कार्ल पॉपर
कोई सिद्धांत तभी वैज्ञानिक है जब उसे प्रेक्षण द्वारा खंडित किया जा सके, और स्वतंत्र समाज आलोचना से जीता है, इतिहास की भव्य योजनाओं से नहीं।
पृष्ठभूमि
आलोचनात्मक बुद्धिवाद: सिद्धांत सत्यापनीय नहीं, मिथ्याकरणीय होते हैं; इतिहासवाद के विरुद्ध खुला समाज।
मुख्य विचार
- मिथ्याकरण
- खुला समाज
- आलोचनात्मक बुद्धिवाद
शिष्य: पॉल फेएराबेंड
प्रभाव
जिनसे प्रभावित 5
सुकरात
जिनसे प्रभावित ✓
Popper took Socrates’ awareness of his ignorance and his critical questioning as the model of critical rationalism, set against Plato’s ‘spell’ (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945). K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. I: The Spell of Plato (1945); SEP “Karl Popper”
सुकरात › 470–399 ईसा पूर्व
डेविड ह्यूम
जिनसे प्रभावित
Popper accepted Hume’s argument that induction cannot be logically justified but rejected his psychology of habit, replacing induction with conjecture and falsification (Objective Knowledge, 1972). K. R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934); Objective Knowledge (1972), “Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution of the Problem of Induction”; SEP “Karl Popper”
साक्ष्य: InPhO में भी · InPhO
डेविड ह्यूम › 1711–1776
इमानुएल कांट
जिनसे प्रभावित
Popper called demarcation ‘Kant’s problem’ and reinterpreted Kant’s claim that the intellect prescribes its laws to nature: we propose conjectures, which nature may defeat (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934); “Kant’s Critique and Cosmology” (1954), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963); SEP “Karl Popper”
साक्ष्य: InPhO में भी · InPhO
इमानुएल कांट › 1724–1804
अल्बर्ट आइंस्टीन
जिनसे प्रभावित ✓
Popper drew his falsifiability criterion from Einstein’s risky prediction of light deflection, tested in 1919, in contrast to Marx, Freud and Adler (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations” (lecture 1953), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963); Unended Quest (1976); SEP “Karl Popper”
अल्बर्ट आइंस्टीन › 1879–1955
आल्फ्रेड टार्स्की
जिनसे प्रभावित
Popper credited Tarski, who explained his theory to him in Vienna (1935), with rehabilitating correspondence truth, and built on it his notion of verisimilitude (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (1963); Objective Knowledge (1972); Unended Quest (1976); SEP “Karl Popper”
साक्ष्य: InPhO में भी · InPhO
आल्फ्रेड टार्स्की › 1901–1983
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया 1
अब्दुलकरीम सोरूश
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
Soroush took up Popper’s fallibilism for his theory that religious knowledge, unlike religion itself, is human, historical and revisable (The Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge, 1990). A. Soroush, Qabz va bast-e teorik-e shariat (1990); M. Sadri & A. Sadri (eds.), Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam (2000)
साक्ष्य: InPhO में भी · InPhO
अब्दुलकरीम सोरूश › जन्म 1945
आलोचना
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित 5
थियोडोर डब्ल्यू. एडोर्नो
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
In the positivism dispute Adorno objected that Popper’s critical rationalism confines criticism to testing hypotheses rather than to society as a contradictory totality (Tübingen, 1961; Der Positivismusstreit, 1969). T. W. Adorno, “Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften” (reply to K. Popper, Tübingen 1961), in Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (1969)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
थियोडोर डब्ल्यू. एडोर्नो › 1903–1969
थॉमस एस. कुहन
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Kuhn objected to Popper that normal science solves puzzles without testing its paradigm, which single anomalies do not overturn (‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, 1970). T. S. Kuhn, “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970); Popper’s reply “Normal Science and Its Dangers”, ibid.
