卡尔·波普尔
一个理论只有在可能被观察所反驳时才是科学的，而一个自由的社会靠批评而生存，而不是靠关于历史的宏大计划。
定位
批判理性主义：理论不可证实，但可证伪；开放社会反对历史决定论。
核心思想
- 证伪
- 开放社会
- 批判理性主义
学生: 保罗·费耶阿本德
影响
受影响于 5
苏格拉底
受其影响 ✓
Popper took Socrates’ awareness of his ignorance and his critical questioning as the model of critical rationalism, set against Plato’s ‘spell’ (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945). K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. I: The Spell of Plato (1945); SEP “Karl Popper”
苏格拉底 › 公元前470—前399年
大卫·休谟
受其影响
Popper accepted Hume’s argument that induction cannot be logically justified but rejected his psychology of habit, replacing induction with conjecture and falsification (Objective Knowledge, 1972). K. R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934); Objective Knowledge (1972), “Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution of the Problem of Induction”; SEP “Karl Popper”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
大卫·休谟 › 1711–1776
伊曼努尔·康德
受其影响
Popper called demarcation ‘Kant’s problem’ and reinterpreted Kant’s claim that the intellect prescribes its laws to nature: we propose conjectures, which nature may defeat (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934); “Kant’s Critique and Cosmology” (1954), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963); SEP “Karl Popper”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
伊曼努尔·康德 › 1724–1804
阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦
受其影响 ✓
Popper drew his falsifiability criterion from Einstein’s risky prediction of light deflection, tested in 1919, in contrast to Marx, Freud and Adler (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations” (lecture 1953), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963); Unended Quest (1976); SEP “Karl Popper”
阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦 › 1879–1955
阿尔弗雷德·塔斯基
受其影响
Popper credited Tarski, who explained his theory to him in Vienna (1935), with rehabilitating correspondence truth, and built on it his notion of verisimilitude (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (1963); Objective Knowledge (1972); Unended Quest (1976); SEP “Karl Popper”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
阿尔弗雷德·塔斯基 › 1901–1983
影响了 1
阿卜杜勒卡里姆·索鲁什
影响了
Soroush took up Popper’s fallibilism for his theory that religious knowledge, unlike religion itself, is human, historical and revisable (The Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge, 1990). A. Soroush, Qabz va bast-e teorik-e shariat (1990); M. Sadri & A. Sadri (eds.), Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam (2000)
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
阿卜杜勒卡里姆·索鲁什 › 1945年生
批评
受批评于 5
西奥多·W. 阿多诺
受其批评
In the positivism dispute Adorno objected that Popper’s critical rationalism confines criticism to testing hypotheses rather than to society as a contradictory totality (Tübingen, 1961; Der Positivismusstreit, 1969). T. W. Adorno, “Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften” (reply to K. Popper, Tübingen 1961), in Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (1969)
依据: AI 草稿
西奥多·W. 阿多诺 › 1903–1969
托马斯·S. 库恩
受其批评
Kuhn objected to Popper that normal science solves puzzles without testing its paradigm, which single anomalies do not overturn (‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, 1970). T. S. Kuhn, “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970); Popper’s reply “Normal Science and Its Dangers”, ibid.
依据: AI 草稿
托马斯·S. 库恩 › 1922–1996
伊姆雷·拉卡托斯 影响了
影响了 ✓
Lakatos, Popper’s colleague at the LSE from 1960, applied his critical rationalism to mathematics, whose growth he traced through proofs and counterexamples (‘Proofs and Refutations’, 1963–64). I. Lakatos, “Proofs and Refutations”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (1963–64); SEP “Imre Lakatos”
受其批评
Against Popper’s naive falsificationism, Lakatos argued that single refutations decide nothing; research programmes are judged as progressive or degenerating (‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, 1970). I. Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” (1970); “Popper on Demarcation and Induction”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1974)
依据: AI 草稿
伊姆雷·拉卡托斯 › 1922–1974
保罗·费耶阿本德 教过
教过 ✓
Feyerabend came to the London School of Economics in 1952–53 on a British Council scholarship to study with Popper – he had hoped to work with Wittgenstein, who died in 1951 – and defended Popper’s views for some years before turning against them. P. Feyerabend, Killing Time (1995)
依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata
受其批评
Feyerabend argued that Popper’s falsificationism, applied strictly, would have wiped out science, since every theory conflicts with some known facts (Against Method, 1975, ch. 5). P. Feyerabend, Against Method (1975), ch. 5; “Consolations for the Specialist”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970)
依据: AI 草稿
保罗·费耶阿本德 › 1924–1994
尤尔根·哈贝马斯
受其批评
Habermas attacked Popper’s critical rationalism as a ‘positivistically halved rationalism’ that confines reason to method and leaves the choice of values to decision (1963–64, in Der Positivismusstreit, 1969). J. Habermas, “Analytische Wissenschaftstheorie und Dialektik” (1963); “Gegen einen positivistisch halbierten Rationalismus” (1964, reply to H. Albert); both in Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (1969)
