Gilbert Ryle
Umysł nie jest duchem ukrytym w ciele; mieć umysł to mieć zdolności i skłonności do inteligentnego działania, a nie ukrytą wewnętrzną scenę.
Umiejscowienie
Krytyka kartezjańskiego „ducha w maszynie”: mówienie o umyśle jest mówieniem o zdolnościach i dyspozycjach do inteligentnego działania, a nie o ukrytym wewnętrznym teatrze.
Kluczowe idee
- Duch w maszynie
- Błąd kategorialny
- Wiedzieć jak a wiedzieć, że
Uczniowie: Alfred Jules Ayer, Kwasi Wiredu, Daniel Dennett
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 2
Edmund Husserl
pod wpływem
Ryle studied Husserl’s Logical Investigations in the 1920s, lectured on Brentano, Meinong and Husserl, and read phenomenology as a form of conceptual analysis (‘Phenomenology’, 1932). G. Ryle, “Phenomenology”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 11 (1932); “Autobiographical”, in O. P. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds.), Ryle (1970); SEP “Gilbert Ryle”
Źródło: szkic AI
Edmund Husserl › 1859–1938
Ludwig Wittgenstein
pod wpływem
Ryle, who knew Wittgenstein from 1929, shared his view of philosophy as dissolving conceptual confusions and paid tribute to his method (‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’, 1951). G. Ryle, “Ludwig Wittgenstein”, Analysis 12 (1951); “Autobiographical”, in O. P. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds.), Ryle (1970); SEP “Gilbert Ryle”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951
Wpływ na 5
Alfred Jules Ayer uczeń/uczennica
uczeń/uczennica ✓
Ryle was Ayer’s tutor at Christ Church, Oxford (1929–32), and suggested that he spend 1932–33 in Vienna with the Vienna Circle, the background to Language, Truth and Logic (1936). A. J. Ayer, Part of My Life (1977)
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Alfred Jules Ayer › 1910–1989
J.J.C. Smart
wpływ na
Smart, who studied with Ryle at Oxford, held a Rylean behaviourism at Adelaide until Place persuaded him that sensations are brain processes (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, 1959). J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
J.J.C. Smart › 1920–2012
Clifford Geertz
wpływ na
Geertz took Ryle’s distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ description – twitch, wink, parodied wink – as the model of ethnography as interpretation (‘Thick Description’, 1973). C. Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture”, in The Interpretation of Cultures (1973); G. Ryle, “The Thinking of Thoughts: What is ‘Le Penseur’ Doing?” (1968); SEP “Gilbert Ryle”
Źródło: szkic AI
Clifford Geertz › 1926–2006
Kwasi Wiredu uczeń/uczennica
uczeń/uczennica
Wiredu came to University College, Oxford, in 1958 for the BPhil; his thesis, ‘Knowledge, Truth and Reason’, was supervised by Ryle, with Strawson as his college tutor. University College Oxford, obituary notice for K. Wiredu (2022)
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Kwasi Wiredu › 1931–2022
Daniel Dennett uczeń/uczennica
uczeń/uczennica
Dennett wrote his Oxford DPhil (1965) under Ryle; the revised thesis became Content and Consciousness (1969). D. C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (1969), preface; I’ve Been Thinking (2023)
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Daniel Dennett › 1942–2024
Krytyka
Krytyka ze strony 4
Donald Davidson
krytyka ze strony
Davidson rejected Ryle’s view that motives explain as dispositions, not as causes: a reason explains only if the agent acted because of it (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, 1963). D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949), ch. 4
Źródło: szkic AI
Donald Davidson › 1917–2003
U. T. Place wpływ na
wpływ na
Place, who studied at Oxford under Ryle’s influence, started from Ryle’s treatment of attention and noticing in ‘The Concept of Heed’ (1954), the preliminary to his identity thesis. U. T. Place, “The Concept of Heed”, British Journal of Psychology 45 (1954); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
Źródło: szkic AI
krytyka ze strony
Place accepted Ryle’s dispositional analysis of belief and intelligence but held that consciousness and sensations are inner brain processes (‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, 1956). U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956), 44–50
Źródło: szkic AI
U. T. Place › 1924–2000
Jerry Alan Fodor
krytyka ze strony
Against Ryle’s logical behaviourism Fodor argued that psychology must posit inner mental states that cause behaviour, not mere dispositions to behave (Psychological Explanation, 1968). J. Fodor, Psychological Explanation (1968); “The Mind–Body Problem”, Scientific American 244 (1981)
Źródło: szkic AI
Jerry Alan Fodor › 1935–2017
Jason Stanley
krytyka ze strony
With Williamson, Stanley argued against Ryle that knowing how is a species of knowing that, propositional knowledge of a way to act (‘Knowing How’, 2001). J. Stanley & T. Williamson, “Knowing How”, Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001), 411–444; J. Stanley, Know How (2011); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949), ch. 2
Źródło: szkic AI
Jason Stanley › ur. 1969
Krytykuje 1
Kartezjusz
krytykuje
Ryle called the Cartesian ‘official doctrine’ of mind and body the dogma of the ‘Ghost in the Machine’, a category mistake (The Concept of Mind, 1949). G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949), ch. 1
Źródło: szkic AI
Kartezjusz › 1596–1650
Dzieła
Dogmat ducha w maszynie.
Stanowisko
Ryle attacked what he mockingly called the official doctrine since Descartes: the idea that a person is a body plus an invisible inner theatre, a “ghost in the machine.” This picture, he argued, rests on a category mistake – like a visitor who has seen the colleges and libraries and then asks where the university is. To say someone is intelligent or vain is not to report hidden inner events but to describe dispositions: how they would act and react under various circumstances. Ryle also distinguished “knowing how” from “knowing that”: skill is not the application of memorised propositions. His work paved the way for behaviourist and later functionalist theories of mind.
Życie i kontekst
Ryle was born in Brighton in 1900 and spent virtually his entire academic life in Oxford, from 1945 as Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy. For more than two decades he edited the journal Mind. Together with Austin he made postwar Oxford the centre of ordinary language philosophy, and he trained many philosophers from Britain and abroad.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- Dilemmas (1954)
Pojawia się w
- Podróż „Wątpienie i ja” · Przystanek 9 z 10
- Podróż „Zagadka świadomości” · Przystanek 4 z 10
Stan na listopad 2026 · Źródła · Ulepsz tę stronę · Jak powstaje Agora