Andy Clark

Agora

Andy Clark

ur. 1957

Pierwsze przybliżeniecelowe uproszczenie – portret mówi więcej

Umysł nie kończy się na czaszce – notesy, telefony i narzędzia mogą być częścią naszego myślenia – a mózg jest przede wszystkim maszyną przewidującą.

Umiejscowienie

Filozofia analityczna · Europa Północna · Umysł i świadomość, Nauka, Epistemologia

Filozof nauk kognitywnych z Sussex: umysł wykracza poza czaszkę w notesy i narzędzia – jesteśmy „urodzonymi cyborgami” – a mózg jest maszyną przewidującą.

Kluczowe idee

Rozszerzony umysł (z Chalmersem)
Ucieleśnione poznanie
Przetwarzanie predykcyjne

Otwórz na mapie gwiazd

Wpływ

Pod wpływem 4

Martin Heidegger

pod wpływem
Clark drew on Heidegger’s analysis of ready-to-hand equipment, used fluently without being represented, for his action-oriented account of embodied cognition (Being There, 1997). A. Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (1997); M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1927); SEP “Embodied Cognition”
Źródło: szkic AI
Martin Heidegger › 1889–1976
Lew Wygotski

pod wpływem
Clark took up Vygotsky’s view of speech as a tool that guides thought, treating public language as external scaffolding for cognition (Being There, 1997). A. Clark, Being There (1997); L. S. Vygotsky, Myshlenie i rech’ (1934; Engl. Thought and Language, 1962)
Źródło: szkic AI
Lew Wygotski › 1896–1934
Maurice Merleau-Ponty

pod wpływem
Clark took up Merleau-Ponty’s view of the body as the subject of skilled engagement with the world for an embodied, action-oriented cognitive science (Being There, 1997). A. Clark, Being There (1997); M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (1945); SEP “Embodied Cognition”
Źródło: szkic AI
Maurice Merleau-Ponty › 1908–1961
Daniel Dennett

pod wpływem
Clark took up Dennett’s picture of words as tools that augment cognition, treating public language as an external artefact that reshapes the brain’s computational tasks (‘Magic Words’, 1998). A. Clark, “Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation”, in P. Carruthers and J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought (1998); D. C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995)
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Daniel Dennett › 1942–2024

Krytyka

Krytykuje 2

Kartezjusz

krytykuje
Clark rejected the Cartesian picture of the mind as an inner, disembodied reasoner: cognition is embodied and can extend into tools and environment (Being There, 1997). A. Clark, Being There (1997); A. Clark & D. J. Chalmers, “The Extended Mind”, Analysis 58 (1998); Supersizing the Mind (2008)
Źródło: szkic AI
Kartezjusz › 1596–1650
Jerry Alan Fodor

krytykuje
Clark defended connectionist models against Fodor and Pylyshyn’s claim that only a classical language of thought can explain the systematicity of cognition (Microcognition, 1989). A. Clark, Microcognition (1989); Associative Engines (1993); J. Fodor & Z. Pylyshyn, “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture”, Cognition 28 (1988)
Źródło: szkic AI
Jerry Alan Fodor › 1935–2017

Stanowisko

Clark is a leading advocate of the view that cognition is embodied, embedded and extended. “Being There”, drawing on robotics and developmental psychology as well as on Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, argued that minds evolved not to build detailed inner models of the world but to guide action, letting the body and the environment do part of the work. “The Extended Mind”, written with David Chalmers, argued that when an external resource plays the same role as an inner process – Otto’s notebook standing in for Inga’s biological memory – it is literally part of the mind. “Natural-Born Cyborgs” holds that humans have always been cyborgs, creatures whose thinking incorporates tools, from writing to smartphones. His later work champions predictive processing: the brain is fundamentally a prediction machine that constantly anticipates incoming signals and learns from its errors, so that perception is a kind of controlled hallucination checked by the senses, and action a way of making predictions come true. “The Experience Machine” draws out what this means for pain, placebo effects, mental health and self-knowledge.

Życie i kontekst

Andy Clark (born 1957 in London) studied at the University of Stirling, where he took his doctorate in 1984. He taught at Glasgow and Sussex, directed the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology programme at Washington University in St. Louis from 1993 and the cognitive science programme at Indiana University from 2002, and in 2004 became professor of logic and metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh. Since 2019 he has been professor of cognitive philosophy at the University of Sussex. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and in 2025 he received the inaugural Dennett Prize.