Richard Rorty
Umysł nie jest zwierciadłem rzeczywistości; filozofia powinna porzucić poszukiwanie fundamentów i stać się rozmową, która sprzyja solidarności.
Umiejscowienie
Zwierciadło natury pęka: filozofia powinna być nie fundamentem, lecz rozmową.
Kluczowe idee
- Antyreprezentacjonizm
- Liberalna ironia
- Solidarność zamiast obiektywności
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 9
William James
pod wpływem
In Consequences of Pragmatism (1982) Rorty made James’s ‘what is good in the way of belief’ the core of a pragmatism without a theory of truth. R. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (1982), Introduction; W. James, Pragmatism (1907); SEP “Richard Rorty”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
William James › 1842–1910
John Dewey
pod wpływem ✓
Rorty set Dewey beside Wittgenstein and Heidegger as models of a philosophy that gives up the mind as mirror of nature (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979). R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); SEP “Richard Rorty”
John Dewey › 1859–1952
Martin Heidegger
pod wpływem ✓
Rorty read Heidegger’s history of metaphysics as an ally of pragmatism against foundationalism, while rejecting his nostalgia for Being (‘Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey’, 1976). R. Rorty, “Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey” (1976), in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); Essays on Heidegger and Others (1991); SEP “Richard Rorty”
Martin Heidegger › 1889–1976
Ludwig Wittgenstein
pod wpływem
Rorty took from the later Wittgenstein the idea of philosophy as therapy, not theory, and read him as dissolving rather than solving traditional problems (‘Keeping Philosophy Pure’, 1976). R. Rorty, “Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay on Wittgenstein” (1976), in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); SEP “Richard Rorty”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951
Hans-Georg Gadamer
pod wpływem
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) Rorty took Gadamer’s notion of Bildung as a model for ‘edifying’ philosophy, with hermeneutics in place of epistemology. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), “Hermeneutics and Edification”; H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (1960); SEP “Richard Rorty”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Hans-Georg Gadamer › 1900–2002
Willard Van Orman Quine
pod wpływem
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) Rorty combined Quine’s attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction with Sellars’s on the Given to argue for epistemological behaviourism. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951); SEP “Richard Rorty”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Willard Van Orman Quine › 1908–2000
Pokaż wszystko (9)Pokaż mniej
Wilfrid Sellars
pod wpływem
Rorty took Sellars’s critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’ (1956) as a key argument against foundationalism, later introducing the 1997 edition of the essay. W. Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956), introd. R. Rorty (1997); R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); SEP “Richard Rorty”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Wilfrid Sellars › 1912–1989
Donald Davidson
pod wpływem
Rorty read Davidson’s rejection of the scheme–content distinction and his account of truth as support for pragmatism (‘Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth’, 1986), though Davidson declined the label. R. Rorty, “Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth” (1986), in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991); D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); SEP “Richard Rorty”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Donald Davidson › 1917–2003
Gianni Vattimo
pod wpływem
Rorty found in Vattimo’s ‘weak thought’ and his reading of secularisation as the fulfilment of Christianity an ally of post-metaphysical liberalism (The Future of Religion, 2005). R. Rorty and G. Vattimo, The Future of Religion, ed. S. Zabala (2005); SEP “Richard Rorty”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Gianni Vattimo › 1936–2023
Krytyka
Krytyka ze strony 1
Enrique Dussel
krytyka ze strony
In The Underside of Modernity (1996), after their debate in the early 1990s, Dussel objected to Rorty’s pragmatism that its “we” of liberal ironists cannot hear the interpellation of the excluded Other, the starting point of a philosophy of liberation. E. Dussel, The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation (1996, ed. and tr. E. Mendieta); Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty y la filosofía de la liberación (1993)
Źródło: szkic AI
Enrique Dussel › 1934–2023
Krytykuje 4
Kartezjusz
krytykuje
Rorty argued that Descartes invented the mind as an inner mirror of nature, founding a philosophy centred on epistemology (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979, ch. 1). R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), ch. 1; SEP “Richard Rorty”
Źródło: szkic AI
Kartezjusz › 1596–1650
Immanuel Kant
krytykuje
Rorty held that Kant turned philosophy into a tribunal of pure reason and made epistemology the foundation of culture (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979, ch. 3). R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Introduction, ch. 3
Źródło: szkic AI
Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804
Clifford Geertz
krytykuje
Against Geertz’s warning, Rorty defended ethnocentrism: a liberal culture can only start from its own beliefs, but is distinguished by widening its sympathies (‘On Ethnocentrism’, 1986). R. Rorty, “On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz”, Michigan Quarterly Review 25 (1986); in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991), 203–210; C. Geertz, “The Uses of Diversity” (1986)
Źródło: szkic AI
Clifford Geertz › 1926–2006
Umberto Eco
krytykuje
Rorty rejected Eco’s distinction between interpreting and using a text, holding that all readings simply put texts to use (‘The Pragmatist’s Progress’, in Eco, Interpretation and Overinterpretation, 1992). R. Rorty, “The Pragmatist’s Progress”, in U. Eco et al., Interpretation and Overinterpretation (1992; Tanner Lectures, Cambridge 1990)
Źródło: szkic AI
Umberto Eco › 1932–2016
Dzieła
Pożegnanie z epistemologią jako „zwierciadłem” rzeczywistości.
Liberalny ironista: prywatne tworzenie siebie, publiczne unikanie okrucieństwa.
Stanowisko
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Rorty attacked the idea that the mind or language mirrors reality and that philosophy’s task is to secure the foundations of knowledge. Knowledge, he argued, is a matter of justification within a community, not of correspondence with the world. Drawing on Dewey, Wittgenstein and Heidegger, he urged philosophy to give up the search for ultimate truth and become an edifying conversation. His ideal is the “liberal ironist”, who knows that her deepest beliefs are contingent yet holds that cruelty is the worst thing we do. Solidarity should replace objectivity as the goal. He revived pragmatism and sparked fierce debates.
Życie i kontekst
Rorty grew up in New York as the son of left-wing writers, entered the University of Chicago at fifteen and earned his doctorate at Yale. He taught at Princeton, then at the University of Virginia and Stanford, increasingly outside philosophy departments. As a provocative public intellectual he became one of the best-known American philosophers of his time.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)
- Consequences of Pragmatism (1982)
- Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989)
- Achieving Our Country (1998)
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