جورج بيركلي
لا عالم مادي خارج العقول؛ الأشياء لا توجد إلا بقدر ما تُدرَك، والله يدرك كل شيء دائمًا.
التموضع
أن تكون هو أن تُدرَك: لا مادة مستقلة عن العقل.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- الوجود هو الإدراك (Esse est percipi)
- اللامادية
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 2
رينيه ديكارت
تأثّر بـ
Berkeley accepted the Cartesian starting point that we immediately perceive only our ideas, but used it to deny the material world Descartes had tried to prove (Principles, 1710). G. Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710); Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713); SEP “George Berkeley”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
رينيه ديكارت › 1596–1650
نيكولا مالبرانش
تأثّر بـ ✓
Like Malebranche, Berkeley made God the cause of our ideas of sense, but in the Three Dialogues (1713) he distinguished his view from seeing all things in God. G. Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713); Philosophical Commentaries (1707–08); SEP “George Berkeley”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في Wikidata · Wikidata
نيكولا مالبرانش › 1638–1715
أثّر في 2
ديفيد هيوم
أثّر في ✓
Hume adopted Berkeley’s account of abstract ideas as particular ideas that stand for others, praising it as a ‘valuable discovery’ (Treatise, 1739). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), “Of abstract ideas”; G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Introduction; SEP “David Hume”
ديفيد هيوم › 1711–1776
تشارلز ساندرز برس
أثّر في ✓
Peirce reviewed Fraser’s edition of Berkeley’s Works (1871) and later, writing to James (1903), gave Berkeley more right than anyone to be called the introducer of pragmatism. C. S. Peirce, review of A. C. Fraser (ed.), The Works of George Berkeley, North American Review (1871); letter to W. James (1903); L. Friedman, “Pragmatism: The Unformulated Method of Bishop Berkeley”, Journal of the History of Philosophy (2003)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في Wikidata · Wikidata
تشارلز ساندرز برس › 1839–1914
النقد
انتقده 5
توماس ريد
انتقده
Reid traced Berkeley’s denial of matter to the ‘ideal system’, the assumption that we perceive only ideas, which he rejected for common-sense direct realism (Inquiry, 1764). T. Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), Dedication, ch. I; Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), II.10; SEP “Thomas Reid”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
توماس ريد › 1710–1796
دنيس ديدرو
انتقده
In the Letter on the Blind (1749) Diderot called Berkeley’s idealism the most absurd of all systems, yet the hardest to combat. D. Diderot, Lettre sur les aveugles (1749); SEP “Denis Diderot”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
دنيس ديدرو › 1713–1784
إيمانويل كانط
انتقده
Kant set his transcendental idealism apart from Berkeley’s ‘dogmatic’ idealism, which he said degrades bodies to mere illusion (Critique of Pure Reason, 1787, B 71, B 274). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787), B 69–71, B 274; Prolegomena (1783), Appendix; SEP “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إيمانويل كانط › 1724–1804
ماري شيبرد
انتقده
Against Berkeley, Shepherd held that reason infers external objects as continuing causes of our sensations (Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, 1827). M. Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe (1827); SEP “Mary Shepherd”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ماري شيبرد › 1777–1847
جورج إدوارد مور
انتقده
In ‘The Refutation of Idealism’ (1903) Moore attacked the principle esse est percipi, distinguishing the act of awareness from its object, which need not exist only when perceived. G. E. Moore, “The Refutation of Idealism”, Mind 12 (1903), 433–453; G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), § 3
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جورج إدوارد مور › 1873–1958
ينتقد 3
جون لوك تأثّر بـ
تأثّر بـ ✓
In the New Theory of Vision (1709) Berkeley took up Molyneux’s question from Locke’s Essay, agreeing with Locke’s negative answer and building his theory of vision on it. G. Berkeley, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709); J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (2nd ed., 1694); SEP “Molyneux’s Problem”
انتقد
Berkeley rejected Locke’s abstract general ideas – a triangle neither oblique nor right-angled – and his distinction of primary and secondary qualities (Principles, 1710). G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Introduction §§6–20, Part I §§9–15; J. Locke, Essay IV.vii.9; SEP “George Berkeley”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جون لوك › 1632–1704
إسحاق نيوتن
انتقد
Berkeley attacked Newton’s fluxions as ‘ghosts of departed quantities’ (The Analyst, 1734) and rejected absolute space and motion (Principles, 1710, §§110–117; De motu, 1721). G. Berkeley, The Analyst (1734), §35; Principles (1710), §§110–117; De motu (1721); SEP “George Berkeley”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إسحاق نيوتن › 1643–1727
برنارد ماندفيل
انتقد
Berkeley’s Alciphron (1732, Dialogue II) attacked Mandeville’s thesis that private vices are public benefits, voiced by the free-thinker Lysicles; Mandeville replied in A Letter to Dion. G. Berkeley, Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1732), Dialogue II; B. Mandeville, A Letter to Dion (1732)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
برنارد ماندفيل › 1670–1733
الأعمال
«أن يوجد هو أن يُدرَك» (Esse est percipi) – المادة افتراض زائد.
الموقف
Berkeley pushed Locke’s empiricism to a surprising conclusion: there is no matter existing independently of minds. Everything we know of things are ideas – colours, shapes, sounds – and an idea can only exist in being perceived: to be is to be perceived (esse est percipi). The notion of an unperceived material substance is not only unprovable but incoherent. Yet the world does not vanish when we look away, because God perceives everything constantly and produces in us the orderly ideas we call nature. Berkeley meant this to defeat scepticism and atheism. His immaterialism forced every later empiricist, from Hume to Mill, to confront the question of the external world.
الحياة والسياق
Born in 1685 near Kilkenny in Ireland, Berkeley studied and taught at Trinity College, Dublin, where he wrote his main philosophical works while still in his twenties. He travelled in Europe and spent three years in Rhode Island pursuing a plan to found a college in Bermuda. From 1734 he was Anglican bishop of Cloyne. He died in Oxford in 1753.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709)
- A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710)
- Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713)
- Alciphron (1732)
- Siris (1744)
بحسب الوضع في نوفمبر 2026 · المصادر · حسّن هذه الصفحة · كيف صُنع Agora