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鲁道夫·卡尔纳普

1891–1970

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

形而上学的主张不是错的,而是无意义的,而哲学应当成为对科学语言的逻辑分析。

定位

分析哲学 · 西欧 · 逻辑学, 科学, 语言

逻辑经验主义:通过对语言的逻辑分析来克服形而上学。

核心思想

  • 《世界的逻辑构造》
  • 证实原则
  • 宽容原则

老师: 戈特洛布·弗雷格

学生: 卡尔·古斯塔夫·亨普尔

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影响

受影响于 10

  • 伊曼努尔·康德

    受其影响 ✓

    Carnap kept a Kantian synthetic a priori for the topological structure of intuitive space (Der Raum, 1922); Friedman reads the Aufbau (1928) as recasting neo-Kantian constitution. R. Carnap, Der Raum (1922); Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928); M. Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (1999); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata · InPhO

    伊曼努尔·康德 › 1724–1804

  • 恩斯特·马赫

    受其影响 ✓

    Carnap built the Aufbau (1928) on an autopsychological basis of experiences, in the line of Mach’s analysis of sensations, but took elementary experiences, not sensation elements, as basic. R. Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928); E. Mach, Die Analyse der Empfindungen (1886); SEP “Ernst Mach”; SEP “Rudolf Carnap”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata · InPhO

    恩斯特·马赫 › 1838–1916

  • 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔

    受其影响 ✓

    Carnap grounded intuitive space on Husserl’s eidetic intuition (Wesensschau) in his dissertation (Der Raum, 1922) and attended Husserl’s seminars in Freiburg (1924–25). R. Carnap, Der Raum. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre (1922); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata · InPhO

    埃德蒙德·胡塞尔 › 1859–1938

  • 伯特兰·罗素

    受其影响

    Carnap set Russell’s maxim to replace inferred entities by logical constructions as motto of the Aufbau (1928); reading Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) had launched it. R. Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928); “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); B. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (1914); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    伯特兰·罗素 › 1872–1970

  • 路德维希·维特根斯坦

    受其影响 ✓

    Carnap took from the Tractatus, read in the Vienna Circle, the view that logic consists of tautologies and metaphysics of pseudo-sentences, and met Wittgenstein in 1927–29. R. Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache” (1932); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”; SEP “Vienna Circle”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata

    路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951

  • 阿尔弗雷德·塔斯基

    受其影响 ✓

    After talks with Tarski from 1930, Carnap adopted Tarski’s semantic concept of truth and turned from logical syntax to semantics (Introduction to Semantics, 1942). R. Carnap, Introduction to Semantics (1942); “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”; SEP “Tarski’s Truth Definitions”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata

    阿尔弗雷德·塔斯基 › 1901–1983

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  • 戈特洛布·弗雷格 师从

    师从 ✓

    Carnap attended Frege’s courses in Jena – Begriffsschrift I and II (1910–11, 1913) and Logic in Mathematics (1914) – as one of very few students; he later recalled them as his introduction to modern logic. R. Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963)

    依据: AI 草稿

    戈特洛布·弗雷格 › 1848–1925

  • 奥托·纽拉特

    受其影响

    Carnap adopted Neurath’s physicalism, making physical language the universal language of science (1932), and came round to his view that protocol sentences are revisable. R. Carnap, “Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft”, Erkenntnis 2 (1932); “Über Protokollsätze”, Erkenntnis 3 (1932); O. Neurath, “Protokollsätze”, Erkenntnis 3 (1932); SEP “Otto Neurath”

    依据: AI 草稿

    奥托·纽拉特 › 1882–1945

  • 雅尼娜·霍西亚松-林登鲍姆

    受其影响

    Carnap took up Hosiasson-Lindenbaum’s axioms for a degree of confirmation (‘On Confirmation’, 1940) in his inductive logic (Logical Foundations of Probability, 1950). R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability (1950); J. Hosiasson-Lindenbaum, “On Confirmation”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 5 (1940)

    依据: AI 草稿

    雅尼娜·霍西亚松-林登鲍姆 › 1899–1942

  • 库尔特·哥德尔

    受其影响

    Carnap used Gödel’s arithmetisation to state the syntax of a language within that language and, after the incompleteness results, separated derivability from consequence (Logische Syntax der Sprache, 1934). R. Carnap, Logische Syntax der Sprache (1934); K. Gödel, “Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I”, Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik 38 (1931); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”

    依据: AI 草稿

    库尔特·哥德尔 › 1906–1978

影响了 6

  • 卡尔·古斯塔夫·亨普尔 教过

    教过

    Hempel studied with Carnap, Schlick and Waismann in Vienna in the autumn semester of 1929 and in 1937–38 worked with Carnap at the University of Chicago; his doctorate (Berlin, 1934) was taken elsewhere. SEP “Carl Hempel”

    依据: AI 草稿

    卡尔·古斯塔夫·亨普尔 › 1905–1997

  • A. J. 艾耶尔

    影响了 ✓

    Ayer took up Carnap’s elimination of metaphysics by logical analysis of language and his view of philosophy as a department of logic (Language, Truth and Logic, 1936). A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936); R. Carnap, “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache”, Erkenntnis 2 (1932); SEP “Alfred Jules Ayer”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata

