Bernard Williams
Moralności nie da się wcisnąć w uporządkowaną teorię – szczęście kształtuje to, za co jesteśmy obwiniani, a nasze najgłębsze zobowiązania się liczą.
Umiejscowienie
Szczęście moralne, integralność i granice teorii moralnej.
Kluczowe idee
- Szczęście moralne
- Integralność
- Racje wewnętrzne
Uczniowie: Miranda Fricker
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 3
Arystoteles
pod wpływem
Williams began ethics with Socrates’ question how one should live and examined Aristotle’s attempt to ground ethics in human well-being (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 1985). B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985); Shame and Necessity (1993); SEP “Bernard Williams”
Źródło: szkic AI
Arystoteles › 384–322 p.n.e.
Friedrich Nietzsche
pod wpływem ✓
Williams used Nietzsche’s genealogy to explain values through their history, but in vindicating rather than debunking form, for the virtues of truth (Truth and Truthfulness, 2002). B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (2002); “Nietzsche’s Minimalist Moral Psychology” (1993); SEP “Bernard Williams”
Friedrich Nietzsche › 1844–1900
Ludwig Wittgenstein
pod wpływem
Williams asked whether Wittgenstein’s later philosophy implies a transcendental idealism of the first-person plural (‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’, 1974) and discussed Wittgensteinian arguments on thick ethical concepts (1985). B. Williams, “Wittgenstein and Idealism” (1974), in Moral Luck (1981); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985); SEP “Bernard Williams”
Źródło: szkic AI
Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951
Wpływ na 3
Martha Nussbaum
wpływ na
Nussbaum took up Williams’s ‘moral luck’ and his doubts about systematic moral theory in her study of Greek tragedy and ethics (The Fragility of Goodness, 1986). M. C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (1986); B. Williams, “Moral Luck”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 50 (1976)
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Martha Nussbaum › ur. 1947
Miranda Fricker uczeń/uczennica
uczeń/uczennica
Fricker’s Oxford DPhil (1996) was co-supervised by Bernard Williams and Sabina Lovibond; in Epistemic Injustice (2007) she takes up Williams’s genealogical method. M. Fricker, personal website (mirandafricker.com, “About”); M. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice (2007)
Źródło: szkic AI
Miranda Fricker › ur. 1966
Amia Srinivasan
wpływ na
Srinivasan asked when genealogies of belief undermine and when they vindicate, a contrast set out in Williams’s Truth and Truthfulness (2002), and introduced ‘genealogical luck’ (2019). A. Srinivasan, “Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2019); B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness (2002)
Źródło: szkic AI
Amia Srinivasan › ur. 1984
Krytyka
Krytyka ze strony 2
Derek Parfit
krytyka ze strony
Parfit rejected Williams’s view that all reasons are internal, grounded in motivations: reasons are given by facts that count in favour of acting (On What Matters, 2011). D. Parfit, “Reasons and Motivation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 71 (1997); On What Matters (2011), vol. 1; B. Williams, “Internal and External Reasons” (1980)
Źródło: szkic AI
Derek Parfit › 1942–2017
Christine Korsgaard
krytyka ze strony
Korsgaard argued against Williams that motivational scepticism about practical reason depends on content scepticism: if pure practical reason exists, it can motivate (‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, 1986). C. M. Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason”, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), 5–25; B. Williams, “Internal and External Reasons” (1980); Williams’s response in Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (1996)
Źródło: szkic AI
Christine Korsgaard › ur. 1952
Krytykuje 4
Immanuel Kant
krytykuje
Williams objected that Kantian impartiality alienates agents from their attachments: a husband rescuing his wife on impartial grounds has ‘one thought too many’ (‘Persons, Character and Morality’, 1976). B. Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality” (1976), in Moral Luck (1981); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), ch. 10
Źródło: szkic AI
Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804
Jeremy Bentham
krytykuje
Williams argued that utilitarianism as founded by Bentham sums welfare impersonally and leaves no room for agents’ own projects and integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), ch. 5
Źródło: szkic AI
Jeremy Bentham › 1748–1832
John Stuart Mill
krytykuje
Williams’s critique of utilitarianism, aimed chiefly at Smart, extends to Mill’s: it weighs lives impersonally and leaves no place for integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), chs. 5–6
Źródło: szkic AI
John Stuart Mill › 1806–1873
J.J.C. Smart
krytykuje
Answering Smart, Williams argued that utilitarian ‘negative responsibility’ turns agents into channels for the best outcome and attacks their integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973), §§ 3–5 (the cases of George and Jim)
Źródło: szkic AI
J.J.C. Smart › 1920–2012
Dzieła
Smart broni utylitaryzmu czynów, Williams go atakuje – na przykładach chemika George’a i Jima, od którego żąda się, by zastrzelił jednego z dwudziestu jeńców, aby pozostałych dziewiętnastu wyszło na wolność.
Gauguin i kierowca ciężarówki: moralność zależy też od szczęścia.
Przeciw „systemowi moralności” – za gęstymi pojęciami etycznymi.
Stanowisko
Williams was a sharp sceptic of systematic moral theory. Utilitarianism and Kantianism, he argued, look at action from an impersonal standpoint that ignores what gives human lives their shape: personal projects, attachments and integrity. In his famous case of Jim, who is told that if he shoots one villager the other nineteen will be spared, the point is not that the answer is obvious but that the utilitarian ignores what it means for Jim to do it. With the concept of “moral luck” he showed that our moral assessment depends on factors beyond our control. Williams defended “thick” ethical concepts such as cruelty or courage against thin, abstract notions of “ought.” His later work on truthfulness and Greek ethics broadened this into a historically aware philosophy.
Życie i kontekst
Williams was born in Essex in 1929, studied classics and philosophy at Oxford and flew Spitfires in Canada with the Royal Air Force during national service. He taught in London and Cambridge, where he was Knightbridge Professor and Provost of King’s College, then at Berkeley and finally Oxford. He chaired a government committee on obscenity and film censorship and was knighted in 1999.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- Utilitarianism: For and Against (with J. J. C. Smart, 1973)
- Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985)
- Shame and Necessity (1993)
- Truth and Truthfulness (2002)
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