AgoraOtwarty plac myśli

Jerry Alan Fodor

1935–2017

Pierwsze przybliżeniecelowe uproszczenie – portret mówi więcej

Myślenie jest obliczaniem w wewnętrznym języku symboli, a percepcja i język opierają się na wyspecjalizowanych, w dużej mierze wrodzonych modułach.

Umiejscowienie

Filozofia analityczna · Ameryka Północna · Umysł i świadomość, Język, Nauka

Filozof nauk kognitywnych z MIT i Rutgers: myślenie jest obliczaniem na reprezentacjach mentalnych w „języku myśli”; percepcja opiera się na wyspecjalizowanych modułach.

Kluczowe idee

  • Język myśli
  • Komputacyjna teoria umysłu
  • Modularność umysłu
  • Natywizm pojęciowy

Nauczyciele: Hilary Putnam

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Wpływ

Pod wpływem 2

  • Alan Turing

    pod wpływem

    Fodor built his computational theory of mind on Turing’s model of computation: thinking is rule-governed manipulation of symbols in a language of thought (The Language of Thought, 1975). J. A. Fodor, The Language of Thought (1975); The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way (2000); SEP “The Computational Theory of Mind”

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Alan Turing › 1912–1954

  • Hilary Putnam nauczyciel(ka)

    nauczyciel(ka)

    Fodor took his PhD at Princeton in 1960 under Putnam with a dissertation in the philosophy of language, The Uses of ‘Use’. Mathematics Genealogy Project, entry J. A. Fodor (Princeton 1960)

    Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO

    Hilary Putnam › 1926–2016

Krytyka

Krytyka ze strony 2

  • Daniel Dennett

    krytyka ze strony

    Dennett objected to Fodor’s language of thought that ascribing beliefs does not require explicitly stored sentences in the head (‘A Cure for the Common Code?’, 1977). D. C. Dennett, “A Cure for the Common Code?”, Mind 86 (1977), repr. in Brainstorms (1978); The Intentional Stance (1987)

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Daniel Dennett › 1942–2024

  • Andy Clark

    krytyka ze strony

    Clark defended connectionist models against Fodor and Pylyshyn’s claim that only a classical language of thought can explain the systematicity of cognition (Microcognition, 1989). A. Clark, Microcognition (1989); Associative Engines (1993); J. Fodor & Z. Pylyshyn, “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture”, Cognition 28 (1988)

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Andy Clark › ur. 1957

Krytykuje 3

  • Karol Darwin

    krytykuje

    With Piattelli-Palmarini, Fodor argued that natural selection cannot distinguish traits selected for from coextensive ‘free riders’ and so does not explain adaptation (What Darwin Got Wrong, 2010). J. Fodor & M. Piattelli-Palmarini, What Darwin Got Wrong (2010), part II

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Karol Darwin › 1809–1882

  • Ludwig Wittgenstein

    krytykuje

    With Chihara, Fodor attacked Wittgensteinian criteria for mental concepts (1965) and later argued that learning a language presupposes an innate language of thought (The Language of Thought, 1975). C. Chihara & J. Fodor, “Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein”, American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965); J. Fodor, The Language of Thought (1975), ch. 2

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951

  • Gilbert Ryle

    krytykuje

    Against Ryle’s logical behaviourism Fodor argued that psychology must posit inner mental states that cause behaviour, not mere dispositions to behave (Psychological Explanation, 1968). J. Fodor, Psychological Explanation (1968); “The Mind–Body Problem”, Scientific American 244 (1981)

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Gilbert Ryle › 1900–1976

Dzieła

  • 1975Język myśli

    Psychologia poznawcza zakłada wewnętrzny system reprezentacji z własną składnią – „mentalese”, w którym myślenie jest obliczaniem.

  • 1983Modularność umysłu

    Percepcją i językiem zajmują się szybkie, hermetyczne moduły wejściowe; myślenie centralne jest natomiast holistyczne i trudne do wyjaśnienia.

Stanowisko

Fodor was the leading defender of the computational theory of mind. Against behaviourism, in Psychological Explanation (1968), and against Wittgensteinian views of mental concepts, in a 1965 paper with Charles Chihara, he argued that psychology must postulate inner mental states that cause behaviour. The Language of Thought (1975) claimed that these states are representations in an inner language with its own syntax and semantics – “mentalese” – and that thinking is the computation of such symbols. Only this, he argued, explains why thought is productive and systematic: whoever can think that John loves Mary can also think that Mary loves John. With Zenon Pylyshyn he used this argument in 1988 against connectionist models of the mind. The Modularity of Mind (1983) distinguished fast, encapsulated input systems for perception and language from central processes such as belief fixation, which are holistic and, he thought, beyond the reach of current cognitive science. He also held that most lexical concepts are innate and criticised semantic holism. His late book What Darwin Got Wrong (2010, with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini) argued that natural selection cannot explain why particular traits were selected; most biologists rejected it.

Życie i kontekst

Jerry Fodor was born in New York City in 1935. He studied at Columbia University and took his doctorate at Princeton in 1960 under Hilary Putnam. From 1959 to 1986 he taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he worked closely with linguists and psychologists in the circle around Noam Chomsky. After two years at the City University of New York he moved in 1988 to Rutgers University, where he remained until his retirement in 2016. He wrote many essays and reviews for the London Review of Books. He died in New York in 2017.

Dalsze główne dzieła

  • Psychological Explanation (1968)
  • The Language of Thought (1975)
  • The Modularity of Mind (1983)
  • Psychosemantics (1987)
  • Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (1998)
  • The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way (2000)
  • What Darwin Got Wrong (with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010)

Źródła: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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