Alice Crary
Właściwe widzenie świata jest już osiągnięciem moralnym, a życie zwierząt niesie znaczenie, którego nie dostrzeże zdystansowana, rachująca etyka.
Umiejscowienie
Filozofka moralności w duchu Wittgensteina z New School: właściwe widzenie świata jest już pracą moralną, zwierzęta są „wewnątrz etyki” – a rachunki efektywnego altruizmu pomijają niesprawiedliwość strukturalną.
Kluczowe idee
- Percepcja moralna i „szersza” obiektywność
- Zwierzęta wewnątrz etyki
- Krytyka efektywnego altruizmu
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 4
Ludwig Wittgenstein
pod wpływem
Crary co-edited The New Wittgenstein (2000) and drew on Wittgenstein to argue that moral thought pervades our concepts, not only explicit judgements (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary and R. Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein (2000); A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007)
Źródło: szkic AI
Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951
Theodor Adorno
pod wpływem
Crary joined Wittgenstein’s later thought with Frankfurt School critical theory, defending a ‘wide’ conception of rationality on which social critique can be objective (‘Wittgenstein Goes to Frankfurt’, 2018). A. Crary, “Wittgenstein Goes to Frankfurt (and Finds Something Useful to Say)”, Nordic Wittgenstein Review 7 (2018); Inside Ethics (2016)
Źródło: szkic AI
Theodor Adorno › 1903–1969
Iris Murdoch
pod wpływem
Crary followed Murdoch in holding that moral work lies in learning to see situations justly, so that the world, rightly perceived, has moral features (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007); I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (1970)
Źródło: szkic AI
Iris Murdoch › 1919–1999
Hilary Putnam
pod wpływem
Crary, whose Harvard undergraduate thesis Putnam supervised, shared his rejection of the fact–value dichotomy, arguing that moral concepts reveal real features of the world (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007); H. Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (2002)
Źródło: szkic AI
Hilary Putnam › 1926–2016
Krytyka
Krytykuje 1
Peter Singer
krytykuje
Crary objected that Singer ranks beings by individual capacities, a ‘moral individualism’ that does justice neither to animals nor to people with severe cognitive disabilities (Inside Ethics, 2016). A. Crary, Inside Ethics: On the Demands of Moral Thought (2016)
Źródło: szkic AI
Peter Singer › ur. 1946
Dzieła
Zwierzęta i ludzie są „wewnątrz etyki”: ich status moralny ujawnia się w rozumieniu ich życia, które już jest moralne, a nie w neutralnej liście zdolności.
Stanowisko
Crary rejects the widespread view that moral thinking consists in applying principles to morally neutral facts. Following Wittgenstein, Iris Murdoch and Cora Diamond, she argues in “Beyond Moral Judgment” and “Inside Ethics” that the world, rightly perceived, already contains morally significant features: learning to see a situation justly, with the right concepts and sensibilities, is itself moral work, and emotions can be ways of knowing. Applied to animals, this means that what animals are and what we owe them cannot be read off neutral lists of capacities. Animals are “inside ethics” – beings whose lives have a meaning that an attentive observer can perceive – and the same holds for human beings with severe cognitive disabilities, whom capacity-based arguments tend to degrade. “Animal Crisis”, written with Lori Gruen, links the treatment of animals with racism, colonialism and environmental destruction. She is also one of the most prominent critics of effective altruism: in essays and in a volume co-edited with Carol J. Adams and Gruen she argues that its quantifying approach overlooks structural injustice and the knowledge of affected communities, and that longtermism diverts attention from present harms.
Życie i kontekst
Alice Crary (born 1967) studied philosophy at Harvard, where Hilary Putnam supervised her undergraduate thesis on Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell was among her teachers, and took her doctorate at the University of Pittsburgh in 1999 under John McDowell. She has taught at the New School for Social Research in New York since 2000, chaired its philosophy department and is now Walter A. Eberstadt University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy; in 2018–19 she held a professorship at Regent’s Park College, Oxford. Her work connects Wittgensteinian moral philosophy with feminism, animal ethics, disability studies and critical theory.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- The New Wittgenstein (ed. with Rupert Read, 2000)
- Beyond Moral Judgment (2007)
- Animal Crisis (with Lori Gruen, 2022)
- The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does (ed. with Carol J. Adams and Lori Gruen, 2023)
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