Agoraساحة مفتوحة للفكر

ديريك بارفيت

1942–2017

مدخل أولتبسيط مقصود – واللمحة تقول أكثر

الهوية الشخصية عبر الزمن ليست ما يهم – ورؤية ذلك تجعلنا نهتم بالآخرين أكثر ونخشى الموت أقل.

التموضع

الفلسفة التحليلية · شرق آسيا · الأخلاق, الوجود والذات

«الأسباب والأشخاص»: الهوية الشخصية ليست ما يهم.

الأفكار الرئيسة

  • اختزالية الأشخاص
  • الاستنتاج البغيض

افتح في خريطة النجوم

التأثير

تأثّر بـ 4

  • غوتاما بودا

    تأثّر بـ

    Parfit added an appendix “Buddha’s View” to Reasons and Persons (1984), quoting Buddhist texts to show that the Buddha had held the reductionist view of persons he defends. D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984), Appendix J “Buddha’s View”

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    غوتاما بودا › نحو 480–400 ق.م · يُؤرَّخ عرفًا 563–483 ق.م

  • جون لوك

    تأثّر بـ

    Parfit developed Locke’s memory criterion into psychological continuity – overlapping chains of memories, intentions and character – and asked whether identity is what matters (Reasons and Persons, 1984). D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984); J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (2nd ed., 1694), “Of Identity and Diversity”; SEP “Locke on Personal Identity”

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    جون لوك › 1632–1704

  • ديفيد هيوم

    تأثّر بـ

    Parfit’s reductionism about persons – identity is psychological and physical continuity, no further fact – is commonly compared with Hume’s bundle view (Reasons and Persons, 1984). D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984); D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), “Of personal identity”; SEP “Personal Identity”

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    ديفيد هيوم › 1711–1776

  • هنري سيدجويك

    تأثّر بـ

    Parfit took up Sidgwick’s ‘dualism of practical reason’ between egoism and impartial benevolence and sought to resolve it (Reasons and Persons, 1984; On What Matters, 2011). D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984); On What Matters (2011); H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1874); SEP “Henry Sidgwick”

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    هنري سيدجويك › 1838–1900

أثّر في 2

  • نيك بوستروم

    أثّر في

    Bostrom used Parfit’s comparison of a war killing 99 per cent of humanity with one killing everyone to argue that reducing existential risk is a global priority (2013). N. Bostrom, “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority”, Global Policy 4 (2013); D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    نيك بوستروم › وُلد 1973

  • ويليام ماكسكيل

    أثّر في

    MacAskill built on Parfit’s population ethics, including the repugnant conclusion and the value of future generations, in his case for longtermism (What We Owe the Future, 2022). W. MacAskill, What We Owe the Future (2022); D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    ويليام ماكسكيل › وُلد 1987

النقد

ينتقد 1

  • بيرنارد وليمز

    انتقد

    Parfit rejected Williams’s view that all reasons are internal, grounded in motivations: reasons are given by facts that count in favour of acting (On What Matters, 2011). D. Parfit, “Reasons and Motivation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 71 (1997); On What Matters (2011), vol. 1; B. Williams, “Internal and External Reasons” (1980)

    التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي

    بيرنارد وليمز › 1929–2003

الأعمال

الموقف

In Reasons and Persons Parfit used thought experiments involving teleportation and brain division to argue that personal identity is not a deep further fact. A person is nothing over and above a body, a brain and psychological connections such as memory and character. What matters is this psychological continuity, which comes in degrees – and Parfit found this liberating, as the wall between himself and others became thinner. Its last part became a starting point of population ethics. There Parfit showed that principles which seem plausible imply the “Repugnant Conclusion”: for any population of people who all live very good lives, a much larger population whose lives are barely worth living would be better. The conclusion follows from premises that are hard to reject, yet it strikes most people, Parfit included, as unacceptable; he spent decades looking for a way out. His late work On What Matters argued that Kantians, consequentialists and contractualists are “climbing the same mountain on different sides.”

الحياة والسياق

Parfit was born in 1942 in Chengdu, China, to British medical missionaries and grew up in Oxford. He first studied history before turning to philosophy. Almost his entire career was spent at All Souls College, Oxford, with regular visiting positions at Harvard, New York University and Rutgers. He was famous for working on his books with extreme perfectionism for many years.

أعمال رئيسة أخرى

  • Personal Identity (1971)

يرد في

المصادر: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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