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
थॉमस एस. कुहन › 1922–1996
इम्रे लक़तोस जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया ✓
Lakatos, Popper’s colleague at the LSE from 1960, applied his critical rationalism to mathematics, whose growth he traced through proofs and counterexamples (‘Proofs and Refutations’, 1963–64). I. Lakatos, “Proofs and Refutations”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (1963–64); SEP “Imre Lakatos”
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Against Popper’s naive falsificationism, Lakatos argued that single refutations decide nothing; research programmes are judged as progressive or degenerating (‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, 1970). I. Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” (1970); “Popper on Demarcation and Induction”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1974)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
इम्रे लक़तोस › 1922–1974
पॉल फेएराबेंड जिन्हें पढ़ाया
जिन्हें पढ़ाया ✓
Feyerabend came to the London School of Economics in 1952–53 on a British Council scholarship to study with Popper – he had hoped to work with Wittgenstein, who died in 1951 – and defended Popper’s views for some years before turning against them. P. Feyerabend, Killing Time (1995)
साक्ष्य: Wikidata में भी · Wikidata
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Feyerabend argued that Popper’s falsificationism, applied strictly, would have wiped out science, since every theory conflicts with some known facts (Against Method, 1975, ch. 5). P. Feyerabend, Against Method (1975), ch. 5; “Consolations for the Specialist”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
पॉल फेएराबेंड › 1924–1994
युर्गन हाबरमास
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Habermas attacked Popper’s critical rationalism as a ‘positivistically halved rationalism’ that confines reason to method and leaves the choice of values to decision (1963–64, in Der Positivismusstreit, 1969). J. Habermas, “Analytische Wissenschaftstheorie und Dialektik” (1963); “Gegen einen positivistisch halbierten Rationalismus” (1964, reply to H. Albert); both in Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (1969)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
युर्गन हाबरमास › 1929–2026
जिनकी आलोचना की 9
प्लेटो
जिनकी आलोचना की
Popper read Plato’s ideal state as a closed society and his historicism and holism as an intellectual source of modern totalitarianism (The Spell of Plato, 1945). K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1: The Spell of Plato (1945); critique: R. B. Levinson, In Defense of Plato (1953)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
प्लेटो › 428–348 ईसा पूर्व
अरस्तू
जिनकी आलोचना की
Popper attacked Aristotle’s ‘methodological essentialism’, the search for definitions of essences, as a root of Hegelian historicism (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945). K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2 (1945), ch. 11 (“The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism”)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
अरस्तू › 384–322 ईसा पूर्व
गेऑर्ग विल्हेल्म फ़्रीडरिश हेगल
जिनकी आलोचना की
Popper read Hegel as a historicist apologist of the Prussian state whose dialectic prepared modern totalitarianism (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945, vol. 2, ch. 12). K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), vol. 2, ch. 12 “Hegel and the New Tribalism”; critique of this reading: W. Kaufmann, “The Hegel Myth and Its Method”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
गेऑर्ग विल्हेल्म फ़्रीडरिश हेगल › 1770–1831
कार्ल मार्क्स
जिनकी आलोचना की
Popper argued that Marx’s historicism claims to predict history; when its prophecies failed, they were reinterpreted, making the theory immune to criticism (The Open Society, 1945). K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), vol. 2; Conjectures and Refutations (1963), ch. 1; The Poverty of Historicism (1957)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
कार्ल मार्क्स › 1818–1883
ज़ीगमुंड फ़्रॉइड
जिनकी आलोचना की
Popper argued that psychoanalysis can interpret any behaviour in its own terms; its constant confirmations show that it cannot be tested (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963, ch. 1). K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (1963), ch. 1 “Science: Conjectures and Refutations”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
ज़ीगमुंड फ़्रॉइड › 1856–1939
लुडविग विट्गेंश्टाइन
जिनकी आलोचना की
Popper rejected Wittgenstein’s view that there are no genuine philosophical problems, and objected that the Tractatus’ criterion of meaning would also exclude natural laws (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 4, 10; “The Nature of Philosophical Problems and Their Roots in Science” (1952), in Conjectures and Refutations (1963)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
लुडविग विट्गेंश्टाइन › 1889–1951
सभी दिखाएँ (9)कम दिखाएँ
ओटो न्यूरथ
जिनकी आलोचना की
Popper welcomed Neurath’s view that protocol sentences are revisable, but objected that without rules for discarding them empiricism is thrown overboard (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), § 26; O. Neurath, “Protokollsätze”, Erkenntnis 3 (1932/33)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
ओटो न्यूरथ › 1882–1945
रुडोल्फ कार्नैप
जिनकी आलोचना की
Popper rejected Carnap’s verifiability criterion of meaning and inductive logic, proposing falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation, not of meaning (‘The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics’, 1963). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 4–6; “The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963), with Carnap’s reply
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
रुडोल्फ कार्नैप › 1891–1970
हान्स राइशनबाख
जिनकी आलोचना की
Popper rejected Reichenbach’s probability logic of induction: no principle of induction can be justified without infinite regress, and hypotheses cannot be assigned probabilities (Logik der Forschung, 1934). K. Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934), §§ 1, 80–81; H. Reichenbach, Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre (1935)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
हान्स राइशनबाख › 1891–1953
कृतियाँ
सत्यापन के बजाय मिथ्याकरणीयता – आगमन की समस्या का हल?
प्लेटो, हेगल और मार्क्स के विरुद्ध: इतिहासवाद स्वतंत्रता को ख़तरे में डालता है।
मत
Popper started from Hume’s problem of induction: no number of observed white swans proves that all swans are white. Science therefore cannot verify its theories – but it can refute them. A theory is scientific if it forbids something and thus risks being falsified; theories that explain everything, like certain forms of Marxism or psychoanalysis in his view, explain nothing. Knowledge grows through bold conjectures and rigorous attempts at refutation. Popper carried this critical rationalism into politics: against Plato, Hegel and Marx he defended the “open society,” in which institutions can be corrected without bloodshed and no one claims to know the course of history. His ideas influenced scientists and politicians far beyond philosophy.
जीवन और संदर्भ
Popper was born in Vienna in 1902, worked as a teacher and took his doctorate in 1928 with a thesis on the method of the psychology of thought; he stood close to the Vienna Circle without belonging to it. In 1937 he fled the rise of National Socialism to New Zealand, where he wrote The Open Society. From 1946 he taught at the London School of Economics; he was knighted in 1965 and died in London in 1994.
अन्य प्रमुख कृतियाँ
- The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934)
- The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945)
- The Poverty of Historicism (1957)
- Conjectures and Refutations (1963)
- Objective Knowledge (1972)
इनमें आता है
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