Daniel Dennett
Świadomość nie jest zagadką, lecz dziełem wielu równoległych procesów w mózgu, bez wewnętrznego obserwatora – nie ma wewnętrznego teatru, w którym wszystko się zbiega.
Umiejscowienie
Świadomość da się wyjaśnić: żadnego kartezjańskiego teatru, lecz „wielokrotne wersje robocze”; niebezpieczna idea Darwina.
Kluczowe idee
- Postawa intencjonalna
- Wielokrotne wersje robocze
- Krytyka qualiów
Nauczyciele: Gilbert Ryle, Willard Van Orman Quine
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 5
Karol Darwin
pod wpływem
Dennett read Darwin’s natural selection as an algorithmic process that yields design without a designer, a ‘universal acid’ for traditional ideas of purpose (Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 1995). D. C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (1995); C. Darwin, On the Origin of Species (1859)
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Karol Darwin › 1809–1882
Ludwig Wittgenstein
pod wpływem
Dennett, a student of Ryle, drew on Wittgenstein’s attack on private inner objects in denying that experience has ineffable, intrinsic qualia (‘Quining Qualia’, 1988; Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, “Quining Qualia”, in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science (1988); Consciousness Explained (1991)
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951
Gilbert Ryle nauczyciel(ka)
nauczyciel(ka)
Dennett wrote his Oxford DPhil (1965) under Ryle; the revised thesis became Content and Consciousness (1969). D. C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (1969), preface; I’ve Been Thinking (2023)
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Gilbert Ryle › 1900–1976
Willard Van Orman Quine nauczyciel(ka)
nauczyciel(ka) ✓
Dennett studied with Quine at Harvard (BA 1963) and wrote his senior thesis in critical engagement with him; for his doctorate he went to Ryle in Oxford. D. C. Dennett, I’ve Been Thinking (2023)
Źródło: szkic AI
Willard Van Orman Quine › 1908–2000
Alan Turing
pod wpływem
Dennett defended Turing’s test as a fair criterion (‘Can Machines Think?’, 1985) and paired Turing with Darwin on competence without comprehension (From Bacteria to Bach and Back, 2017). D. C. Dennett, “Can Machines Think?” (1985), in Brainchildren (1998); From Bacteria to Bach and Back (2017); SEP “The Turing Test”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Alan Turing › 1912–1954
Wpływ na 1
Andy Clark
wpływ na
Clark took up Dennett’s picture of words as tools that augment cognition, treating public language as an external artefact that reshapes the brain’s computational tasks (‘Magic Words’, 1998). A. Clark, “Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation”, in P. Carruthers and J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought (1998); D. C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995)
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Andy Clark › ur. 1957
Krytyka
Krytyka ze strony 1
David Chalmers
krytyka ze strony
Chalmers argued that Dennett’s functional account of consciousness addresses only the ‘easy problems’ and denies the explanandum, experience itself (‘Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness’, 1995). D. J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995); The Conscious Mind (1996); reply: D. C. Dennett, “Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness”, JCS 3 (1996)
Źródło: szkic AI
David Chalmers › ur. 1966
Krytykuje 5
Kartezjusz
krytykuje
Dennett attacked the ‘Cartesian Theater’, a central place in the brain where it all comes together for consciousness, surviving as ‘Cartesian materialism’ (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 5; D. C. Dennett & M. Kinsbourne, “Time and the Observer”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1992)
Źródło: szkic AI
Kartezjusz › 1596–1650
John Searle
krytykuje
Dennett called Searle’s Chinese Room an ‘intuition pump’ that directs attention to the rule-following man instead of the whole system (‘The Milk of Human Intentionality’, 1980). D. C. Dennett, “The Milk of Human Intentionality”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980); Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 14
Źródło: szkic AI
John Searle › 1932–2025
Jerry Alan Fodor
krytykuje
Dennett objected to Fodor’s language of thought that ascribing beliefs does not require explicitly stored sentences in the head (‘A Cure for the Common Code?’, 1977). D. C. Dennett, “A Cure for the Common Code?”, Mind 86 (1977), repr. in Brainstorms (1978); The Intentional Stance (1987)
Źródło: szkic AI
Jerry Alan Fodor › 1935–2017
Thomas Nagel
krytykuje
Dennett denied Nagel’s claim that subjective experience escapes objective science: much about what it is like to be a bat can be learned (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 14; T. Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review 83 (1974); Nagel’s reply: “Is Consciousness an Illusion?”, New York Review of Books, 9 March 2017
Źródło: szkic AI
Thomas Nagel › ur. 1937
Frank Jackson
krytykuje
Dennett argued that Jackson’s Mary, knowing all physical facts, would learn nothing on seeing colour and would spot a blue-painted banana as a trick (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 12; F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); Jackson later gave up the argument (“Postscript on Qualia”, 1998)
Źródło: szkic AI
Frank Jackson › ur. 1943
Dzieła
Przypisywanie przekonań to przyjęcie postawy przewidującej.
Żadnego kartezjańskiego teatru – wielokrotne wersje robocze.
Dobór naturalny jako uniwersalny kwas.
Stanowisko
Dennett sought to explain the mind entirely within a scientific, Darwinian world view. With the “intentional stance” he argued that attributing beliefs and desires is a strategy for predicting behaviour that works for people, animals and even chess computers – and that this success is all there is to having beliefs. In Consciousness Explained he rejected the “Cartesian theater,” the idea of a central place in the brain where everything comes together for an inner observer; instead, many parallel processes produce “multiple drafts.” He regarded qualia as a confused notion. In Darwin’s Dangerous Idea he described natural selection as a “universal acid” that dissolves traditional ideas of design and purpose. Dennett also defended a compatibilist account of free will.
Życie i kontekst
Dennett was born in Boston in 1942, studied at Harvard and wrote his doctorate at Oxford under Gilbert Ryle. For more than four decades he taught at Tufts University, where he co-directed the Center for Cognitive Studies. He worked closely with cognitive scientists and biologists and became one of the best-known public intellectuals of his time. He died in 2024.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- Brainstorms (1978)
- Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995)
- Freedom Evolves (2003)
Pojawia się w
- Podróż „Zagadka świadomości” · Przystanek 9 z 10
- Debata „Czy maszyny mogą myśleć lub czuć?”
- Debata „Czym jest świadomość?”
- Debata „Czy jesteśmy wolni? Wolna wola w epoce neurobiologii”
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