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Elizabeth Anscombe

1919–2001

Pierwsze przybliżeniecelowe uproszczenie – portret mówi więcej

Nowoczesna etyka mówi o obowiązku bez prawodawcy; powinniśmy wrócić do charakteru i cnoty oraz pytać, co ludzie zamierzają, gdy działają.

Umiejscowienie

Filozofia analityczna · Europa Północna · Etyka, Umysł i świadomość

„Współczesna filozofia moralna” (1958) ożywiła etykę cnót i ukuła termin „konsekwencjalizm”.

Kluczowe idee

  • Intencja
  • Odrodzenie etyki cnót
  • Konsekwencjalizm (sam termin)

Nauczyciele: Ludwig Wittgenstein

Uczniowie: Charles Taylor

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Wpływ

Pod wpływem 3

  • Arystoteles

    pod wpływem ✓

    Anscombe took Aristotle’s practical syllogism as a model of intentional action (Intention, 1957) and urged that ethics start from psychology and the virtues (‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, 1958). G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (1957); “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33 (1958); SEP “Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe”

    Źródło: także w Wikidanych · Wikidata

    Arystoteles › 384–322 p.n.e.

  • Tomasz z Akwinu

    pod wpływem ✓

    Anscombe adopted Aquinas’s account of practical knowledge as ‘the cause of what it understands’ (Intention, 1957) and defended his principle of double effect (‘War and Murder’, 1961). G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (1957); “War and Murder”, in W. Stein (ed.), Nuclear Weapons: A Catholic Response (1961); SEP “Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe”; SEP “Doctrine of Double Effect”

    Źródło: także w Wikidanych · Wikidata

    Tomasz z Akwinu › ok. 1225–1274

  • Ludwig Wittgenstein nauczyciel(ka)

    nauczyciel(ka) ✓

    Anscombe moved to Newnham College, Cambridge, in 1942 as a research student and attended Wittgenstein’s lectures, which she said freed her from phenomenalism; she became one of his closest students, translated the Philosophical Investigations (1953) and was one of his literary executors. SEP “Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe”; R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990)

    Źródło: także w Wikidanych · Wikidata

    Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951

Wpływ na 4

  • Georg Henrik von Wright

    wpływ na

    Von Wright developed Anscombe’s practical syllogism from Intention (1957) into a teleological model of understanding action, set against causal explanation (Explanation and Understanding, 1971). G. H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (1971); G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (1957)

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Georg Henrik von Wright › 1916–2003

  • Philippa Foot

    wpływ na

    Foot took up Anscombe’s call for an ethics of the virtues and her ‘Aristotelian necessities’, grounding moral evaluation in facts about human life (Natural Goodness, 2001). P. Foot, Natural Goodness (2001); G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33 (1958); “On Promising and Its Justice” (1969); SEP “Philippa Foot”

    Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO

    Philippa Foot › 1920–2010

  • Alasdair MacIntyre

    wpływ na

    MacIntyre took up Anscombe’s thesis that the moral ‘ought’ survives from a lost law conception of ethics in diagnosing modern moral discourse (After Virtue, 1981). A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981); G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33 (1958); SEP “Virtue Ethics”

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Alasdair MacIntyre › 1929–2025

  • Charles Taylor uczeń/uczennica

    uczeń/uczennica

    Taylor’s biography at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna names Anscombe, with Isaiah Berlin, as supervisor of his Oxford DPhil (1961), the basis of The Explanation of Behaviour (1964); other accounts name Berlin alone, so her formal role is uncertain. IWM Vienna, “Charles Taylor – Short Biography”; R. Abbey, Charles Taylor (2000)

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Charles Taylor › ur. 1931

Krytyka

Krytyka ze strony 1

  • Donald Davidson

    krytyka ze strony

    Davidson rejected the view, associated with Anscombe’s Intention (1957), that reasons are not causes: rationalisation is a species of causal explanation (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, 1963). D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963), 685–700; G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (1957)

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Donald Davidson › 1917–2003

Krytykuje 3

  • Immanuel Kant

    krytykuje

    Anscombe called Kant’s idea of legislating for oneself absurd and objected that universalisability is useless without a rule on relevant descriptions of an act (‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, 1958). G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33 (1958), 1–19

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804

  • John Stuart Mill

    krytykuje

    Anscombe held that Mill, like Kant, ignores the need to stipulate which description of an act is relevant, so his principle lacks content (‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, 1958). G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33 (1958), 1–19

    Źródło: szkic AI

    John Stuart Mill › 1806–1873

  • Henry Sidgwick

    krytykuje

    Anscombe faulted Sidgwick for denying any moral difference between intended and foreseen consequences, the step that opened the way to what she named ‘consequentialism’ (‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, 1958). G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33 (1958), 1–19; H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1874)

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Henry Sidgwick › 1838–1900

Dzieła

Stanowisko

Anscombe’s short book Intention founded modern action theory: an action is intentional “under a description,” and the question “Why?” – answered with a reason – reveals it. In her essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” she argued that the moral “ought” of duty-based ethics is a relic of a divine law conception that modern philosophers no longer believe in. Without a lawgiver, she suggested, moral philosophy should start again with psychology and the virtues, as in Aristotle. In the same essay she coined the term “consequentialism” for a view she rejected – including the idea that any act might be justified by its good outcomes. Her essay sparked the revival of virtue ethics; Foot and MacIntyre built on it.

Życie i kontekst

Born in Limerick in 1919, Anscombe studied at Oxford, converted to Catholicism and went to Cambridge, where she became one of Wittgenstein’s closest students. She translated the Philosophical Investigations and was one of his literary executors. After many years at Oxford she held Wittgenstein’s former chair in Cambridge from 1970 to 1986. She was married to the philosopher Peter Geach.

Dalsze główne dzieła

  • Intention (1957)
  • An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1959)
  • The First Person (1975)

Źródła: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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