت › 1920–2012
النقد
انتقده 1
سالي هاسلانغر
انتقده
Haslanger defended endurance against Lewis’s argument from temporary intrinsics: things can change their intrinsic properties without having temporal parts (‘Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics’, Analysis, 1989). S. Haslanger, “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”, Analysis 49 (1989), 119–125; D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (1986), 202–204
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
سالي هاسلانغر › وُلد 1955
ينتقد 2
شاول كريبك
انتقد
Lewis rejected Kripke’s view that possible worlds are stipulated and share individuals, defending counterpart theory against the ‘Humphrey objection’ (On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986, ch. 4). D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (1986), ch. 4; “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968); S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
شاول كريبك › 1940–2022
فرانك كاميرون جاكسون
انتقد
Lewis answered Jackson’s knowledge argument with the ability hypothesis: on seeing red, Mary gains abilities to recognise, imagine and remember, not new information (‘What Experience Teaches’, 1988). D. Lewis, “What Experience Teaches”, Proceedings of the Russellian Society 13 (1988); F. Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know”, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
فرانك كاميرون جاكسون › وُلد 1943
الأعمال
العوالم الممكنة واقعية مثل عالمنا – علاقات النظير بدل الهوية.
الموقف
Lewis built a systematic metaphysics of unusual clarity. His best-known and most controversial thesis is modal realism: talk of what is possible or necessary refers to other possible worlds that exist just as concretely as ours, only spatiotemporally separate from it. Things in other worlds are not identical with us but our “counterparts.” Lewis defended this view not out of eccentricity but because it explains modality, counterfactual conditionals, properties and content more economically than its rivals. He also gave an analysis of conventions in game-theoretic terms, a theory of counterfactuals and causation, and the programme of “Humean supervenience,” according to which everything depends on the local distribution of physical qualities.
الحياة والسياق
Lewis was born in Oberlin, Ohio, in 1941 and wrote his dissertation at Harvard under Quine. After teaching at UCLA he spent the rest of his career at Princeton from 1970, with frequent stays in Australia, which he regarded as a second philosophical home. He died in 2001; his papers, collected in several volumes, are among the most cited in analytic philosophy.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- Convention (1969)
- Counterfactuals (1973)
- Philosophical Papers I–II (1983–86)
يرد في
- نقاش «ما الوعي؟»
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