Charles Sanders Peirce
Znaczenie idei leży w jej praktycznych skutkach, a wiedza rośnie dzięki wspólnocie badaczy, która sama się sprawdza i poprawia.
Umiejscowienie
Twórca pragmatyzmu i semiotyki: znaczenie pojęcia leży w jego praktycznych konsekwencjach.
Kluczowe idee
- Maksyma pragmatyczna
- Semiotyka
- Abdukcja
- Fallibilizm
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 4
Arystoteles
pod wpływem
Peirce took his term ‘abduction’ for inference to an explanatory hypothesis from Aristotle’s apagoge in the Prior Analytics, setting it beside deduction and induction. Aristotle, Prior Analytics; SEP “Abduction”; SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
Źródło: szkic AI
Arystoteles › 384–322 p.n.e.
Jan Duns Szkot
pod wpływem
Peirce called himself a Scotistic realist, defending against nominalism the reality of generals, and adapted Scotus’s haecceity, ‘thisness’, for his category of Secondness. J. F. Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism (1963); C. S. Peirce, review of Fraser’s Berkeley (1871); SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
Źródło: szkic AI
Jan Duns Szkot › ok. 1266–1308
George Berkeley
pod wpływem ✓
Peirce reviewed Fraser’s edition of Berkeley’s Works (1871) and later, writing to James (1903), gave Berkeley more right than anyone to be called the introducer of pragmatism. C. S. Peirce, review of A. C. Fraser (ed.), The Works of George Berkeley, North American Review (1871); letter to W. James (1903); L. Friedman, “Pragmatism: The Unformulated Method of Bishop Berkeley”, Journal of the History of Philosophy (2003)
Źródło: także w Wikidanych · Wikidata
George Berkeley › 1685–1753
Immanuel Kant
pod wpływem
Peirce studied the Critique of Pure Reason for years in his youth and took the name ‘pragmatism’ from Kant’s distinction between pragmatisch and praktisch (‘What Pragmatism Is’, 1905). C. S. Peirce, “What Pragmatism Is”, The Monist (1905); SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
Źródło: szkic AI
Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804
Wpływ na 5
William James
wpływ na
In ‘Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results’ (1898) James credited Peirce’s ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ (1878) with the principle of pragmatism and made it widely known. W. James, “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results” (1898); C. S. Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878); SEP “Pragmatism”
Źródło: szkic AI
William James › 1842–1910
John Dewey
wpływ na
Dewey heard Peirce at Johns Hopkins and built Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) on Peirce’s account of inquiry as the passage from doubt to settled belief. J. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938); C. S. Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief” (1877); SEP “John Dewey”
Źródło: szkic AI
John Dewey › 1859–1952
Wilfrid Sellars
wpływ na
Sellars took over Peirce’s idea of truth as the ideal end of inquiry, calling the final conceptual framework of science ‘Peirceish’ (Science and Metaphysics, 1968). W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (1968); SEP “Wilfrid Sellars”; SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Wilfrid Sellars › 1912–1989
Jürgen Habermas
wpływ na
In Knowledge and Human Interests (1968) Habermas read Peirce’s logic of inquiry as uncovering the technical interest that guides the empirical sciences. J. Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse (1968); SEP “Jürgen Habermas”
Źródło: szkic AI
Jürgen Habermas › 1929–2026
Umberto Eco
wpływ na ✓
Eco took Peirce’s interpretant and unlimited semiosis, every sign interpreted by further signs, as the basis of his general semiotics (Trattato di semiotica generale, 1975). U. Eco, Trattato di semiotica generale (1975); Lector in fabula (1979); SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
Źródło: także w Wikidanych · Wikidata
Umberto Eco › 1932–2016
Krytyka
Krytykuje 1
Kartezjusz
krytykuje
Peirce rejected Cartesian doubt – ‘let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts’ (‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’, 1868). C. S. Peirce, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”, Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2 (1868); SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
Źródło: szkic AI
Kartezjusz › 1596–1650
Dzieła
Nie możemy zaczynać od całkowitej wątpliwości – przeciw kartezjanizmowi.
Maksyma pragmatyczna.
Stanowisko
Peirce is the founder of pragmatism, though he later renamed his version “pragmaticism” to distinguish it from James’. His pragmatic maxim says that the meaning of a concept lies in the practical effects we conceive its object to have. Inquiry begins not with Cartesian doubt but with real doubt, and aims to fix belief; truth is what a community of inquirers would ultimately agree on. All knowledge is fallible. Beyond induction and deduction he identified abduction, the inventive inference to the best hypothesis. He also founded modern semiotics, with his theory of signs as icon, index and symbol, and in logic devised a notation for quantifiers independently of Frege.
Życie i kontekst
The son of a Harvard mathematician, Peirce worked for three decades as a scientist for the US Coast Survey and taught logic only briefly at Johns Hopkins University. With William James and others he belonged to the “Metaphysical Club” in Cambridge. Difficult and unconventional, he never held a permanent professorship and died in poverty in Milford, Pennsylvania, leaving thousands of manuscript pages.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- The Fixation of Belief (1877)
- What Pragmatism Is (1905)
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