George Berkeley
Nie ma świata materialnego poza umysłami; rzeczy istnieją tylko jako postrzegane, a Bóg postrzega wszystko zawsze.
Umiejscowienie
Być to być postrzeganym: nie ma materii niezależnej od umysłu.
Kluczowe idee
- Esse est percipi
- Immaterializm
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 2
Kartezjusz
pod wpływem
Berkeley accepted the Cartesian starting point that we immediately perceive only our ideas, but used it to deny the material world Descartes had tried to prove (Principles, 1710). G. Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710); Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713); SEP “George Berkeley”
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Kartezjusz › 1596–1650
Nicolas Malebranche
pod wpływem ✓
Like Malebranche, Berkeley made God the cause of our ideas of sense, but in the Three Dialogues (1713) he distinguished his view from seeing all things in God. G. Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713); Philosophical Commentaries (1707–08); SEP “George Berkeley”
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Nicolas Malebranche › 1638–1715
Wpływ na 2
David Hume
wpływ na ✓
Hume adopted Berkeley’s account of abstract ideas as particular ideas that stand for others, praising it as a ‘valuable discovery’ (Treatise, 1739). D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), “Of abstract ideas”; G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Introduction; SEP “David Hume”
David Hume › 1711–1776
Charles Sanders Peirce
wpływ na ✓
Peirce reviewed Fraser’s edition of Berkeley’s Works (1871) and later, writing to James (1903), gave Berkeley more right than anyone to be called the introducer of pragmatism. C. S. Peirce, review of A. C. Fraser (ed.), The Works of George Berkeley, North American Review (1871); letter to W. James (1903); L. Friedman, “Pragmatism: The Unformulated Method of Bishop Berkeley”, Journal of the History of Philosophy (2003)
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Charles Sanders Peirce › 1839–1914
Krytyka
Krytyka ze strony 5
Thomas Reid
krytyka ze strony
Reid traced Berkeley’s denial of matter to the ‘ideal system’, the assumption that we perceive only ideas, which he rejected for common-sense direct realism (Inquiry, 1764). T. Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), Dedication, ch. I; Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), II.10; SEP “Thomas Reid”
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Thomas Reid › 1710–1796
Denis Diderot
krytyka ze strony
In the Letter on the Blind (1749) Diderot called Berkeley’s idealism the most absurd of all systems, yet the hardest to combat. D. Diderot, Lettre sur les aveugles (1749); SEP “Denis Diderot”
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Denis Diderot › 1713–1784
Immanuel Kant
krytyka ze strony
Kant set his transcendental idealism apart from Berkeley’s ‘dogmatic’ idealism, which he said degrades bodies to mere illusion (Critique of Pure Reason, 1787, B 71, B 274). I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787), B 69–71, B 274; Prolegomena (1783), Appendix; SEP “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism”
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Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804
Mary Shepherd
krytyka ze strony
Against Berkeley, Shepherd held that reason infers external objects as continuing causes of our sensations (Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, 1827). M. Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe (1827); SEP “Mary Shepherd”
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Mary Shepherd › 1777–1847
George Edward Moore
krytyka ze strony
In ‘The Refutation of Idealism’ (1903) Moore attacked the principle esse est percipi, distinguishing the act of awareness from its object, which need not exist only when perceived. G. E. Moore, “The Refutation of Idealism”, Mind 12 (1903), 433–453; G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), § 3
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George Edward Moore › 1873–1958
Krytykuje 3
John Locke pod wpływem
pod wpływem ✓
In the New Theory of Vision (1709) Berkeley took up Molyneux’s question from Locke’s Essay, agreeing with Locke’s negative answer and building his theory of vision on it. G. Berkeley, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709); J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (2nd ed., 1694); SEP “Molyneux’s Problem”
krytykuje
Berkeley rejected Locke’s abstract general ideas – a triangle neither oblique nor right-angled – and his distinction of primary and secondary qualities (Principles, 1710). G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Introduction §§6–20, Part I §§9–15; J. Locke, Essay IV.vii.9; SEP “George Berkeley”
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John Locke › 1632–1704
Isaac Newton
krytykuje
Berkeley attacked Newton’s fluxions as ‘ghosts of departed quantities’ (The Analyst, 1734) and rejected absolute space and motion (Principles, 1710, §§110–117; De motu, 1721). G. Berkeley, The Analyst (1734), §35; Principles (1710), §§110–117; De motu (1721); SEP “George Berkeley”
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Isaac Newton › 1643–1727
Bernard Mandeville
krytykuje
Berkeley’s Alciphron (1732, Dialogue II) attacked Mandeville’s thesis that private vices are public benefits, voiced by the free-thinker Lysicles; Mandeville replied in A Letter to Dion. G. Berkeley, Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1732), Dialogue II; B. Mandeville, A Letter to Dion (1732)
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Bernard Mandeville › 1670–1733
Dzieła
Esse est percipi – materia jest zbędnym założeniem.
Stanowisko
Berkeley pushed Locke’s empiricism to a surprising conclusion: there is no matter existing independently of minds. Everything we know of things are ideas – colours, shapes, sounds – and an idea can only exist in being perceived: to be is to be perceived (esse est percipi). The notion of an unperceived material substance is not only unprovable but incoherent. Yet the world does not vanish when we look away, because God perceives everything constantly and produces in us the orderly ideas we call nature. Berkeley meant this to defeat scepticism and atheism. His immaterialism forced every later empiricist, from Hume to Mill, to confront the question of the external world.
Życie i kontekst
Born in 1685 near Kilkenny in Ireland, Berkeley studied and taught at Trinity College, Dublin, where he wrote his main philosophical works while still in his twenties. He travelled in Europe and spent three years in Rhode Island pursuing a plan to found a college in Bermuda. From 1734 he was Anglican bishop of Cloyne. He died in Oxford in 1753.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709)
- A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710)
- Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713)
- Alciphron (1732)
- Siris (1744)
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