    A. J. 艾耶尔 › 1910–1989

  • 威尔弗里德·塞拉斯

    影响了

    Sellars developed Carnap’s logical syntax and semantics into a ‘pure pragmatics’ of rule-governed language, the frame of his later epistemology (‘Pure Pragmatics and Epistemology’, 1947). W. Sellars, “Pure Pragmatics and Epistemology”, Philosophy of Science 14 (1947); “Autobiographical Reflections” (1975); SEP “Wilfrid Sellars”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    威尔弗里德·塞拉斯 › 1912–1989

  • 唐纳德·戴维森

    影响了 ✓

    Davidson worked through Carnap’s semantics of extension and intension (Schilpp volume, 1963) before replacing meanings with a Tarskian theory of truth (‘Truth and Meaning’, 1967). D. Davidson, “The Method of Extension and Intension”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); “Truth and Meaning”, Synthese 17 (1967); SEP “Donald Davidson”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata

    唐纳德·戴维森 › 1917–2003

  • 希拉里·普特南

    影响了

    Putnam, who worked with Carnap on inductive logic (1953–54), illustrated his conceptual relativity with a ‘Carnapian’ world of three individuals (The Many Faces of Realism, 1987). H. Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (1987); “‘Degree of Confirmation’ and Inductive Logic”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”

    依据: AI 草稿

    希拉里·普特南 › 1926–2016

  • 戴维·刘易斯

    影响了

    Lewis adapted the Ramsey–Carnap method for theoretical terms to define mental states by their causal roles (‘How to Define Theoretical Terms’, 1970; ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, 1972). D. Lewis, “How to Define Theoretical Terms”, Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970); “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972); SEP “David Lewis”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    戴维·刘易斯 › 1941–2001

批评

受批评于 4

  • 苏珊·斯泰宾

    受其批评

    Stebbing rejected Carnap’s logically constructed systems and methodological solipsism, objecting that the positivists put the question of meaning before that of truth (‘Logical Positivism and Analysis’, 1933). L. S. Stebbing, “Logical Positivism and Analysis”, Proceedings of the British Academy 19 (1933); SEP “Susan Stebbing”, §§ 3–4

    依据: AI 草稿

    苏珊·斯泰宾 › 1885–1943

  • 埃诺·凯拉

    受其批评

    In Der logistische Neupositivismus (1930) Kaila argued against Carnap’s Aufbau (1928) that the concepts of science cannot all be constructed from elementary experiences. E. Kaila, Der logistische Neupositivismus. Eine kritische Studie (1930); R. Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928)

    依据: AI 草稿

    埃诺·凯拉 › 1890–1958

  • 卡尔·波普尔

    受其批评

    Popper rejected Carnap’s verifiability criterion of meaning and inductive logic, proposing falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation, not of meaning (‘The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics’, 1963). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 4–6; “The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963), with Carnap’s reply

    依据: AI 草稿

    卡尔·波普尔 › 1902–1994

  • W. V. O. 奎因 影响了

    影响了

    Quine met Carnap in Prague (1933), read Logische Syntax in typescript and presented it in Harvard lectures (1934); he called Carnap his teacher (‘Homage to Rudolf Carnap’, 1970). W. V. Quine, “Lectures on Carnap” (1934), in R. Creath (ed.), Dear Carnap, Dear Van (1990); “Homage to Rudolf Carnap” (1970); SEP “Willard Van Orman Quine”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    受其批评

    In ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951) Quine rejected Carnap’s analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism: statements face the tribunal of experience only as a corporate body. W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951), 20–43; “Carnap and Logical Truth” (1963)

    依据: AI 草稿

    W. V. O. 奎因 › 1908–2000

批评了 1

  • 马丁·海德格尔

    批评了

    Carnap declared sentences such as Heidegger’s ‘The Nothing itself nothings’ pseudo-statements without cognitive content (‘Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache’, Erkenntnis, 1931/32). R. Carnap, “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache”, Erkenntnis 2 (1931/32), 219–241, § 5; M. Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik? (1929)

    依据: AI 草稿

    马丁·海德格尔 › 1889–1976

作品

立场

Carnap wanted to make philosophy as precise as mathematics. In The Logical Structure of the World he attempted to reconstruct all concepts of science step by step from elementary experiences. Metaphysical sentences such as Heidegger’s “Nothing nothings” he declared not false but meaningless: they look like statements yet cannot be checked by any experience. Later his “principle of tolerance” gave the program a liberal turn: one may choose among different logical languages, and the choice is a practical question of usefulness, not of truth. With his work on logical syntax, semantics and inductive probability, Carnap became the central figure of logical empiricism and a teacher of a whole generation of American philosophers, Quine among them.

生平与背景

Carnap was born in 1891 near Wuppertal and studied in Jena, where he heard Gottlob Frege’s lectures on logic. From 1926 he taught in Vienna and became a leading member of the Vienna Circle, then moved to Prague in 1931. In 1935 he emigrated to the United States, teaching in Chicago and later at UCLA until his death in 1970.

其他主要作品

  • The Logical Structure of the World (1928)
  • The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language (1932)
  • The Logical Syntax of Language (1934)
  • Meaning and Necessity (1947)
  • Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology (1950)

出现在

来源: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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