托马斯·S. 库恩
科学不是稳步增长的；它在一个共有的框架内工作，直到危机迫使一场革命用新的框架取代它。
定位
科学通过范式转换而发展，而不是通过知识的稳步积累。
核心思想
- 范式
- 科学革命
- 不可通约性
影响
受影响于 4
路德维希·维特根斯坦
受其影响
Kuhn used Wittgenstein’s family resemblance to explain how paradigms can guide research without a shared set of rules (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
依据: AI 草稿
路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951
迈克尔·波兰尼
受其影响 ✓
Kuhn referred to Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge (1958) for tacit knowledge gained through practice rather than rules, on which paradigms as shared exemplars rely (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1958); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
迈克尔·波兰尼 › 1891–1976
让·皮亚杰
受其影响 ✓
Kuhn named Piaget’s studies of the successive worlds of the growing child among the sources of his idea of scientific revolutions (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, preface). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), preface; SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
让·皮亚杰 › 1896–1980
W. V. O. 奎因
受其影响
Kuhn credited Quine with opening for him the puzzles of the analytic–synthetic distinction, a background to his holistic view of scientific concepts (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, preface). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), preface; W. V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
依据: AI 草稿
W. V. O. 奎因 › 1908–2000
影响了 3
保罗·费耶阿本德
影响了
At Berkeley Feyerabend commented on Kuhn’s draft of Structure (letters, 1960–61); both introduced ‘incommensurability’ in 1962, and Feyerabend later criticised Kuhn’s normal science (‘Consolations for the Specialist’, 1970). P. Hoyningen-Huene (ed.), “Two Letters of Paul Feyerabend to Thomas S. Kuhn on a Draft of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 26 (1995); P. K. Feyerabend, “Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism” (1962); “Consolations for the Specialist” (1970); SEP “Paul Feyerabend”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
保罗·费耶阿本德 › 1924–1994
桑德拉·哈丁
影响了
Harding built on the post-Kuhnian view that scientific knowledge is shaped by its historical and social setting to ask about androcentric bias (The Science Question in Feminism, 1986). S. Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (1986); T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); SEP “Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science”
依据: AI 草稿
桑德拉·哈丁 › 1935–2025
布鲁诺·拉图尔
影响了
Latour followed Kuhn’s turn from the logic of science to the practice of scientific communities, but studied laboratories ethnographically rather than paradigms (Laboratory Life, with S. Woolgar, 1979). B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life (1979); B. Latour, Science in Action (1987); T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)
依据: AI 草稿
布鲁诺·拉图尔 › 1947–2022
批评
受批评于 2
唐纳德·戴维森
受其批评
Davidson rejected the incommensurable conceptual schemes he found in Kuhn: an untranslatable language could not be recognised as language (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 47 (1974), 5–20
依据: AI 草稿
唐纳德·戴维森 › 1917–2003
伊姆雷·拉卡托斯
受其批评
Lakatos objected that Kuhn makes theory change a matter of ‘mob psychology’ and proposed rationally reconstructed research programmes instead (‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, 1970). I. Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970), 91–196
依据: AI 草稿
伊姆雷·拉卡托斯 › 1922–1974
批评了 1
卡尔·波普尔
批评了
Kuhn objected to Popper that normal science solves puzzles without testing its paradigm, which single anomalies do not overturn (‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, 1970). T. S. Kuhn, “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970); Popper’s reply “Normal Science and Its Dangers”, ibid.
依据: AI 草稿
卡尔·波普尔 › 1902–1994
作品
- 1962科学革命的结构
常规科学、反常、范式转换。
立场
Kuhn challenged the image of science as a steady accumulation of truths. Most of the time, he argued, scientists practise “normal science”: they solve puzzles within a paradigm – a shared framework of theories, methods and exemplary achievements that is not itself questioned. When anomalies pile up, a crisis can arise, and finally a scientific revolution in which a new paradigm replaces the old, as with Copernicus, Newton or Einstein. Since paradigms define different problems and standards, they are partly “incommensurable”: there is no neutral measure to compare them. Kuhn thus put history and sociology at the centre of philosophy of science; “paradigm shift” became a household word.
生平与背景
Kuhn was born in Cincinnati in 1922 and took his doctorate in physics at Harvard. Teaching science to humanities students led him to the history of science, where he discovered how differently Aristotle had thought about motion. He taught at Harvard, Berkeley, Princeton and MIT; his book on scientific revolutions became one of the most cited academic works of the century.
其他主要作品
- The Copernican Revolution (1957)
- The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)
- The Essential Tension (1977)
截至 2026年11月 · 来源 · 改进本页 · Agora 是如何制作的