依据: AI 草稿
尤尔根·哈贝马斯 › 1929–2026
批评了 9
柏拉图
批评了
Popper read Plato’s ideal state as a closed society and his historicism and holism as an intellectual source of modern totalitarianism (The Spell of Plato, 1945). K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1: The Spell of Plato (1945); critique: R. B. Levinson, In Defense of Plato (1953)
依据: AI 草稿
柏拉图 › 公元前428—前348年
亚里士多德
批评了
Popper attacked Aristotle’s ‘methodological essentialism’, the search for definitions of essences, as a root of Hegelian historicism (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945). K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2 (1945), ch. 11 (“The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism”)
依据: AI 草稿
亚里士多德 › 公元前384—前322年
格奥尔格·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔
批评了
Popper read Hegel as a historicist apologist of the Prussian state whose dialectic prepared modern totalitarianism (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945, vol. 2, ch. 12). K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), vol. 2, ch. 12 “Hegel and the New Tribalism”; critique of this reading: W. Kaufmann, “The Hegel Myth and Its Method”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951)
依据: AI 草稿
格奥尔格·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔 › 1770–1831
卡尔·马克思
批评了
Popper argued that Marx’s historicism claims to predict history; when its prophecies failed, they were reinterpreted, making the theory immune to criticism (The Open Society, 1945). K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), vol. 2; Conjectures and Refutations (1963), ch. 1; The Poverty of Historicism (1957)
依据: AI 草稿
卡尔·马克思 › 1818–1883
西格蒙德·弗洛伊德
批评了
Popper argued that psychoanalysis can interpret any behaviour in its own terms; its constant confirmations show that it cannot be tested (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963, ch. 1). K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (1963), ch. 1 “Science: Conjectures and Refutations”
依据: AI 草稿
西格蒙德·弗洛伊德 › 1856–1939
路德维希·维特根斯坦
批评了
Popper rejected Wittgenstein’s view that there are no genuine philosophical problems, and objected that the Tractatus’ criterion of meaning would also exclude natural laws (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 4, 10; “The Nature of Philosophical Problems and Their Roots in Science” (1952), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963)
依据: AI 草稿
路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951
显示全部 (9)收起
奥托·纽拉特
批评了
Popper welcomed Neurath’s view that protocol sentences are revisable, but objected that without rules for discarding them empiricism is thrown overboard (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), § 26; O. Neurath, “Protokollsätze”, Erkenntnis 3 (1932/33)
依据: AI 草稿
奥托·纽拉特 › 1882–1945
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普
批评了
Popper rejected Carnap’s verifiability criterion of meaning and inductive logic, proposing falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation, not of meaning (‘The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics’, 1963). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 4–6; “The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963), with Carnap’s reply
依据: AI 草稿
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普 › 1891–1970
汉斯·赖欣巴哈
批评了
Popper rejected Reichenbach’s probability logic of induction: no principle of induction can be justified without infinite regress, and hypotheses cannot be assigned probabilities (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 1, 80–81; H. Reichenbach, Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre (1935)
依据: AI 草稿
汉斯·赖欣巴哈 › 1891–1953
作品
立场
Popper started from Hume’s problem of induction: no number of observed white swans proves that all swans are white. Science therefore cannot verify its theories – but it can refute them. A theory is scientific if it forbids something and thus risks being falsified; theories that explain everything, like certain forms of Marxism or psychoanalysis in his view, explain nothing. Knowledge grows through bold conjectures and rigorous attempts at refutation. Popper carried this critical rationalism into politics: against Plato, Hegel and Marx he defended the “open society,” in which institutions can be corrected without bloodshed and no one claims to know the course of history. His ideas influenced scientists and politicians far beyond philosophy.
生平与背景
Popper was born in Vienna in 1902, worked as a teacher and took his doctorate in 1928 with a thesis on the method of the psychology of thought; he stood close to the Vienna Circle without belonging to it. In 1937 he fled the rise of National Socialism to New Zealand, where he wrote The Open Society. From 1946 he taught at the London School of Economics; he was knighted in 1965 and died in London in 1994.
其他主要作品
- The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934)
- The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945)
- The Poverty of Historicism (1957)
- Conjectures and Refutations (1963)
- Objective Knowledge (1972)
出现在
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